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INTRODUCTION 
On May 24, 2006, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FISC) approved an FBI application for an order, pursuant to 50 
U.S.C. § 1861, requiring Verizon to turn over all telephony 
metadata to the National Security Agency.1 The Court subse-
quently approved similar applications for all major U.S. tele-
communication service providers. Over the next seven years, 
FISC issued orders renewing the bulk collection program thir-
ty-four times.2 Almost all of the information obtained related to 
																																																																																																																						
 1. In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring 
the Prod. of Tangible Things from [Telecommunications Providers] Relating to 
[REDACTED], Order, No. BR 0605 (FISA Ct. May 24, 2006), available at 
https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/docket_06-
05_1dec201_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf, [http://perma.cc/MT9D-4W2Y] (released by 
court order as part of the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA) litigation). Note that the specific telecommunications compa-
nies from which such records were sought were redacted, as well as the remain-
ing title; the government, however, also released an NSA report that provided 
more detail on the title of the Order. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., NAT’L SEC. 
AGENCY, ST-06-0018, ASSESSMENT OF MANAGEMENT CONTROLS FOR IMPLEMENT-
ING THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT ORDER: TELEPHONY BUSI-
NESS RECORDS, available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb% 
2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf, [http://perma.cc/YXA7-PTT4] 
(see page 94 of 1846 and 1862 Production). For purposes of a more precise citation, 
I draw from both sources. 
 2. ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER: BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADA-
TA UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 2 (Aug. 9, 2013), available at 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/750211-administration-white-
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the activities of law-abiding persons who were not the subjects 
of any investigation.3 
This program remained secret until mid-2013, when a combina-
tion of leaks by Edward Snowden, a former National Security 
Agency (NSA) employee, and Freedom of Information Act litiga-
tion launched by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, forced key 
documents into the public domain.4 In response, the Obama Ad-
ministration issued statements, fact sheets, redacted FISC opin-
ions, and even a White Paper, acknowledging the existence of the 
program and arguing that it is both legal and constitutional.5 
According to these documents, the purpose of the telephony 
metadata program is to collect information related to counter-
terrorism efforts and foreign intelligence.6 These data include 
all communications routing information, including (but not 
limited to) session identifying information (for example, origi-
nating and terminating telephone number, identity of the 
communications device, etc.), trunk identifier, and time and 
duration of the call.7 The metadata collected as part of this pro-
gram does not include the substantive content of communica-
																																																																																																																						
paper-section-215.html, [http://perma.cc/V7VM-5MAU] [hereinafter SECTION 
215 WHITE PAPER]. 
 3. In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13, at 12 (FISA 
Ct. Mar. 2, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_ 
March%202%202009%20Order%20from%20FISC.pdf, [http://perma.cc/5LYL-RKAZ]. 
 4. Electronic Frontier Found. v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 4:11-cv-05221-YGR, at 2, 
¶ 1(b) (N.D. Cal. Jul. 19, 2013) (order responding to the request for records related to 
Section 215, i.e., orders and opinions of the FISC issued from January 1, 2004 to June 
6, 2011, containing a significant legal interpretation of the government’s authority or 
use of its authority under Section 215; and responsive “significant documents, pro-
cedures, or legal analyses incorporated into FISC opinions or orders and treated as 
binding by the Department of Justice or the National Security Agency”). 
 5. See, e.g., In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order 
Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [Telecommunications Providers] 
Relating to [REDACTED], Order, No. BR 0605 (FISA Ct. May 24, 2006), available at 
https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/docket_06-
05_1dec201_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf, [http://perma.cc/MT9D-4W2Y] (released by 
court order as part of the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA) litigation); SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 2. 
 6. See, e.g., SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 3 (“The Government can-
not conduct substantive queries of the bulk records for any purpose other than 
counterterrorism.”); id. at 4 (“Query results can be further analyzed only for valid 
foreign intelligence purposes.”). 
 7. Id. at 3. 
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tions, nor does it include subscribers’ names, addresses, or fi-
nancial information.8 
Although many of the details about the telephony metadata 
program remain classified, from what has been made public by 
the government, it appears that the NSA takes all information 
obtained and feeds it into a bulk data set, which is then queried 
with an “identifier,” referred to as a “seed.”9 The NSA uses both 
international and domestic identifiers.10 FISC requires that the 
NSA establish a “reasonable, articulable suspicion” that a seed 
identifier used to query the data is linked to a foreign terrorist 
organization before running it against the bulk data. Once ob-
tained, information responsive to the query can be further mined 
for information. The NSA can analyze the data to ascertain sec-
ond- and third-tier contacts, in steps known as “hops.”11 
																																																																																																																						
 8. Content is defined consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2006). But note that the 
same arguments brought by the government in support of the telephony metada-
ta program would support building similar databases of subscribers’ and custom-
ers’ financial records. See SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 3. In addition, 
the Section 215 White Paper is careful to note that the government does not collect 
cell phone locational information “pursuant to these orders.” Id. However, the 
same arguments that support the telephony metadata program would support the 
collection of precisely this information under other FISC orders. 
 9. SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 3. Note that although the White Pa-
per uses telephone numbers as an example of an identifier, it is conceivable that 
various other identifiers may be used. In a recently-released memorandum, for in-
stance, the government refers to “bins” or “zip codes,” suggesting that the types of 
queries can be significantly broad. See Memorandum of the United States in Re-
sponse to the Court’s Order Dated Jan. 28, 2009 at 9, In re Prod. of Tangible Things 
from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorand
um%20of%20US.pdf, [http://perma.cc/9EYZ-D597]. The Guardian, in turn, reports 
that the term “identifiers” includes information such as names, telephone numbers, 
e-mail addresses, IP addresses, and usernames. See James Ball & Spencer Ackerman, 
NSA loophole allows warrantless search for U.S. Citizens’ emails and phone calls, THE 
GUARDIAN, Aug. 9, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-
loophole-warrantless-searches-email-calls, [http://perma.cc/UVP5-TCJJ] (containing 
screen shot of classified document). 
 10. Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated 
Jan. 28, 2009 at 8, 10, In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 
08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/ 
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf, 
[http://perma.cc/9EYZ-D597]. 
 11. SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 3–4 (“The first ‘hop’ refers to the set 
of numbers directly in contact with the seed identifier. The second ‘hop’ refers to the 
set of numbers found to be in direct contact with the first ‘hop’ numbers, and the 
third ‘hop’ refers to the set of numbers found to be in direct contact with the second 
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As a practical matter, the NSA interprets the primary order as 
authorizing the agency to retrieve information as many as three 
tiers away from the initial identifier.12 The government refers to 
this process as “automated chaining.”13 These results can then be 
further queried for “foreign intelligence purposes.”14 In some 
cases, this information can then be forwarded to the FBI for fur-
ther investigation, including using the information for an appli-
cation for an electronic intercept order under Title I of the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act.15 On at least three occasions, 
the government has obtained authorization to expand the tele-
phone identifiers that the NSA could query.16 
																																																																																																																						
‘hop’ numbers.”). Initially, neither FISC nor the NSA limited the number of ‘hops’ 
that could be undertaken. In March 2009, the government implemented software 
changes to its system to limit the number of hops permitted to three. Memorandum 
of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated Jan. 28, 2009 at 20, In re 
Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), 
available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009% 
20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf, [http://perma.cc/9EYZ-D597]. In January 2014 
the President announced that henceforward the number of hops would be limited to 
two. Transcript of President Obama’s Jan. 17 speech on NSA reforms, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 
2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-of-president-obamas-jan-17-
speech-on-nsa-reforms/2014/01/17/fa33590a-7f8c-11e3-9556-4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html, 
[http://perma.cc/CF5-TVP5] (“Effective immediately, we will only pursue phone 
calls that are two steps removed from a number associated with a terrorist organiza-
tion, instead of the current three.”). Notably, these changes are not statutory; nor are 
there statutory provisions requiring that the number of hops, should it be changed, 
be made public. 
 12. SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 4. 
 13. Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated 
Jan. 28, 2009 at 10, In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-
13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/ 
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf, 
[http://perma.cc/9EYZ-D597]. But see Transcript of President Obama’s Jan. 17 speech 
on NSA reforms, supra note 11 (suggesting that in the future NSA surveillance will 
be limited to two hops). 
 14. SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 4. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See generally Memorandum of the United States In Response to the Court’s 
Order Dated Jan. 28, 2009 at 4 n.3, In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACT-
ED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/ 
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf, 
[http://perma.cc/9EYZ-D597] (“Authorizations after this matter was initiated in 
May 2006 expanded the telephone identifiers that NSA could query to those iden-
tifiers associated with [REDACTED] see generally docket number BR 06-05 (motion 
to amend granted in August 2006) . . . docket number BR 07-10 (motion to amend 
granted in June 2007). The Court’s authorization in docket number BR 08-13 ap-
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Since the advent of the program FISC has acknowledged 
“that the vast majority of the call-detail records provided are 
expected to concern communications that are (i) between the 
United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United 
States, including local telephone calls.”17 The rationale behind 
collecting this information is that: 
International terrorist organizations and their agents use the 
international telephone system to communicate with one 
another between numerous countries all over the world, in-
cluding to and from the United States. In addition, when 
they are located inside the United States, terrorist operatives 
make domestic U.S. telephone calls. The most analytically 
significant terrorist-related communications are those with 
one end in the United States or those that are purely domes-
tic, because those communications are particularly likely to 
identify suspects in the United States—whose activities may 
include planning attacks against the homeland.18 
The program is thus designed to obtain foreign intelligence and 
to protect against international terrorist threats both in the 
United States and overseas. Under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA), which governs the program, the data 
obtained is understood as “presumptively relevant to an au-
thorized investigation” where the government can establish 
that the information pertains to (a) a foreign power or an agent 
of a foreign power, (b) the activities of a suspected agent of a 
foreign power who is the subject of such authorized investiga-
tion, or (c) an individual in contact with, or known to, a sus-
pected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of an au-
thorized investigation.19 
However important the purpose, the National Security 
Agency’s bulk collection of telephony metadata embodies pre-
cisely what Congress sought to avoid by enacting the 1978 For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act in the first place. In so doing, 
the program violates the spirit, as well as the letter, of the law. 
It also gives rise to troubling constitutional concerns. 
																																																																																																																						
proved querying related to [REDACTED] Primary Order, docket number BR 08-
13, at 8.”). 
 17. Id. at 2 n.1. 
 18. SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 3. 
 19. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iii) (2006). 
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Part I of this Article begins by pointing out that the reason 
Congress introduced FISA was to make use of new technolo-
gies and to enable the intelligence community to obtain infor-
mation vital to U.S. national security, while preventing the 
NSA and other federal intelligence-gathering entities from en-
gaging in broad domestic surveillance. The legislature sought 
to prevent a recurrence of the abuses of the 1960s and 1970s 
that accompanied both the Cold War and the rapid expansion 
of communications technologies. 
Congress accordingly circumscribed the NSA’s authorities 
by limiting them to foreign intelligence gathering. It required 
that the target be a foreign power or an agent thereof, insisted 
that such claims be supported by probable cause, and height-
ened the protections afforded to the domestic collection of U.S. 
citizens’ information. Initially focused on electronic surveil-
lance, FISA expanded over time to incorporate physical search-
es, pen registers and trap and trace, and searches of business 
records and tangible goods. The NSA program reflects neither 
the particularization required by Congress prior to acquisition 
of information, nor the role Congress anticipated for FISC and 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR). 
The bulk collection program, moreover, as pointed out in 
Part II of this Article, violates the statutory language in three 
important ways: (1) it fails to satisfy the requirement that rec-
ords sought be “relevant to an authorized investigation;” (2) it 
fails to satisfy the statutory provision that requires that infor-
mation sought also could be obtained via subpoena duces te-
cum; and (3) it bypasses the statutory framing for pen registers 
and trap and trace devices. 
Part III of this Article suggests that the bulk collection of U.S. 
citizens’ metadata also gives rise to serious constitutional con-
cerns. Efforts by the government to save the program on 
grounds of third party doctrine are unpersuasive in light of the 
unique circumstances of Smith v. Maryland and the significant 
privacy invasions resulting from the universal use of pen regis-
ters and trap and trace devices, the evolution of social norms, 
and the advent of new technologies. In addition, the role of 
compulsion with regard to the FISC orders (in contrast to the 
consent of the telephone company in 1979) implicates the 
Fourth Amendment. 
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Further examining the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, Part 
III goes on to note that over the past decade, tension has 
emerged between the view that new technologies should be 
considered from the perspective of trespass doctrine and the 
view that Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test should 
apply. Cases involving, for instance, GPS chips, thermal scan-
ners, and highly-trained dogs divide along these lines. Regard-
less of which approach one adopts, however, similar results 
mark the application of these doctrines to the telephony 
metadata program. 
Under trespass doctrine, the primary order for the program 
amounts to a general warrant—the elimination of which was 
the aim of the Fourth Amendment. In light of social norms, it is 
also a digital trespass on individuals’ private spheres. 
Under Katz, in turn, Americans do not expect that their te-
lephony metadata will be collected and analyzed.20 Most Amer-
icans do not even realize what can be learned from such data, 
making invalid any claim that they reasonably expect the gov-
ernment to have access to such information. The courts also 
have begun to recognize, in a variety of contexts, the greater 
incursions into privacy represented by new technologies. 
A variant of the government’s argument suggests that the 
mere acquisition of data, absent human intervention, cannot 
constitute a search. There are multiple problems with this ap-
proach, not least of which are that the Supreme Court has 
never carved out an automation exception; that privacy inter-
ests are determined from the perspective of the individual, 
not the government; and that the decision to collect the in-
formation is replete with human interaction. Citations to the 
usefulness of such information fail to extract the program 
from a constitutional abyss. 
Part IV concludes by calling for an end to the telephony 
metadata program and the implementation of FISA reforms to 
enable the government to take advantage of new technologies, 
to empower the intelligence agencies to respond to national 
security threats, and to bring surveillance operations within the 
bounds of statutory and constitutional law. Inserting adversar-
																																																																																																																						
 20. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(finding that the Fourth Amendment protects reasonable expectations of privacy). 
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ial counsel into the FISA process, creating a repository of tech-
nological expertise for FISC and FISCR, restoring prior target-
ing, heightening protections for U.S. persons, further delimit-
ing relevant data, narrowing the definition of “foreign 
intelligence” to exclude “foreign affairs,” and requiring the 
government to demonstrate past effectiveness prior to obtain-
ing renewal orders offer some possibilities for the future of for-
eign intelligence gathering in the United States. 
I. BULK COLLECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF FISA’S  
GENERAL APPROACH 
In the early 1970s, a series of news stories broke detailing the 
existence of covert domestic surveillance programs directed at 
U.S. citizens. These revelations led, inter alia, to the creation of 
the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Opera-
tions with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Chaired by Senator 
Frank Church, the Committee uncovered a range of disconcert-
ing domestic surveillance operations—including some con-
ducted by the NSA—prompting Congress to pass the FISA. 
In this legislation, Congress purposefully circumscribed in-
telligence agencies’ authorities by adopting four key protec-
tions.21 First, any information obtained from an electronic inter-
cept had to be tied to a specific person or entity, identified as a 
foreign power or an agent thereof, prior to the collection of the 
information. 22  Second, the government had to demonstrate 
probable cause that the target, about whom information was to 
be collected, was a foreign power or an agent thereof.23 For U.S. 
persons, probable cause could not be established solely on the 
basis of otherwise protected First Amendment activities, thus 
providing U.S. citizens with a higher level of protection. 24 
Third, Congress adopted minimization procedures to restrict 
the types of information that could be obtained and retained.25 
Fourth, FISA made provision for the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
																																																																																																																						
 21. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811 (1978). 
 22. Id. § 1802(a). 
 23. Id. § 1804(a). 
 24. Id. § 1805(a)(2). 
 25. See id. § 1801(h). 
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veillance Court to oversee the process.26 Designed to introduce 
a neutral, disinterested magistrate into the equation, FISC’s role 
was, narrowly, to ascertain whether the government had met 
the appropriate requirements for targeting prior to the acquisi-
tion of information. All of these limits dealt, specifically, with 
electronic communications. Over time, the statute expanded to 
apply a similar approach to physical searches, the placement of 
pen registers and trap and trace, and business records—as well 
as tangible goods. 
The telephony metadata program runs contrary to the gen-
eral approach Congress adopted in FISA both with regard to 
the particularization otherwise required and the role Congress 
envisioned for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and 
the Court of Review. 
A. Prior Domestic Surveillance 
One of the first public indications that the executive branch 
was engaging in broad domestic intelligence gathering came 
in January 1970. Writing in the Washington Monthly, Christo-
pher Pyle charged that the Army was engaged in the surveil-
lance of U.S. citizens.27 The following year, an organization 
calling itself the Citizens’ Commission to Investigate the FBI 
broke into a two-person FBI office in Media, Pennsylvania, 
stealing 1000 classified documents, all of which WIN Magazine 
subsequently published.28 A code word on these documents, 
“COINTELPRO” (for “counterintelligence program”), 
prompted Carl Stern, a reporter for NBC, to initiate a Free-
dom of Information Act lawsuit.29 On December 6, 1973, Stern 
																																																																																																																						
 26. See id. § 1803. 
 27. Christopher H. Pyle, CONUS Intelligence: The Army Watches Civilian Politics, 
WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 1, 1970, reprinted in 91 CONG. REC. 2227–2231 (1970). 
 28. The Complete Collection of Political Documents Ripped-off from the FBI Office in 
Media, PA, March 8, 1971, WIN MAG., Mar. 1972. Note that the original FBI files 
are now located at the Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore College, 
Swarthmore, Pennsylvania. 
 29. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOV’T OPERATIONS, S. REP. NO. 94-755, SUPPLE-
MENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS 
OF AMERICANS: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMEN-
TAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 3 (1976) (citing Letter 
From FBI Headquarters to All SACs (Apr. 28, 1971), available at 
http://archive.org/stream/finalreportofsel03unit#page/n3/mode/2up, 
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filed a story that ran on NBC Nightly News, detailing exten-
sive domestic surveillance and disruption undertaken by the 
FBI for national security purposes.30 
In 1974, Seymour M. Hersh, an investigative reporter, pub-
lished a detailed report in the New York Times catapulting the 
conversation forward. Hersh reported that during the Nixon 
Administration the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had con-
ducted a massive intelligence operation “against the antiwar 
movement and other dissident groups in the United States.”31 
A special unit that reported directly to the Director of Central 
Intelligence had maintained intelligence files on more than 
10,000 Americans, including members of Congress.32 The CIA 
had also engaged in dozens of other illegal operations since the 
1950s, such as “break-ins, wiretapping, and the surreptitious 
inspection of mail.”33 One official reported that the requirement 
to keep files on U.S. citizens stemmed, in part, from the so-
called Huston plan.34 Agency officials claimed at the time that, 
although directed at U.S. citizens, everything they had done 
had been under the auspices of foreign intelligence gathering.35 
These new revelations came as quite a surprise, not least be-
cause the 1947 National Security Act forbade the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency from having any “police, subpoe-
na, law-enforcement powers or internal-security functions.”36 
The report, moreover, came on the heels of a Senate Armed 
Services Committee report condemning the Pentagon for spy-
ing on the White House National Security Council. 
																																																																																																																						
[http://perma.cc/PP98-82PB]; Memorandum from C.D. Brennan to W.C. Sullivan 
(Apr. 27, 1971). 
 30. See Michael Isikoff, NBC reporter recounts breaking FBI spying story, NBC 
NEWS, Jan. 8, 2014, http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/08/22220561-
nbc-reporter-recounts-breaking-fbi-story?lite, [http://perma.cc/FD5B-3R8K]. 
 31. Seymour M. Hersh, Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar 
Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1974, at 1. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 26. Named for Tom Charles Huston, the Presidential aide who con-
ceived the project, the plan called for the use of burglaries and wiretapping to 
counter antiwar activities and student turmoil ostensibly “fomented” by black 
extremists. President Nixon and senior officials claimed that it had never been 
implemented. 
 35. Id. 
 36. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 253, § 102(d)(3), 61 Stat. 495, 498 (1947). 
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These public allegations, related to intelligence agencies’ im-
propriety, illegal activities, and abuses of authority, prompted 
both Houses of Congress to create temporary committees to 
investigate the accusations: the House Select Committee on In-
telligence, and the Senate Select Committee to Study Govern-
mental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.37 
The latter, Chaired by Senator Frank F. Church (D-ID), with 
the assistance of Senator John G. Tower (R-TX) as Vice Chair-
man, was a carefully-constructed, bipartisan initiative. Its mem-
bership included eleven Senators, six drawn from the majority 
party and five from the minority party.38 The Republican leader-
ship in the Senate chose legislators representing a range of views 
within their party, as did the Democratic leadership.39 Further 
thought was given to diversity of experience, incorporating both 
senior members of the Senate as well as some of the most junior 
members—including one Senator who had only begun his ser-
vice a few weeks prior to the formation of the committee.40 The 
Senate overwhelmingly supported the establishment of the Se-
lect Committee, endorsing its creation by a vote of 82-4.41 
The Senate directed the committee to do two things: first, to 
investigate “illegal, improper, or unethical activities” in which 
the intelligence agencies engaged; and, second, to determine 
the “need for specific legislative authority to govern” the NSA 
and other agencies.42 The Church Committee subsequently took 
testimony from hundreds of people, inside and outside of gov-
ernment, in public and private hearings. The NSA, FBI, CIA, 
Internal Revenue Service, Post Office, and other federal agen-
cies submitted documents. In 1975 and 1976 the Committee is-
																																																																																																																						
 37. H.R. Res. 138, 94th Cong. (1975), replaced and expanded by H.R. Res. 591, 94th 
Cong. (1975); S. Res. 21, 94th Cong. (1975). 
 38. Intelligence Activities: Hearing on S. Res. 21 Before the Select Comm. to Study 
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States, 
94th Cong. ii (1975) [hereinafter Church Committee Report]. 
 39. Interviews with Senator Walter Mondale and Senator Gary Hart, in Wash-
ington, D.C. (Sept. 23, 2013). 
 40. Id. 
 41. S. Res. 21, 94th Cong., 121 CONG. REC. 1416–34 (1975). 
 42. Id. 
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sued seven reports and six supplemental volumes, classifying 
another sixty reports for future release.43 
The committee found that broad domestic surveillance pro-
grams, conducted under the guise of foreign intelligence collec-
tion, had undermined the privacy rights of U.S. citizens.44 The 
NSA figured largely in these concerns. 
1. NSA Programs 
Although the NSA maintained a definition of foreign intelli-
gence that focused on threats external to the United States, a 
key contributor to the agency’s decision to intercept Ameri-
cans’ communications was the question of whether the defini-
tion of foreign communications prevented the acquisition, or 
merely the analysis, of information not related to foreign intel-
ligence. The NSA adopted—and the Church Committee reject-
ed—the latter approach. 
In October 1952, President Truman issued a classified memo 
that laid out the future of U.S. signals intelligence and created 
the NSA.45 Truman’s aims were to (a) strengthen U.S. signals 
intelligence capabilities, (b) support the country’s ability to wage 
war, and (c) generate information central to the conduct of for-
eign affairs.46 The NSA’s mission, accordingly, was to obtain for-
eign intelligence from foreign electronic communications.47 
																																																																																																																						
 43. Interview with Senator Gary Hart, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 24, 2013). 
Since 1992, another 50,000 pages of the records have been declassified and made 
publicly available at the National Archives. Rockefeller Commission Report, HISTORY 
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declassified_docs.shtml, [http://perma.cc/SR2A-TCGK]. 
 44. See supra note 38. 
 45. 5 Church Committee Report, supra note 38, at 6 (citing Memorandum from 
President Harry Truman (Oct. 29, 1952)). 
 46. 5 Church Committee Report, supra note 38. For an informative discussion of 
MI-8 and the NSA’s predecessor agencies, see House Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 
Interception of International Telecommunications by the National Security Agen-
cy 1–12 (Draft Report), available at http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/ 
viewer/showDoc.do?docId=145022&relPageId=14, [http://perma.cc/3LK5-CDWR]. 
 47. 5 Church Committee Report, supra note 38, at 6 (statement of Lieutenant Gen-
eral Lew Allen, Jr., Director, National Security Agency). 
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From the beginning, the agency understood foreign intelli-
gence to involve the interception of communications wholly or 
partly outside the United States and not targeted at U.S. per-
sons. Neither the Presidential directive of 1952, nor the Nation-
al Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 6, which 
authorized the CIA to engage in Foreign Wireless and Radio 
Monitoring, defined the term “foreign communications.”48 
NSCID No. 9, however, titled “Communications Intelli-
gence,” defined “foreign communications” as “all telecommu-
nications and related materials . . . of the government and/or 
their nationals or of any military, air, or naval force, faction, 
party, department, agency, or bureau of a foreign country, or of 
any person or persons acting or purporting to act therefor.” It 
included “all other telecommunications and related material of, 
to, and from a foreign country which may contain information 
of military, political, scientific or economic value.”49 “Foreign 
communications” thus turned upon the nature of the entity en-
gaged in communications: a foreign power, or an individual 
acting on behalf of a foreign power. 
The NSA did not (indeed, could not) discuss NSCID No. 9 
during the Church Committee’s public hearings. The Director 
of Central Intelligence, however, had issued a directive that the 
NSA did discuss, which employed a definition of foreign 
communications that excluded communications between U.S. 
citizens or entities.50 In keeping with these understandings, the 
NSA ostensibly focused on communications conducted wholly 
or partly outside the United States and not targeted at U.S. per-
sons. The distinction was drawn, however, at the point of anal-
ysis—not the point of interception. 
Testifying in 1975, NSA Director Lieutenant General Lew Al-
len, Jr. could thus assert that the NSA did not at that time, nor 
had it (with one exception—individuals whose names were 
																																																																																																																						
 48. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 6 (Dec. 12, 1947) (National 
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, 
Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, Dulles-Jackson-Correa 
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 49. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9 (Mar. 10, 1950) (on file 
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ment of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 66 D 195). 
 50. 5 Church Committee Report, supra note 38, at 9. 
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contained on the NSA’s watch list) “conducted intercept opera-
tions for the purpose of obtaining the communications of U.S. 
citizens.” 51  Whether such communications were incidentally 
intercepted, however, was another matter. As Lieutenant Gen-
eral Allen recognized, “[S]ome circuits which are known to car-
ry foreign communications necessary for foreign intelligence 
will also carry personal communications between U.S. citizens, 
one of whom is at a foreign location.”52 
Central to Allen’s assertion was the understanding that, to 
constitute foreign communications, and to legitimate the col-
lection of information on U.S. citizens, the target of the sur-
veillance must be a foreign power, or an agent of a foreign 
power, and at least one party to each communication must be 
outside the country. 
The Senate considered this approach, in light of the broad 
swathes of information obtained about U.S. citizens, to run afoul 
of the Fourth Amendment. Two NSA programs in particular 
generated significant concern. The first, Project MINARET, in-
troduced to collect foreign intelligence information, ended up 
intercepting hundreds of U.S. citizens’ communications. The 
second, Operation SHAMROCK, involved the large-scale collec-
tion of U.S. citizens’ communications from private companies. 
a. Project MINARET 
In the late 1960s, the NSA, like the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS), the FBI, and the CIA, constructed a list of U.S. citizens 
and non-U.S. citizens subject to surveillance.53 The program, 
which operated from 1967 to 1973 started out by narrowly fo-
cusing on the international communications of U.S. citizens 
traveling to Cuba. It quickly expanded, however, to include 
individuals (a) involved in civil disturbances, (b) suspected of 
criminal activity, (c) implicated in drug activity, (d) of concern 
to those tasked with Presidential protection, and (e) suspected 
of involvement in international terrorism.54 
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In 1969 the collection of information on individuals included 
on the watch list became known as Project MINARET.55 When 
details about the program emerged, senators and members of 
the public expressed alarm about the privacy implications. 
Central to the legislators’ concern was the potential for such 
programs to target communications of a wholly domestic na-
ture. Senator (later Vice President) Walter Mondale articulated 
the Committee’s disquiet: 
Given another day and another President, another perceived 
risk and someone breathing hot down the neck of the mili-
tary leader then in charge of the NSA: demanding a review 
based on another watch list, another wide sweep to deter-
mine whether some of the domestic dissent is really foreign 
based, my concern is whether that pressure could be resisted 
on the basis of the law or not . . . . [W]hat we have to deal 
with is whether this incredibly powerful and impressive in-
stitution . . . could be used by President ‘A’ in the future to 
spy upon the American people . . . . [W]e need to . . . very 
carefully define the law, spell it out so that it is clear what 
[the Director of the NSA’s] authority is and . . . is not.56 
Senator Mondale asked Allen whether he would object to a 
new law clarifying that the NSA did not have the authority to 
collect domestic information on U.S. citizens. Allen indicated 
that he did not object.57 FISA subsequently became the instru-
ment designed to limit the NSA’s collection of information on 
U.S. citizens. 
b. Operation SHAMROCK 
During the Senate hearings, much concern was expressed 
about whether to make public a second, highly classified, large-
scale surveillance program run by the NSA.58 The committee 
decided to discuss the program in open session on the grounds 
that it was both illegal and violated the Fourth Amendment.59 
																																																																																																																						
 55. Id. at 30. 
 56. Id. at 36. 
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46, at 2–6 (discussing pressures on the Church Committee from the House side). 
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Operation SHAMROCK was the cover name given to a pro-
gram in which the government had convinced three major tel-
egraph companies (RCA Global, ITT World Communications, 
and Western Union International) to forward international tel-
egraphic traffic to the Department of Defense.60 For nearly thir-
ty years, the NSA and its predecessors received copies of most 
international telegrams that had originated in, or been for-
warded through, the United States.61 
Operation SHAMROCK stemmed from wartime measures, 
in which companies turned messages related to foreign intelli-
gence targets over to military intelligence. In 1947, the Depart-
ment of Defense negotiated the continuation of the program in 
return for protecting the companies from criminal liability and 
public exposure.62 
Like Project MINARET, the scope of the program gradually 
expanded. Initially, the program focused on foreign targets. 
Eventually, however, as new technologies became available, 
the NSA began extracting U.S. citizens’ communications.63 It 
selected approximately 150,000 messages per month for further 
analysis, distributing some messages to other agencies.64 
Senators expressed strong concern at the resulting privacy 
violations, inviting the Attorney General before the Select 
Committee to discuss “the fourth amendment of the Constitu-
tion and its application to 20th century problems of intelligence 
and surveillance.”65 Senator Frank Church explained: 
In the case of the NSA, which is of particular concern to us 
today, the rapid development of technology in the area of 
electronic surveillance has seriously aggravated present am-
biguities in the law. The broad sweep of communications in-
terception by NSA takes us far beyond the previous fourth 
amendment controversies where particular individuals and 
specific telephone lines were the target.66 
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Lieutenant General Allen sought to reassure the committee that 
although some circuits carried personal communications, the in-
terception was “conducted in such a manner as to minimize the 
unwanted messages.”67 Nevertheless, the agency could have ob-
tained many unwanted communications, and thus undertook 
procedures to process, sort, and analyze the relevant data. “The 
analysis and reporting is accomplished only for those messages 
which meet specified conditions and requirements for foreign in-
telligence.”68 Elaborating further, Allen noted, “[t]he use of lists of 
words, including individual names, subjects, locations, etc., has 
long been one of the methods used to sort out information of for-
eign intelligence value from that which is not of interest.”69 
The question that confronted Congress was how to limit the 
NSA’s ability to acquire broad swathes of information up front, 
in the process obtaining access to private communications of 
individuals with no connection to foreign intelligence concerns. 
Congress would have to find a way to control new, sophisticat-
ed technologies and to allow intelligence agencies to perform 
their legitimate foreign intelligence activities, without also al-
lowing the agencies to invade U.S. citizens’ privacy by allow-
ing them access to information unrelated to national security.70 
In the absence of any governing statute, Attorney General 
Edward H. Levi’s approach had been to authorize the request-
ed surveillance only where a clear nexus existed between the 
target and a foreign power.71 The Attorney General sought to 
distinguish the process from the British Crown’s use of writs of 
assistance, in the shadow of which James Madison had drafted 
the Fourth Amendment.72 The Founders’ objection to such in-
struments was simple: Were the government to be granted the 
																																																																																																																						
 67. Id. at 19. 
 68. Id. Former CIA Director William E. Colby provided similar testimony before 
the Pike Committee on August 6, 1975: “On some occasions, [the interception of 
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authority to break into and search individuals’ homes without 
cause, the private affairs of every person would be subject to 
inspection.73 In contrast, Levi argued, the exercise of electronic 
wiretaps for foreign intelligence gathering fell subject to Attor-
ney General review. Nevertheless, he recognized the need for 
new laws to address the ambiguity that attended the use of 
modern technologies. The senators agreed.74 
2. Broader Context 
The NSA was not the only federal entity making use of new 
technologies to collect significant amounts of information on 
U.S. citizens. The FBI, CIA, IRS, U.S. Army, and other federal 
entities similarly engaged in broad domestic intelligence-
gathering operations. Details relating to many of these pro-
grams, such as the FBI’s COINTELPRO and the CIA’s Operation 
CHAOS, were uncovered by the exhaustive investigations of the 
Senate Select Committee and other entities that looked into the 
range and extent of programs underway.75 Both statutory viola-
tions and constitutional concerns accompanied these inquiries. 
In 1970, for instance, Senator Sam Ervin (D-NC) began inves-
tigating the public allegations. After a year of making minimal 
progress in the face of misleading statements from the Nixon 
Administration, claims of inherent executive power, and a re-
fusal to disclose information that might damage national secu-
rity, Senator Ervin called for public hearings to consider “the 
dangers which the Army’s program presents to the principles 
of the Constitution.”76 
In 1975, President Ford issued an executive order establish-
ing the President’s Commission on CIA Activities Within the 
United States (the “Rockefeller Commission”).77 Ford appoint-
ed Vice President Nelson Rockefeller as chairman.78 The public 
charges to which the Rockefeller Commission responded in-
cluded large-scale domestic surveillance of U.S. citizens, retain-
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ing dossiers on U.S. citizens, and aiming these activities at in-
dividuals who disagreed with government policies. 79  The 
Commission’s aim was further supplemented by allegations 
that the CIA had intercepted and opened personal mail in the 
United States for the past twenty years, infiltrated domestic 
dissident groups and intervened in domestic politics, engaged 
in illegal wiretaps and break-ins, and improperly assisted other 
government agencies.80 
Like the Senate Select Committee, the Rockefeller Commis-
sion faced the key question of how to define the term “foreign 
intelligence”—a crucial step in protecting Americans’ right to 
privacy. Accordingly, in its first recommendation, the Rockefel-
ler Commission advised that Section 403 of the 1947 National 
Security Act be amended to make it explicit that the CIA’s ac-
tivities must be solely related to “foreign intelligence.”81 Any 
involvement of U.S. citizens could only be incidental to foreign 
intelligence collection.82 
The Commission reinforced the strict separation between for-
eign targets and U.S. persons through its second recommenda-
tion: that the President, by executive order, “prohibit the CIA 
from the collection of information about the domestic activities 
of United States citizens (whether by overt or covert means), the 
evaluation, correlation, and dissemination of analyses or reports 
about such activities, and the storage of such information.”83 
The House Select Intelligence Committee, created on Febru-
ary 19, 1975, was replaced five months later by a committee 
headed by Representative Otis Pike (D-NY).84 The Pike Com-
mittee focused on a range of intelligence gathering programs, 
including those of the National Security Agency.85 Public hear-
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ings on the agency’s operations were held in October 1975 and 
February and March 1976.86 Its draft report complained of the 
tension between Congress and the executive branch, noting the 
“intense Executive branch efforts” to have the NSA hearings 
curtailed or postponed—both in the Senate and the House.87 
Like the Church Committee, the Pike Committee expressed 
concern about SHAMROCK and MINARET, noting that the 
former resulted in the NSA maintaining files on approximately 
75,000 U.S. citizens between 1952 and 1974: 
Persons included in these files included civil rights leaders, 
antiwar activists, and Members of Congress. For at least 13 
years, CIA employees were given unrestricted access to 
these files, and one or more worked full time retrieving in-
formation that presumably was contributed to the CIA’s 
domestic intelligence program—Operation CHAOS—which 
existed from 1967 to 1974.88 
For the Pike Committee, these programs violated both Section 
605 of the Communications Act and the Fourth Amendment.89 
The committee expressed particular concern about the NSA’s 
“vacuum cleaner” approach to foreign intelligence gathering.90 
The committee noted that international telephone calls, some 
twenty-four million telegrams and fifty million telex (teletype) 
messages entered, left, and transited the United States each 
year, and millions of additional messages that traveled over 
leased lines—“including millions of computer data transmis-
sions electronically entering and leaving the country”—
presented further potential sources of intelligence.91 
Coming on the heels of the Pentagon Papers, which demon-
strated that the Johnson Administration had systematically lied 
to the public and to Congress; the Watergate scandal, in which 
the Nixon Administration orchestrated a June 1972 break-in at 
the Democratic National Committee headquarters; and Presi-
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dent Nixon’s resignation on August 9, 1974, the revelation of 
these programs deepened the erosion of public confidence in 
the executive branch. More specifically, their findings under-
mined citizens’ confidence in the intelligence agencies.92 Criti-
cal questions facing Congress were how to rebuild confidence 
in the system, how to incorporate new technologies into the 
existing infrastructure, and how to empower the intelligence 
agencies to conduct electronic surveillance, while protecting 
the privacy rights of U.S. citizens. 
A timely judicial decision helped to lay the groundwork for 
congressional action. In 1972 the Supreme Court had held that 
the electronic surveillance of domestic groups, even where se-
curity issues might be involved, required that the government 
first obtain a warrant.93 The “inherent vagueness of the domes-
tic security concept,” and the significant possibility that it could 
be abused to quash political dissent, underscored the im-
portance of the Fourth Amendment—particularly when the 
government was spying on its own citizens.94 
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, emphasized the limits 
of the decision: “[T]his case involves only the domestic aspects 
of national security. We have not addressed, and express no 
opinion as to, the issues which may be involved with respect to 
activities of foreign powers or their agents.”95 Standards and 
procedures for domestic security surveillance might differ from 
those required by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968.96 Congress may wish to consider pass-
ing new laws covering such cases.97 
Four critical changes followed. First, consistent with the 
Church Committee’s recommendations, Congress created a 
permanent Senate Intelligence Committee. Within a month of 
the final report, a resolution to this effect was introduced, and 
on May 19, 1976 it passed by overwhelming majority, 72-22.98 
The new Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) was 
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given exclusive oversight of the CIA and concurrent jurisdic-
tion over the NSA and other elements of the intelligence com-
munity.99 The resolution directed that the intelligence commu-
nity keep the new entity “fully and currently informed” of their 
activities, including all “significant anticipated activities.”100 It 
was to be a “select,” rather than a “standing.” committee, pre-
cisely to allow the Senate majority and minority leaders to de-
cide its composition, and to avoid the same in the party cau-
cuses preceding each new Congress.101 The chair and vice chair 
would not be allowed to serve concurrently as chair or ranking 
minority member of any major standing committee.102 
Of the fifteen members selected, no more than eight would be 
drawn from the majority party, ensuring balance between the 
parties.103 In addition, the Committee’s composition would en-
sure cross-representation of related committees: Two members 
each would be drawn from the Appropriations, Armed Services, 
Foreign Relations, and Judiciary Committees.104 A limit of eight 
years was placed on committee membership, to avoid intelli-
gence agency capture.105 Notably, five of the first fifteen mem-
bers, Walter Huddleston (D-KY), Gary Hart (D-CO), Robert 
Morgan (D-NC), Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), and Howard Baker 
(R-TN), had served as members of the Church Committee. Four-
teen members of SSCI’s staff had served as staff members to the 
same, including William Miller, the staff director for both the 
Church Committee and the newly-minted SSCI.106 
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Second, the President issued an executive order “to improve 
the quality of intelligence needed for national security, to clarify 
the authority and responsibilities of the intelligence departments 
and agencies, and to establish effective oversight to assure com-
pliance with law in the management and direction of intelli-
gence agencies and departments of the national government.”107 
Executive Order 11,905 prohibited the CIA from engaging in 
electronic surveillance in the United States and banned intelli-
gence agencies from engaging in physical surveillance, elec-
tronic surveillance, unconsented physical searches, mail open-
ing, or examining federal tax returns except as consistent with 
procedures approved by the Attorney General or in accordance 
with applicable statutes and regulations.108  It prohibited the 
infiltration of organizations for the purpose of reporting on 
their activities, with the exception of organizations primarily 
composed of non-U.S. persons that were reasonably believed to 
be acting on behalf of a foreign power.109 The order further 
prevented any collection of information about U.S. persons’ 
domestic activities absent situations with a clear foreign intelli-
gence or counterintelligence component.110 
Despite the provisions contained in the executive order, 
Congress considered legislative action crucial to reining in the 
intelligence agencies and therefore, as a third outcome, chose to 
rewrite the National Security Act to require a finding and noti-
fication for covert action. 
																																																																																																																						
gence (HPSCI). The structure of both committees remained relatively constant until 
2004. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States issued 
its report in July 2004, criticizing the system of congressional oversight of intelli-
gence agencies as “dysfunctional” and recommending either a joint committee on 
intelligence (similar to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee), with authority both to 
authorize and appropriate, or smaller committees, and the elimination of term lim-
its. U.S. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT 420–21 (2004). In 2004, the Senate eliminated the 
eight-year term limits, elevated the committee to category A (Senators are generally 
only able to serve on up to two “A” Committees), created an oversight subcommit-
tee, and created an intelligence subcommittee in the Appropriations Committee. S. 
Res. 445, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 107. Exec. Order No. 11,905, 41 Fed. Reg. 7703 (Feb. 19, 1976). This order was sub-
sequently strengthened by Exec. Order No. 12,036, 43 Fed. Reg. 3674 (Jan. 26, 1978), 
and replaced in part by Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 8, 1981). 
 108. Exec. Order No. 11,905, § 5(b)(1)–(5), 41 Fed. Reg. at 7728–30. 
 109. Id. § 5(b)(6). 
 110. Id. § 5(b)(7). 
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Fourth, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act. The aim was to empower the intelligence agencies to 
collect information necessary to protect U.S. national security, 
while preventing agencies from using foreign intelligence 
gathering as an excuse for engaging in domestic surveillance of 
U.S. citizens. The process began with the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1976, the first bill introduced in Congress, 
which was supported by the President and Attorney General 
and would require judicial warrants in foreign intelligence cas-
es.111 Its successor bill, S. 1566, became the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978.112 
B. Protections Built into FISA 
From the beginning, Congress made it clear that the legislation 
was designed to prevent precisely the types of broad surveillance 
programs and incursions into privacy represented by Project 
MINARET, Operation SHAMROCK, COINTELPRO, Operation 
CHAOS, and other intelligence-gathering initiatives that had 
come to light.113 During consideration of the conference report on 
S. 1566, for instance, Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) noted, “The 
abuses of recent history sanctioned in the name of national securi-
																																																																																																																						
 111. 124 CONG. REC. 35,389 (1978) (statement of Sen. Charles Matthias, Jr.); see 
also Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976, S. 3197, 94th Cong. (1976). 
 112. See Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783; 124 CONG. REC. 35,389 (1978). 
 113. Proponents of the bulk metadata collection program assert that the statute 
was not intended to protect against invasive surveillance. Instead, the statute 
“creates a balance between the criminal system’s restrictions on government 
searches and the broader acceptance of information-gathering during wartime.” 
John Yoo, The Legality of the National Security Agency’s Bulk Data Surveillance Pro-
grams, 37 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 901, 906 (2014). There are three problems with this 
claim. First, the two statements are not in opposition—that is, the program could 
be oriented toward curbing government surveillance even as it seeks a balance 
between competing concerns. Second, the historical record does not support the 
first part of the claim. The entire raison d’etre behind FISA was to create a frame-
work to protect against overzealous use of surveillance. Third, FISA does not bal-
ance wartime information gathering with criminal law standards. It creates a 
framework for national security, regardless of whether the country is engaged in 
hostilities. The legislation specifically contemplates war, creating a short period of 
suspension, following which the FISA procedures must again be followed. Instead 
of a “wartime information gathering scheme[]”, it would be more accurate to de-
scribe FISA as establishing a national security framework that applies regardless 
of whether or not the country is at war. See id.  
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ty highlighted the need for this legislation.”114 For Kennedy, the 
legislation represented the “final chapter in the ongoing 10-year 
debate to regulate foreign intelligence electronic surveillance.”115 
With the passage of FISA, the Senate would “at long last place 
foreign intelligence electronic surveillance under the rule of 
law.”116 Senator Birch Bayh, Jr. (D-IN) echoed Kennedy’s senti-
ments: “This bill, for the first time in history, protects the rights of 
individuals from government activities in the foreign intelligence 
area.”117 Senator Charles Mathias (R-MD) noted that enactment of 
the legislation would be a milestone, ensuring “that electronic 
surveillance in foreign intelligence cases will be conducted in con-
formity with the principles set forth in the fourth amendment.”118 
The Foreign Intelligence Act of 1978 represented the culmi-
nation of a multi-branch, multi-year, cross-party initiative di-
rected at bringing the collection of foreign intelligence within a 
narrowly circumscribed legal framework.119 Congress consult-
ed the NSA, FBI, CIA, and representatives of interested citizen 
groups, gaining broad support for the measure.120 As a result, 
FISA passed by significant majorities.121 
Congress purposefully circumscribed the NSA’s authorities in 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act by adopting four key 
protections. First, any information obtained from an electronic 
intercept had to be tied to a specific person or entity, identified 
																																																																																																																						
 114. 124 CONG. REC. 34,845 (1978). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. 124 CONG. REC. 35,389 (1978) (statement of Senator Mathias). 
 119. In 1972, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary’s Subcommittee on Admin-
istrative Practice and Procedure held extensive hearings on the subject of warrant-
less wiretapping. 122 CONG. REC. 7543 (1976). In 1975, the subcommittee issued a 
report jointly with a special subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
calling for Congress to introduce legislation governing foreign intelligence collec-
tion. Id. In 1976, President Ford and Attorney General Levi introduced the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976, H.R. 12,750, 94th Cong. (as introduced in the 
House, Mar. 23, 1976). President Carter and Attorney General Bell subsequently 
supported S. 1566, which became FISA. 124 CONG. REC. 36,409 (1978). 
 120. 124 CONG. REC. 37,738 (1978); 124 CONG. REC. 36,414 (1978). 
 121. S. 1566 passed the Senate 95-1. 124 CONG. REC. 36,409 (1978). H.R. 7308 
passed the House 246-128. Id. In October 1978, the Senate adopted the Conference 
Report “by an overwhelming voice vote, with no dissenting voice vote.” Id. The 
House, in turn, adopted the Conference Report by a vote of 226-176. 124 CONG. 
REC. 36,417–18 (1978). 
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as a foreign power or an agent thereof, before the collection of the 
information. 122  Second, the government had to demonstrate 
probable cause that the target, about whom information was to 
be collected, was a foreign power or an agent thereof.123 For U.S. 
persons, such probable cause could not be established solely on 
the basis of otherwise protected First Amendment activities, 
thus providing U.S. citizens with a higher level of protection.124 
Third, Congress adopted minimization procedures to restrict the 
type of information that could be obtained and retained. 125 
Fourth, FISA provided for a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FISC) to oversee the process.126 Designed to introduce a 
disinterested magistrate into the equation, FISC’s role was, nar-
rowly, to ascertain whether the government had met the appro-
priate requirements for targeting before the acquisition of infor-
mation. All of these restrictions centered on the interception of 
electronic communications. Over time, the statute expanded to 
apply a similar approach to physical searches, the placement of 
pen registers and trap and trace, and searches of business rec-
ords, as well as tangible goods. 
1. Entity Targeted Prior to Acquisition 
From the outset, Congress sought to limit the amount of in-
formation the NSC and others acquired by requiring that the 
target of surveillance be identified as a foreign power or an 
agent of a foreign power prior to the interception of communi-
cations. FISA defined a “foreign power” as: 
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, wheth-
er or not recognized by the United States; 
(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially 
composed of United States persons; 
(3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign gov-
ernment or governments to be directed and controlled 
by such foreign government or governments; 
																																																																																																																						
 122. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a) (2006). 
 123. Id. § 1804(a). 
 124. Id. § 1805(a)(2). 
 125. Id. § 1801(a). 
 126. Id. § 1803. 
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(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities 
in preparation therefor; 
(5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially 
composed of United States persons; or 
(6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign 
government or governments.127 
Before passage of the bill, the Senate defined “foreign pow-
er,” with regard to terrorist groups, to mean a foreign-based 
entity. The House amendments, in contrast, understood “for-
eign power” to include groups engaged in international terror-
ism or activities in preparation therefor. In the end, the Confer-
ence adopted the House definition, with the idea that limiting 
such surveillance solely to foreign-based groups would be 
“unnecessarily burdensome.”128 
Throughout the nuanced discussion of the definition of “for-
eign power” in both houses was the understanding that prior to 
collection of information, the government would have to estab-
lish that the target—in relation to which such information would 
be obtained—qualified as a foreign power or an agent thereof.129 
In focusing on the targets of the communications, Congress 
rejected the NSA’s previous (and current) reading of what con-
stituted a “target” in relation to data collection.130 That is, the 
information to be obtained, at the moment of acquisition (not in 
the context of subsequent analysis—the position Lieutenant 
General Allen advocated for during the Church Committee 
hearings, which the NSA has recently resurrected), had to re-
late directly to the individual or entity believed to be a foreign 
power or an agent thereof. 
																																																																																																																						
 127. Id. § 1801(a). 
 128. 124 CONG. REC. 33,782 (1978); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1801. 
 129. 124 CONG. REC. 33,784 (1978). 
 130. 5 Church Committee Report, supra note 38, at 16 (testimony of Lieutenant Gen-
eral Lew Allen, Jr.); Daniel F. Gilmore, Director Emphatic: NSA Does Not Bug Ameri-
cans, WASH. POST, July 23, 1977, at A2 (“There are no U.S. citizens now targeted by 
NSA in the United States or abroad.” (quoting Statement of Bobby R. Inman, Direc-
tor, NSA, Before the Senate Subcommittee on Intelligence and Human Rights)). 
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2. Probable Cause and Showing of Criminal Wrongdoing  
Prior to Collection 
A second protection stemmed from concerns evinced in the 
Senate about how to determine whether the (specific) target was 
a “foreign power” or “an agent thereof.” Foremost in legislators’ 
minds was the need to provide heightened protections for sur-
veillance targets generally and U.S. citizens in particular. The 
final bill accomplished this in two ways: by adopting of a stand-
ard of probable cause and, under certain circumstances, requir-
ing a showing of criminal wrongdoing in order to acquire in-
formation. These elements underscore the particularity Congress 
required before foreign intelligence gathering was allowed. 
FISA incorporated a standard of probable cause.131 Unlike 
criminal law—in which the courts required establishing proba-
ble cause that a target had committed, was committing, or was 
about to commit a particular offense—under FISA, the agency 
requesting surveillance had to demonstrate probable cause that 
the entity to be placed under surveillance was a “foreign pow-
er” or “an agent thereof,” and that the target was likely to use 
the facilities to be monitored.132 For some entities, FISA also re-
quired a criminal showing for that entity to be considered a 
“foreign power.” 133  Foreign governments are excluded from 
this rule. When they are directly involved, no showing of crim-
																																																																																																																						
 131. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3). 
 132. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2006) (requiring, under Title III, that the 
court must find “on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that . . . there 
is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is 
about to commit a particular offense enumerated in section 2516 of this chapter”), 
with 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3) (requiring, in contrast, that FISC find “on the basis of 
the facts submitted by the applicant,” that “there is probable cause to believe 
that . . . the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power: Provided, That no United States person may be considered a for-
eign power or an agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities pro-
tected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”). Note 
that for ordinary criminal law regarding wire and oral communications (for ex-
ample, telephone and microphone interceptions), section 2516 enumerates predi-
cate offenses that qualify, such as bank fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1344) unlawful posses-
sion of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)) espionage (for example, 18 U.S.C. § 794), 
assassination (for example, 18 U.S.C. §§ 351, 1751), sabotage (for example, 18 
U.S.C. § 2155), and terrorism (for example, 18 U.S.C. § 2332). For electronic com-
munications (for example, e-mail), any federal felony may serve as a predicate. 18 
U.S.C. § 2516(3). 
 133. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c)(1). 
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inal activity is required. Any foreign government, regardless of 
whether it is an ally or an enemy of the United States, is desig-
nated a “foreign power.”134 
For groups to qualify as foreign powers because they are en-
gaged in international terrorism,135 they must be involved in 
criminal activity. The statute defines “international terrorism” 
to include, inter alia, “activities that . . . involve violent acts or 
acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal 
laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a 
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the 
United States or any State.”136 Acts that would qualify individ-
uals for inclusion in this category must be acts that would be 
criminal if committed within the United States. 
A group may be a “foreign power” not only when it engages in 
international terrorism, but also when engaged in “activities in 
preparation therefor.”137 This may or may not exceed the criminal 
“attempt” standard, which is broadly understood as requiring a 
“substantial step” toward the completion of an offense.138 Never-
theless, a “group” engaged in preparatory activities for interna-
tional terrorism would satisfy criminal conspiracy standards.139 
For agents of a foreign power, Congress inserted heightened 
protections for U.S. persons.140 Specifically, FISA defines “agent 
of a foreign power” as: 
(1) any person other than a United States person, who— 
																																																																																																																						
 134. Id. § 1801(a)(1). 
 135. Id. § 1801(a)(4). 
 136. Id. § 1801(c). 
 137. Id. § 1801(a)(4). 
 138. Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 349 (1991). This is not broader, howev-
er, than the “overt act” requirement contained in some criminal conspiracy statutes. 
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 371; see also Supplemental Brief for the United States app., In re 
Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (No. 02-001) (comparing FISA and 
Title III), available at https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/092502sup.html, 
[http://perma.cc/68JX-BR3N]. 
 139. 18 U.S.C. § 371. 
 140. A “United States person” is understood under the statute as “a citizen of the 
United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in 
section 1101(a)(20) of title 8), an unincorporated association a substantial number of 
members of which are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence, or a corporation which is incorporated in the United States, 
but does not include a corporation or an association which is a foreign power, as 
defined in subsection (a)(1), (2), or (3) of this section.” 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i). 
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(A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of 
a foreign power, or as a member of a foreign power 
as defined in subsection (a)(4) of this section; 
(B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which en-
gages in clandestine intelligence activities in the 
United States contrary to the interests of the United 
States, when the circumstances of such person’s 
presence in the United States indicate that such per-
son may engage in such activities in the United 
States, or when such person knowingly aids or 
abets any person in the conduct of such activities or 
knowingly conspires with any person to engage in 
such activities . . . or 
(2) any person who— 
(A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gath-
ering activities for or on behalf of a foreign power, 
which activities involve or may involve a violation 
of the criminal statutes of the United States; 
(B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service 
or network of a foreign power, knowingly engages 
in any other clandestine intelligence activities for or 
on behalf of such foreign power, which activities 
involve or are about to involve a violation of the 
criminal statutes of the United States; 
(C) knowingly engages in sabotage or international ter-
rorism, or activities that are in preparation therefor, 
for or on behalf of a foreign power; 
(D) knowingly enters the United States under a false or 
fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign 
power or, while in the United States, knowingly as-
sumes a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf 
of a foreign power; or 
(E) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct 
of activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or 
(C) or knowingly conspires with any person to en-
gage in activities described in subparagraph (A), 
(B), or (C).141 
																																																																																																																						
 141. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b). 
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These rules stipulate that U.S. persons may be considered 
agents of a foreign power only if their actions are consistent 
with the five provisions in the second section. Taken together, 
three categories emerge under which a U.S. person can be con-
sidered “an agent of a foreign power”: the person (1) engages 
in espionage and clandestine intelligence activities; (2) engages 
in sabotage and international terrorism (or aids, abets, or con-
spires to do the same); or (3) enters the United States under a 
false identity. This means that for U.S. persons, for the most 
part, evidence of criminality on par with criminal law must be 
established before the collection of information. 
Looking more closely, the first category requires that the indi-
vidual knowingly engage in espionage and clandestine intelli-
gence activities. Unlike the other two categories, there is some 
variation here from criminal law, specifically with regard to the 
“may involve” standard of Section 1801(b)(2)(A).142  Something 
less than the showing of probable cause required in ordinary 
criminal cases would satisfy this provision. Thus, for counterintel-
ligence operations, something less than probable cause is required 
for evidence of criminality. But for a U.S. person to fall into this 
category, some evidence of criminality must be involved. 
For the second category, sabotage and international terror-
ism, the term “sabotage” is defined as “activities that involve a 
violation of chapter 105 of title 18, or that would involve such a 
violation if committed against the United States.”143 “Interna-
tional terrorism,” in turn, as noted above, is also defined in 
terms of activities that are criminal or would be criminal if the 
United States were directly involved. To be considered “an 
agent of a foreign power” (and thus subject to surveillance un-
der FISA), a U.S. person must actually be engaged in such ac-
tivities, or activities in preparation for sabotage or international 
terrorism—or knowingly aiding, abetting, or conspiring with 
others engaged in similar activities.144 
																																																																																																																						
 142. Id. § 1801(b)(2)(A). 
 143. Id. § 1801(d). 
 144. Id. § 1801(b)(2)(E). 
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These provisions reflect criminal law standards. 145  As the 
House of Representatives explained in the introduction to FISA: 
This standard requires the Government to establish probable 
cause that the prospective target knows both that the person 
with whom he is conspiring or whom he is aiding or abet-
ting is engaged in the described activities as an agent of a 
foreign power and that his own conduct is assisting or fur-
thering such activities. The innocent dupe who unwittingly 
aids a foreign intelligence officer cannot be targeted under 
this provision.146 
The third category, which considers a U.S. person to be “an 
agent of a foreign power” for knowingly entering the country 
under false or fraudulent identity, almost always involves a 
showing of criminality, simply because it is not possible to le-
gally enter the United States without providing proof of one’s 
identity to a government official. 147  It is similarly illegal to 
knowingly assume a false identity under anti-fraud provisions 
of the U.S. Code.148 
FISA’s deliberate engagement of criminal law provisions and 
standards has been acknowledged by the government in defense 
of bringing down the wall between prosecution and investigation: 
[A] U.S. person may not be an “agent of a foreign power” 
unless he engages in activity that either is, may be, or would 
be a crime if committed against the United States or within 
U.S. jurisdiction. Although FISA does not always require a 
showing of an imminent crime or “that the elements of a 
specific offense exist,” Senate Intelligence Report at 13, it 
does require the government to establish probable cause to 
believe that an identifiable target is knowingly engaged in 
terrorism, espionage, or clandestine intelligence activities or 
is knowingly entering the country with a false identity or as-
suming one once inside the country on behalf of a foreign 
power. Thus, while FISA imposes a more relaxed criminal 
																																																																																																																						
 145. Compare id., with 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371 (2006) (requiring actor to be engaged in 
the illegal action himself or working with another to commit the offense); see also 
Supplemental Brief for the United States, supra note 138. 
 146. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 44 (1978). 
 147. 18 U.S.C. § 1001. 
 148. Id. § 1028. 
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probable cause standard than Title III, those differences are 
not extensive as applied to U.S. persons.149 
The government cannot have it both ways: either U.S. persons 
have heightened protections under FISA—protections that rise 
to the level of those provided under Title III—or they do not. 
Congress provided further protections for U.S. persons. The 
statute limited the breadth of surveillance operations by requir-
ing that probable cause could not be established solely on the 
basis of otherwise protected First Amendment activity.150 This 
was meant to ensure that the executive branch could not place 
U.S. citizens under surveillance simply for exercising their First 
Amendment rights. 
3. Minimization Procedures for Acquisition and Retention 
A third protection inserted by Congress centered on the in-
troduction of minimization procedures to protect activity not 
related to foreign intelligence from government scrutiny.151 The 
legislature insisted here on minimizing not just the analysis of 
the information, but its “acquisition and retention.”152 Specifical-
ly, according to the statute: 
“Minimization procedures”, with respect to electronic sur-
veillance, means— 
(1) specific procedures, which shall be adopted by the 
Attorney General, that are reasonably designed in light 
of the purpose and technique of the particular surveil-
lance, to minimize the acquisition and retention, and 
prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available in-
formation concerning unconsenting United States per-
sons . . . .153 
Under FISA, only U.S. persons’ information must be subject to 
minimization procedures.154 
																																																																																																																						
 149. Supplemental Brief for the United States, supra note 138, at 28. 
 150. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2). 
 151. Id. § 1804(a)(4). 
 152. Id. § 1801(h) (emphasis added). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
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4. Establishment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and 
Court of Review 
As a further precaution against executive overreach, Con-
gress provided in FISA for two courts: the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court of Review (FISCR). 
As aforementioned, a key principle throughout the debates 
was the importance of heightened protections where U.S. per-
sons’ information may be involved. The conference was dead-
locked on how best to accomplish this, until the Senate receded 
and accepted the House language exempting certain particular-
ly sensitive surveillance (that is, relating solely to foreign pow-
ers) from judicial review. The decision rested on the grounds 
that (1) such surveillance did not involve U.S. persons; and (2) 
having removed the most sensitive information from external 
review, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court could be 
given a greater role in protecting the rights of each U.S. person 
targeted by the government.155 The use of a judicial element 
went some way towards providing for an independent, neu-
tral, disinterested magistrate to review the strength of the gov-
ernment’s case supporting the initiation of surveillance.156 
Initially, the statute provided for seven judges to sit on FISC. 
That number has since expanded to include eleven judges 
drawn from at least seven of the federal circuits, three of whom 
must reside in the Washington, D.C. area.157  Both the FISC 
judges and the judges on FISCR are selected by the Chief Jus-
tice of the U.S. Supreme Court.158 To avoid agency capture, 
judges only may serve for up to seven years, at the conclusion 
of which they are not eligible to serve again as FISC judges.159 
From the beginning, FISC’s role was limited: it was merely to 
grant or to deny applications for orders.160 The statute included 
detailed instructions about what must be included in such ap-
plications: the identity of the federal officer making the applica-
																																																																																																																						
 155. 124 CONG. REC. 36,409 (1978). 
 156. Discussion with former members of the Church Committee, in Washington, 
D.C. (Sept. 23, 2013). 
 157. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1). 
 158. Id. § 1803(a)(1)–(b). 
 159. Id. § 1803(d). 
 160. Id. § 1803(a). 
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tion; the identity, if known, of the target; a statement of the 
facts and circumstances relied upon to justify the applicant’s 
belief that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power and that each of the facilities or places at which electron-
ic surveillance is directed is being (or about to be) used by a 
foreign power or an agent thereof; a statement of the proposed 
minimization procedures; a description of the nature of the in-
formation sought; a certification from an executive branch offi-
cial; a summary statement of the means by which the surveil-
lance will be effected; a statement of the facts concerning all 
previous applications; and a statement of the period of time for 
which the surveillance is required to be maintained.161 
Where the government has met the necessary criteria, the 
judge’s role is to enter an ex parte order as requested or to 
modify it accordingly. Initially, such orders could be issued 
only in relation to electronic surveillance. Subsequent amend-
ments expanded FISC’s jurisdiction to physical searches, pen 
registers and trap and trace devices, searches of business rec-
ords, and tangible things.162 These alterations, however, were in 
substance and not in form. The function being performed by 
FISC throughout was the same: to grant or to deny orders prior 
to the acquisition of information on particular targets. 
C. Subsequent Amendment 
Since FISA’s introduction, Congress has amended the statute 
to cover physical searches,163 pen register and trap and trace 
devices,164 searches of business records,165 and tangible goods.166 
																																																																																																																						
 161. Id. § 1804(a). 
 162. Id. §§ 1821–1824 (orders for physical search); id. § 1842 (pen register and 
trap and trace devices); id. § 1861 (business records and tangible goods). 
 163. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub L. No. 103-359, 
§ 302(c), 108 Stat. 3423, 3445 (1994) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821–1829). 
 164. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, 
§ 601, 112 Stat. 2396, 2404–2410 (1998) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1846). 
 165. Id. § 602, 112 Stat. at 2410. 
 166. Various further amendments of these sections have been enacted. The USA 
PATRIOT Act, for instance, changed the duration of certain FISA authorization 
orders (§ 207), increased the number of FISC judges to 11 (§ 208); amended FISA 
pen register and trap and trace provisions (§ 214), changed the purpose of elec-
tronic & physical searches (§ 218), and authorized coordination between intelli-
gence and law enforcement (§ 504). Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA 
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Because of their consistent structure and approach, these provi-
sions have come to be referred to collectively as “traditional 
FISA.” 167  A brief discussion of the subsequent amendments 
helps to underscore Congress’s general approach and to eluci-
date ways in which the bulk collection of U.S. persons’ metada-
ta violates the orientation of the statute and, as addressed in 
Part II, the statutory language. 
1. Physical Search, Pen-Trap 
Similar to the electronic surveillance provisions, physical 
search orders under FISA are limited by the requirement that 
the government establish the target of the search before acquir-
ing the information. Specifically, physical search orders may be 
used only to target “premises, information, material, or proper-
ty used exclusively by, or under the open and exclusive control 
of, a foreign power or powers.”168 The subsection adopts the 
same definitions of “foreign power,” “agent of a foreign pow-
er,” “international terrorism,” “sabotage,” “foreign intelligence 
information,” and “United States person” as used elsewhere in 
the statute.169 It provides for FISC to grant or to deny orders 
consistent with FISC’s role in electronic surveillance. 170  The 
																																																																																																																						
PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. ITRPA subsequently 
added a “lone wolf” provision via § 60001(a). 
 167. See, e.g., 1 DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVES-
TIGATIONS & PROSECUTIONS, ch. 12 (2d ed. 2012). In addition to the aforemen-
tioned amendments, in 2001 Congress amended FISA to take account of roving 
wiretaps. USA PATRIOT Act § 206, 115 Stat. at 282 (amending § 105(c)(2)(B) of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1805(c)(2)(B)). This alteration reflected a change that had been integrated into 
criminal law measures in 1998. At that time, the House Conference Report ex-
plained:  
Under current law, judges issue wiretap orders authorizing law 
enforcement officials to place a wiretap on a specific telephone number. 
Criminals, including terrorists and spies, know this and often try to avoid 
wiretaps by using pay telephones on the street at random, or by using 
stolen or cloned cell telephones. As law enforcement officials cannot 
know the numbers of these telephones in advance, they are unable to 
obtain a wiretap order on these numbers from a judge in time to intercept 
the conversation, and the criminal is able to evade interception of his 
communication. 
H.R. REP. NO. 105-780, at 32 (1998) (Conf. Rep.). 
 168. 50 U.S.C. § 1822(a)(1)(A)(i). 
 169. Id. § 1821(1). 
 170. Id. §§ 1822–1824. 
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government must make the same showings, particularly de-
scribing the target prior to FISC granting the order.171 Height-
ened protections are afforded to U.S. persons.172 
In 1998, Congress amended FISA to allow for the installation 
and use of pen register (recording numbers dialed from a par-
ticular phone) and trap and trace devices (acting as a caller ID 
record). 173  The Attorney General, or a designated attorney, 
must submit an application in writing and under oath either to 
FISC or to a magistrate specifically appointed by the Chief Jus-
tice to hear pen register or trap and trace applications on behalf 
of the FISA court.174 Similar to the provisions related to elec-
tronic communications and physical search, the application 
must include information to show that the device has been, or 
will in the future be, used by someone who is engaging, or has 
engaged, in international terrorism or is a foreign power or 
agent thereof.175 In the event of an emergency, the Attorney 
General can authorize the installation and use of a pen register 
or trap and trace device without judicial approval.176 Neverthe-
less, a proper application must be made to the appropriate ju-
dicial authority within seven days.177 
Following the 9/11 attacks, Congress relaxed the requirement 
for factual proof for placement of a pen or trap. The applicant 
no longer must demonstrate why he or she believes that an in-
dividual engaged in international terrorism will use a tele-
phone line. Instead, the applicant must demonstrate only that 
the information likely to be gained does not directly concern a 
																																																																																																																						
 171. Id. § 1823. 
 172. See, e.g., id. § 1822(1)(A)(ii) (requiring the Attorney General to certify in 
writing and under oath that “there is no substantial likelihood that the physical 
search will involve the premises, information, material, or property of a United 
States Person”); id. § 1822(1)(A)(iii) (requiring minimization procedures for U.S. 
persons’ information). 
 173. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, 
§§ 601–602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2404 (1998); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1846 (pen and trap); id. 
§§ 1861–1862 (tangible things). 
 174. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(a)–(b). 
 175. As with the application for electronic surveillance, the applicant must in-
clude the name of the official seeking surveillance, as well as certification that “the 
information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing foreign intelligence or 
international terrorism investigation.” Id. § 1842(c)(1)–(2). 
 176. Id. § 1843(a). 
 177. Id. § 1843(a)(2). 
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U.S. person and will be relevant to protection against interna-
tional terrorism.178 This provision, hotly contested by civil liber-
tarians, was scheduled to sunset on December 31, 2005,179 but in 
2006 Congress made it permanent.180 Although the provision 
relaxes the standard for obtaining information from particular 
telephone lines, it still establishes a higher bar for obtaining 
U.S. persons’ information. 
The statute understands the terms “pen register” and “trap 
and trace device” consistent with the criminal law standard 
defining a pen register as: 
[A] device or process which records or decodes dialing, rout-
ing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an in-
strument or facility from which a wire or electronic communi-
cation is transmitted, provided, however, that such information 
shall not include the contents of any communication.181 
A “trap and trace device” is defined as: 
[A] device or process which captures the incoming electronic 
or other impulses which identify the originating number or 
other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information 
reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic 
communication, provided, however, that such information 
shall not include the contents of any communication.182 
In addition to all dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling 
information sent from or received by a target, orders may re-
quire electronic communication service providers to disclose 
further information, including: 
(I) the name of the customer or subscriber; 
(II) the address of the customer or subscriber; 
(III) the telephone or instrument number, or other subscrib-
er number or identifier, of the customer or subscriber, 
																																																																																																																						
 178. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. 
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 287. 
 179. USA PATRIOT Act § 215, 115 Stat. at 287 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1861 (2000 & Supp. V 2001)); id. § 224, 115 Stat. at 295 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 2510 (2000 & Supp. V 2001) (note)). 
 180. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-177, § 102, 120 Stat. 192 (2006). 
 181. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 182. Id. § 3127(4). 
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including any temporarily assigned network address 
or associated routing or transmission information; 
(IV) the length of the provision of service by such pro-
vider to the customer or subscriber and the types of 
services utilized by the customer or subscriber; 
(V) in the case of a provider of local or long distance tel-
ephone service, any local or long distance telephone 
records of the customer or subscriber; 
(VI) if applicable, any records reflecting period of usage 
(or sessions) by the customer or subscriber; and 
(VII) any mechanisms and sources of payment for such 
service, including the number of any credit card or 
bank account utilized for payment for such service.183 
These provisions are consistent with Congress’s approach in 
FISA: namely, particularized showing in relation to the target, 
a decision prior to the collection of information, issuance of an 
individualized order by the court, and heightened protections 
for U.S. persons. 
2. Business Records, Tangible Goods, and Section 215 
Following the Oklahoma City bombing, in 1998 Congress 
amended FISA to authorize the production of certain kinds of 
business records of those suspected of being foreign powers or 
agents of a foreign power: namely, documents maintained by 
common carriers, public accommodation facilities, storage facili-
ties, and vehicle rental facilities.184 Any records obtained under 
this provision had to be for “an investigation to gather foreign 
intelligence information or an investigation concerning interna-
tional terrorism.”185 The application had to include “specific and 
articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person to 
whom the records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power.”186 
As with the other provisions of traditional FISA, Congress as-
signed the terms “foreign power,” “agent of a foreign power,” 
																																																																																																																						
 183. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(2)(C)(i). 
 184. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. 105-272, § 602, 
112 Stat. 2396, 2410 (1998). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
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“foreign intelligence information,” and “international terrorism” 
the same meanings as employed in relation to electronic surveil-
lance.187 Congress also required intelligence agencies to follow 
the same steps as those taken with regard to electronic surveil-
lance (i.e., to submit an application to FISC to obtain an order, 
which then compels the companies to hand over the records).188 
Initially, the FBI did not heavily rely on the business records 
provision. Between 1998 and 2001, the FBI used it only once. 
Nevertheless, in 2001 Congress expanded the types of records 
that could be obtained, authorizing intelligence agencies to ap-
ply for an order from FISC “requiring the production of any 
tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, 
and other items).”189 Congress eliminated restrictions on the 
types of businesses or entities on which such an order could be 
served.190 It retained, however, the general contours of FISA, 
specifying that such items be obtained in the course of “an in-
vestigation to protect against international terrorism or clan-
destine intelligence activities.”191 Congress again added height-
ened protections for U.S. persons, requiring that such 
investigations, where directed towards a U.S. person, “not be 
																																																																																																																						
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287. Congress 
also amended FISA to require that applicants to FISC certify that “a significant 
purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence.” 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1804(a)(6)(B) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). This shift, from the prior language that 
“the” purpose be to obtain foreign intelligence, had the effect of removing a wall 
that had built up within the Department of Justice between intelligence officers 
and criminal prosecutors. The government argued that the latter should be al-
lowed to advise the former concerning the initiation, operation, continuation, or 
expansion of FISA searches or surveillance. In re All Matters Submitted to the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 623 (FISA Ct. 2002). 
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review upheld the change. See In re 
Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). This alteration, however, simply 
recognizes parallels between criminal violations and national security threats. It 
does not suddenly shift the focus of the statute to allow intelligence agencies to 
collect information on millions of Americans not suspected of any wrongdoing. 
 190. Compare USA PATRIOT Act § 215, 115 Stat. at 287, with Intelligence Authori-
zation Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2410 (1998). 
 191. Id. 
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conducted . . . solely upon the basis of activities protected by 
the first amendment to the Constitution.”192 
In the new statute, Congress eliminated the requirement that 
the application include “specific and articulable facts” indicat-
ing that the individual to whom the records pertain is a foreign 
power or an agent thereof.193 Nevertheless, from the beginning 
the Department of Justice rightly understood that the scope of 
information obtainable under the tangible goods provision was 
still narrow, in that the information must pertain directly to the 
person targeted in the authorized investigation. A memoran-
dum sent in October 2003 to all Field Offices explained: 
The business records request is not limited to the records of 
the target of a full investigation. The request must simply be 
sought for a full investigation. Thus, if the business records 
relating to one person are relevant to the full investigation of 
another person, those records can be obtained by a FISC order 
despite the fact that there is no open investigation of the per-
son to whom the subject of the business records pertain.194 
The relevance standard adopted was thus specific with regard 
to the connection between the records sought and the target of 
the investigation, as well as limited with regard to the actual 
establishment of a particular investigation. 
For the first two years, Attorney General guidelines allowed 
business record requests only as part of full field investigations. 
But in 2003, in the same memo specifying that the records must 
be directly related to the person under investigation, the General 
Counsel of the National Security Law Unit indicated that the 
type of investigation that must already be established, and to 
which the records being sought must pertain, “may be revised in 
the near future to allow the use of a FISC business records order 
in a preliminary investigation.”195  “Near future” indeed: two 
days later, on October 31, 2003, the Attorney General issued a 
																																																																																																																						
 192. Compare USA PATRIOT Act § 215, 115 Stat. at 287, with Intelligence Author-
ization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 § 602, 112 Stat. at 2410. 
 193. USA PATRIOT Act § 215, 115 Stat. at 287. 
 194. FBI Memorandum from General Counsel, National Security Law Unit, to 
All Field Offices, Business Records Orders Under 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (Oct. 29, 2003), 
available at http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot/foia/field_memo.pdf, 
[http://perma.cc/0LD8wREXHF1]. 
 195. Id. 
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thirty-eight page document establishing new guidelines for na-
tional security investigations—and allowing agents to obtain 
business records during preliminary investigations.196 
Despite the expansion to preliminary investigations, the 
specificity embedded in the relevance principle remained. To 
open a preliminary investigation, the Attorney General re-
quired in his 2003 guidelines that, inter alia, the individual tar-
geted in the investigation be an international terrorist or an 
agent of a foreign power, or any individual, group, or organi-
zation engaged in activities constituting a threat to national se-
curity for, or on behalf of, a foreign power, or may be the target 
of a recruitment or infiltration effort by an international terror-
ist, foreign power, or an agent of a foreign power.197 
There are two points to make about this novel construction. 
First, the Attorney General emphasized particular “individu-
als,” “groups,” or “organizations” as the targets of preliminary 
investigations. This was consistent with FISA’s traditional ap-
proach. Second, only once a preliminary investigation was es-
tablished could agents then make use of “authorized tech-
niques” to obtain information (e.g., mail opening, physical 
search, or electronic surveillance requiring judicial order or 
warrant).198 This meant that the target had to be determined (in 
the course of which the FBI would open a preliminary investi-
gation) before orders allowing for the acquisition of tangible 
goods could issue. 
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, the tangible goods pro-
vision, was set to expire December 31, 2005.199 Congress has 
since renewed it seven times.200 It is now set to expire June 1, 
																																																																																																																						
 196. See The Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI National Security Investiga-
tions and Foreign Intelligence Collection 3–4, 15 (Oct. 31, 2003), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/nsiguidelines.pdf, 
[http://perma.cc/0rvAkw2hfHR]. 
 197. Id. at 14. 
 198. Id. at 15. 
 199. USA PATRIOT Act,Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 224, 115 Stat. 272, 295 (2001). 
 200. See An Act to Amend the USA PATRIOT Act to Extend the Sunset of Certain 
Provisions of that Act and the Lone Wolf Provision of the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 to July 1, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-160, 119 Stat. 2957 
(2005) (extension until Feb. 3, 2006); An Act To Amend the USA PATRIOT Act to Ex-
tend the Sunset of Certain Provisions of Such Act, Pub. L. No. 109-170, 120 Stat. 3 
(2006) (extension until Mar. 10, 2006); USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006) (extension until Dec. 31, 2009); 
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2015.201 In 2005, in the course of extending Section 215, Congress 
added language tying the section more closely to FISA’s over-
arching structure. It required applicants to submit a statement of 
facts establishing “reasonable grounds to believe that the tangi-
ble things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation 
(other than a threat assessment).”202 The investigation to which 
the order is tied must be conducted under guidelines approved 
by the Attorney General.203  The purpose of the investigation 
must be “to obtain foreign intelligence information not concern-
ing a United States person or to protect against international ter-
																																																																																																																						
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, 123 Stat. 3409 
(2009) (allowing for a short-term, sixty day extension of 50 U.S.C. § 1861 until February 
28, 2010); An Act to Extend Expiring Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Improvement 
and Reauthorization Act of 2005 and Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004 until February 28, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-141, 124 Stat. 37 (2010) (extension 
until Feb. 28, 2011); FISA Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-3, 125 Stat. 5 
(extension until May 27, 2011); PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 
112-14, 125 Stat. 216 (extension until June 1, 2015). 
 201. PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-14, 125 Stat. 216. 
Note that in a race against the clock, President Obama signed the most recent, four-
year extension of Section 215 just minutes before the midnight deadline, May 26, 
2011. Patriot Act extension signed into law despite bipartisan resistance in Congress, 
WASH. POST, May 27, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/patriot-act-
extension-signed-into-law-despite-bipartisan-resistance-in-
congress/2011/05/27/AGbVlsCH_story.html, [http://perma.cc/0q4UyoJK3EU]. A 
bipartisan group of lawmakers had rallied against the measure, with the result that 
the USA PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011 passed the Senate 72 to 23 and the 
House 250 to 153. With President Obama at a summit in France, the White House 
took the unusual step of having him sign the bill with an autopen—prompting 
commentators to question whether it was legal under Art. I, § 7 of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. See, e.g., Originalism and the Autopen: Obama’s “Signing” of Patriot Act Extension 
Constitutional, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROF BLOG (May 30, 2011), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2011/05/originalism-and-the-auto-
pen.html, [http://perma.cc/09EN7mYcRaW]. The White House apparently relied on 
a memorandum opinion issued by the Office of Legal Counsel in 2005. See Memo-
randum Opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel to the President, Whether the 
President May Sign a Bill by Directing that his Signature be Affixed to It (July 7, 
2005), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/opinion_07072005.pdf, 
[http://perma.cc/0YSughFJSVz]. 
 202. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 § 106, 120 
Stat. at 196 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006)). 
 203. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(2)(A). Such guidelines are issued consistent with Execu-
tive Order 12,333. In 2008, the Department of Justice issued new, consolidated 
guidelines. Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (Oct. 3, 
2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines.pdf, 
[http://perma.cc/0GfT5Uq7Wro]. 
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rorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”204 The underlying 
investigation may not be directed at a U.S. person based solely 
on otherwise protected First Amendment activity.205 
Tangible things are presumptively relevant to an investiga-
tion where they pertain to: (1) “a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power”; (2) “the activities of a suspected agent of a for-
eign power,” themselves the subject of an authorized investiga-
tion; or (3) “an individual in contact with, or known to, a sus-
pected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of an au-
authorized investigation.”206 
For certain materials—namely, “library circulation records, 
library patron lists, book sales records, book customer lists, 
firearms sales records, tax return records, educational records, 
or medical records”—with information identifying an individ-
ual, only the Director of the FBI, the Deputy Director of the FBI, 
or the Executive Assistant Director for National Security may 
make the application; none of these individuals may further 
delegate their authorities in this respect.207 
In the 2005 amendments, Congress required “an enumeration 
of the minimization procedures” related to the retention and 
dissemination of any tangible things obtained.208 Any orders is-
sued “may only require the production of a tangible thing if 
such thing can be obtained with a subpoena duces tecum issued 
by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investiga-
tion or with any other order issued by a court of the United 
States directing the production of records or tangible things.”209 
As discussed below, the telephony metadata program, by FISC’s 
own admission, fails to satisfy this statutory requirement.210 
																																																																																																																						
 204. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 § 106, 120 
Stat. at 196 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861). 
 205. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(2)(B). 
 206. See id. § 1861(b)(2)(A); id. § 1861(c)(1). 
 207. Id. § 1861(a)(3). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. § 1861(c)(2)(D). 
 210. Any individual served with an order is gagged from telling anyone other 
than individuals to whom disclosure is necessary to comply with the order or an 
attorney to obtain legal advice or help with regard to producing the items sought. 
Id. § 1861(d). Under the statute, an individual on whom an order has been served 
may challenge the legality of the order by filing a petition with the court within a 
year, requesting that the order be modified or set aside. Id. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i). 
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D. Broad Surveillance in Place of Particularization 
The telephony metadata program lacks the particularization 
that marks Congress’s approach to domestic foreign intelli-
gence gathering in FISA. The statute rejects the wholesale col-
lection of domestic information. It relies on the prior targeting 
of foreign intelligence targets to justify surveillance. It provides 
U.S. persons a heightened level of protection. And it seeks to 
minimize the acquisition (not just the retention and dissemina-
tion) of information. 
1. Wholesale Collection of Information 
Project MINARET, which represented precisely the type of 
surveillance program that FISA was designed to forestall, was 
not nearly as extensive as the telephony metadata program. 
Over the course of Project MINARET, for instance, the watch 
list included approximately 1650 U.S. citizens in total.211 At no 
time were there more than 800 U.S. citizens’ names on the list, 
out of a population of about 200 million Americans.212 
Today, in contrast, there are approximately 316 million Amer-
icans, a significant number of which have access to mobile de-
vices.213 Verizon, which is only one of the telecommunications 
companies served with a FISC order, is estimated to have a mar-
ket share of 31.3% of the total number of wireless subscribers.214 
As of October 2013, this translated into 101.2 million wireless 
accounts.215 This number eclipses the total number of U.S. citi-
zens subject to the most egregious programs previously operat-
ed by the NSA, which gave rise to FISA in the first place. 
The telephony program also goes substantially beyond the 
previous surveillance operation in its focus on calls of a purely 
																																																																																																																						
 211. 5 Church Committee Report, supra note 38, at 33 (testimony of Lieutenant 
General Lew Allen, Jr., Director, National Security Agency). 
 212. Id. at 30, 33–34. 
 213. U.S. and World Population Clock, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/popclock/, [http://perma.cc/NN4C-R3LM] (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2014). 
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 215. Roger Cheng, Verizon posts $2.23B profit, adds 1.1M wireless connections, CNET 
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local nature. According to the Director of the National Security 
Agency, Project MINARET did not monitor entirely domestic 
conversations.216 The FISC Order issued in April 2013, however, 
specifically requires the collection of information “wholly within 
the United States, including local telephone calls.”217 Set to ex-
pire on July 19, 2013, the Office of the Director of National Intel-
ligence has confirmed that FISC has again renewed the order.218 
As discussed above, Congress designed the statute to be 
used in specific cases of foreign intelligence gathering. By limit-
ing the targets of electronic surveillance, requiring probable 
cause, disallowing investigations solely on the basis of other-
wise protected First Amendment activities, and insisting on 
minimization procedures, Congress sought to restrict agencies’ 
ability to violate U.S. citizens’ privacy. The business records 
provision built on this approach, adopting the same definitions 
that prevailed in other portions of the statute and requiring 
that agencies obtain orders to collect information on individu-
als believed to be foreign powers or agents of a foreign power. 
Congress later deliberately inserted “relevant” into the statute 
to ensure the continued specificity of targeted investigations. 
In addition, Congress empowered FISC to consider each in-
stance of placing an electronic wiretap. The NSA’s program, in 
contrast, delegates such oversight to the Executive, leaving all 
further inquiries of the databases to the agency involved. Once 
the NSA collects the telephony metadata, it is the NSA (and not 
FISC) that decides which queries to use, and which individuals 
to target within the database. 
This change means that FISC is not performing its most basic 
function: protecting U.S. persons from incursions into their 
privacy. Instead, it leaves the determination of whom to target 
to the agency’s discretion. Traditional FISA depends upon the 
criteria in the statute being met before collection of information. 
																																																																																																																						
 216. See 5 Church Committee Report, supra note 38, at 36. 
 217. In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring 
the Prod. of Tangible Things from Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc., Secondary 
Order, No. BR 13-80, at 2 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013). 
 218. See Press Release, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Court Renews Authority to Collect Telephony Metadata (July 
19, 2013), available at http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-
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That is, the authorities apply at the moment data is acquired—
not when it is subsequently analyzed for more information. 
Although the government argues that intelligence is not ac-
quired until it is mined for more information, or until a human 
operator is involved in the analysis, this view is neither ex-
pressed in the relevant statutory language nor congruent with 
the government’s own internal position.219 
2. Absence of Prior Targeting 
The government has indicated that the information obtained 
from this program is important because, “by analyzing it, the 
Government can determine whether known or suspected terror-
ist operatives have been in contact with other persons who may 
be engaged in terrorist activities, including persons and activities 
within the United States.”220 The government sees the enormous 
number of records as central to the success of the program.221 
Once the records are obtained—once the “haystack” is created—
the government can then go about finding out who the threats 
are—the proverbial needles in the haystack.222 
This process is backwards. The whole point of FISA is for the 
government to first identify the target, and then to use this 
identification to obtain information. In contrast, the govern-
ment is now arguing that it can obtain information as a way of 
figuring out who the targets should be. This directly contra-
dicts FISA’s design. 
																																																																																																																						
 219. See, e.g., Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y General of the United States, Minimiza-
tion Procedures Used by the National Security Agency in Connection with Acqui-
sitions of Foreign Intelligence Information pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as Amended 1 (Jan. 8, 2007), available at 
http://epic.org/2013/06/nsa-targeting-and-minimization.html, 
[http://perma.cc/0PKxzba3aiL] (“Acquisition means the collection by NSA or the 
FBI through electronic means of a non-public communication to which it is not an 
intended party.”). 
 220. SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 1. 
 221. Id. at 4 (“It would be impossible to conduct these queries effectively with-
out a large pool of telephony metadata to search, as there is no way to know in 
advance which numbers will be responsive to the authorized queries.”). 
 222. See, e.g., How Disclosed NSA Programs Protect Americans, and Why Disclosure 
Aids Our Adversaries: Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 
113th Cong. (2013) (statement of James Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen.), available at 
http://intelligence.house.gov/video/how-disclosed-nsa-programs-protect-americans-
and-why-disclosure-aids-our-adversaries, [http://perma.cc/0NeE3FAYFbT]. 
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3. No Higher Threshold for U.S. Persons 
In addition, as detailed above, there are myriad ways in 
which FISA creates extra protections for U.S. persons. In light 
of the historical context, the reason for this is clear. The statute 
arose from revelations about the cavalier manner in which the 
intelligence agencies were treating Americans’ right to privacy. 
New protections thus centered on creating higher standards for 
targeting U.S. persons, as well as for later analysis and dissemi-
nation of U.S. persons’ information. 
Outside of minimization procedures relating to the down-
stream manipulation and dissemination of information, how-
ever, the telephony metadata program does not recognize a 
higher protection for U.S. persons at the moment of data acqui-
sition. The failure to create higher standards thus runs counter 
to the approach Congress adopted in passing FISA. 
E. Role of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
In at least three important ways, FISC no longer serves the pur-
pose for which it was designed. First, Congress created the court 
to determine whether the executive branch had met its burden of 
demonstrating that there was sufficient evidence to target indi-
viduals within the United States, prior to collection of such infor-
mation. The telephony metadata program demonstrates that FISC 
has abdicated this responsibility to the executive branch generally, 
and to the NSA in particular. Continued noncompliance under-
scores concern about relying on the intelligence community to 
protect the Fourth Amendment rights of U.S. persons. 
Second, Congress did not envision a lawmaking role for 
FISC. Its decisions were not to serve as precedent, and FISC 
was not to offer lengthy legal analyses, crafting in the process, 
for instance, exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant re-
quirement or defenses of wholesale surveillance programs. 
Third, questions have recently been raised about the extent 
to which FISC can fulfill the role of being a neutral, disinterest-
ed magistrate. Congress went to great lengths, for instance, to 
try to ensure diversity on the court. To the extent that the ap-
pointments process implies an ideological predilection, at a 
minimum, it is worth noting that almost all of the judges who 
serve on FISC and FISCR are Republican appointees. The rate 
of applications being granted, in conjunction with the in cam-
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era and ex parte nature of the proceedings, also raises ques-
tions about the extent to which FISC serves as an effective 
check on the executive branch. The lack of technical expertise 
of those on the court further introduces questions about the 
judges’ ability to understand how the authorities they are ex-
tending to the NSA are being used. 
1. Reliance on NSA to Ascertain Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion 
In 1978 Congress created FISC to serve as a neutral, disinter-
ested observer. In this capacity, one of its principal responsibili-
ties was to ascertain whether the government had demonstrat-
ed probable cause that individuals to be targeted under FISA 
were foreign powers or agents thereof, and likely to use the 
facilities to be placed under surveillance. As was previously 
discussed, consistent with this approach, in 1998 Congress in-
troduced the business records provision, requiring in the pro-
cess that the government submit a statement of “specific and 
articulable facts” to the court in support of its application. Alt-
hough the showing was eliminated in 2001, four years later 
Congress re-introduced a requirement that the government 
submit a statement of facts establishing “reasonable grounds to 
believe that the tangible things” to be obtained are “relevant to 
an authorized investigation.” This language puts the court in 
the position of verifying whether the government has met its 
burden of proof prior to intelligence collection. The court, how-
ever, no longer serves in this function. 
To the contrary, FISC’s primary order authorizing the collec-
tion of telephony metadata required that designated NSA offi-
cials make a finding that there is “reasonable, articulable suspi-
cion” (RAS) that a seed identifier proposed for query is 
associated with a particular foreign terrorist organization prior 
to its use. It is thus left to the executive branch to determine 
whether the executive branch has sufficient evidence to place 
individuals or entities under surveillance. 
The dangers associated with the court removing itself from 
the process are clear. Documents recently released under court 
orders in a related FOIA case establish that for nearly three 
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years, the NSA did not follow these procedures 223 —even 
though numerous NSA officials were aware of the violation.224 
Noncompliance incidents have continued. Collectively, these 
incidents raise serious question as to whether FISC is perform-
ing the functions for which it was designed. 
a. Failure to Report Initial Noncompliance 
Although the NSA had been contravening the order since 
May 2006, it was not until early 2009, when representatives of 
the Department of Justice met with NSA representatives to be 
briefed on the NSA’s handling of the telephony metadata, that 
the illegal behavior was brought to FISC’s attention.225 Presi-
dent Barack Obama took office on January 20, 2009; it appears 
that recognition of the noncompliance occurred during the 
transition. During the briefing and in subsequent discussions, 
DOJ representatives inquired about the alert process. Learning 
of the process being used, DOJ personnel expressed concern 
that the program had been misrepresented to FISC.226 The NSA 
had been using identifiers employed to collect information un-
der Executive Order 12,333—not FISA—to search the telephony 
																																																																																																																						
 223. See In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], Order Regarding 
Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident Dated Jan. 15, 2009, No. BR 08-13 
(FISA Ct. Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/ 
pub_Jan%2028%202009%20Order%20Regarding%20Prelim%20Notice%20of%20C
ompliance.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0soKuBTCNQL]; see also DNI Clapper Declassifies 
Intelligence Community Documents Regarding Collection Under Section 501 of the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act, IC ON RECORD, (Sept. 10, 2013), 
http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/60867560465/dni-clapper-declassifies-
intelligence-community, [http://perma.cc/KDV2-3ZT6]. 
 224. Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander at 25–26, In re Prod. of 
Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 13, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorand
um%20of%20US.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT] (listing seven people in the 
Signals Intelligence Directive, two from the Office of the General Counsel, and one 
additional person whose name has not been disclosed who knew, or may have 
known of the problem since May 2006). Three additional people from the General 
Counsel’s office and from SID became aware of the use of non-RAS-approved iden-
tifiers via e-mail on May 25, 2006. Id. at 26. The DNI noted an additional “indetermi-
nate number of other NSA personnel who knew or may have known the alert list 
contained both RAS and non-RAS selectors.” Id. at 26. 
 225. Id. at 27–28. 
 226. Id. at 27. 
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database.227 This meant that the standards applying to foreign-
ers were used in relation to U.S. persons. 
																																																																																																																						
 227. NSA’s general SIGINT authorities derive from (1) Exec. Order No. 12,333, 
§ 1.7, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981) (authorizing the NSA to “[c]ollect (includ-
ing through clandestine means), process, analyze, produce, and disseminate sig-
nals intelligence information for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence pur-
poses to support national and departmental missions”); (2) National Security 
Council Intelligence Directive 6, Foreign Wireless and Radio Monitoring (Dec. 12, 
1947), available at http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/ 
50/NSCID_No_6_Foreign_Wireless_and_Radio_Monitoring_12_Dec_1947.pdf, 
[http://perma.cc/0dy3BfySG6k] (noting that the “DCI shall conduct all Federal moni-
toring of foreign propaganda and press broadcasts required for the collection of 
intelligence information to meet the needs of all Departments and Agencies in con-
nection with the National Security” and that the DCI “shall disseminate such intelli-
gence information to the various Departments and Agencies which have an author-
ized interest therein”); and (3) Department of Defense Directive 5100.20 (Jan. 26, 
2010), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/510020p.pdf, 
[http://perma.cc/0uksdWff7fo] (“[T]he National Security Agency (NSA) is the U.S. 
Government (USG) lead for cryptology, and its mission encompasses both Signals 
Intelligence (SIGINT) and Information Assurance (IA) activities. The Central Security 
Service (CSS) conducts SIGINT collection, processing, analysis, production, and dis-
semination, and other cryptologic operations as assigned by the Director, NSA/Chief, 
CSS (DIRNSA/CHCSS). NSA/CSS provides SIGINT and IA guidance and assistance to 
the DoD Components, as well as national customers . . . .”). In addition, some, but not 
all, of the SIGINT activities undertaken by NSA are governed by FISA. Declaration of 
Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander at 34, In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [RE-
DACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 13, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorand
um%20of%20US.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT]. 
 When executing its SIGINT mission, NSA is only authorized to collect, retain, or 
disseminate information concerning U.S. persons consistent with Attorney Gen-
eral guidelines. The current procedures approved by the Attorney General are 
located in the DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, REGULATION 5240.1-R, PROCEDURES 
GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF DOD INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS THAT AFFECT 
UNITED STATES PERSONS 24–37, as well as a classified annex to the regulation 
overseeing the NSA’s electronic surveillance. Declaration of Lieutenant General 
Keith B. Alexander at 34, In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. 
BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 13, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/ 
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf, 
[http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT]. 
 To administer the program, the NSA constructed two lists: the first, an “alert 
list,” includes all identifiers (foreign and domestic) of interest to counterterrorism 
analysts. Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order 
Dated Jan. 28, 2009 at 10, In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. 
BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/ 
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf, 
[http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT]. The second, the “station table,” is a historical 
listing of all telephone identifiers that had undergone a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion determination, including the results. Id. But see Declaration of Lieuten-
ant General Keith B. Alexander at 9, In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [RE-
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The DOJ informed FISC within a week of the meeting that 
the government had been querying the business records in a 
manner that contravened both the original order and sworn 
statements of several executive branch officials.228 FISC was not 
amused. Judge Reggie Walton expressed concern “about what 
appears to be a flagrant violation of its Order in this matter.”229 
The NSA had repeatedly misled FISC in its handling of the da-
tabase.230 FISC immediately issued an order, directing the NSA 
to comprehensively review the agency’s handling of telephony 
metadata.231 It gave the government until February 17, 2009 to 
file a brief to defend its actions and to help FISC to determine 
whether further action should be taken against the government 
or its representatives.232 
The NSA initially admitted only “that NSA’s descriptions to 
[FISC] of the alert list process . . . were inaccurate and that the 
Business Records Order did not provide the Government with 
authority to employ the alert list in the manner in which it 
did.”233  It further acknowledged, “the majority of telephone 
																																																																																																																						
DACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 13, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memora
ndum%20of%20US.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT] (referring to the first 
source as the “Address Database” and describing it as “a master target database 
of foreign and domestic telephone identifiers”). 
 228. In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], Order Regarding Pre-
liminary Notice of Compliance Incident Dated Jan. 15, 2009, No. BR 08-13, at 2 
(FISA Ct. Jan 28, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/ 
files/documents/section/pub_Jan%2028%202009%20Order%20Regarding%20Preli
m%20Notice%20of%20Compliance.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0zB1dSnc7k5]. 
 229. Id. at 4. 
 230. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 1 (see page 94 of 1846 
and 1862 Production, Mar. 5, 2009) (“The management controls designed by the 
Agency to govern the processing, dissemination, data security, and oversight of 
telephony metadata and U.S. person information obtained under the Order are 
adequate and in several aspects exceed the terms of the Order.”). 
 231. In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [Redacted], Order Regarding Prelimi-
nary Notice of Compliance Incident Dated Jan. 15, 2009, No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. 
Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/ 
pub_Jan%2028%202009%20Order%20Regarding%20Prelim%20Notice%20of%20C
ompliance.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0zB1dSnc7k5]. 
 232. See id. at 2. 
 233. Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated 
Jan. 28, 2009 at 1–2, In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-
13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/ 
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf, 
[http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT]. 
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identifiers compared against the incoming BR metadata in the 
rebuilt alert list were not RAS-approved.”234 The actual num-
bers, reported to FISC in February 2009, were staggering: as of 
January 15, 2009, “only 1,935 of the 17,835 identifiers on the 
alert list were RAS-approved.”235 
It was not that the NSA was unaware of the requirements es-
tablished by the statute and by FISC. The Attorney General 
had, consistent with the primary order, established minimiza-
tion procedures, among which was the following: 
Any search or analysis of the data archive shall occur only 
after a particular known telephone number has been associ-
ated with [REDACTED] More specifically, access to the ar-
chived data shall occur only when NSA has identified a 
known telephone number for which, based on the factual 
and practical considerations of everyday life on which rea-
sonable and prudent persons act, there are facts giving rise 
to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the telephone 
number is associated with [REDACTED] organization; pro-
vided, however, that a telephone number believed to be 
used by a U.S. person shall not be regarded as associated 
with [REDACTED] solely on the basis of activities that are 
protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.236 
Nevertheless, apparently, neither the Signals Intelligence Direc-
torate nor the Office of the General Counsel had caught the fact 
																																																																																																																						
 234. Id. at 11; see also id. at 6. Note that the NSA refers to FISC-authorized Busi-
ness Record metadata as “BR metadata.” In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [RE-
DACTED], Order, No. BR 08-13, at 4 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_March%202%202009%20Order
%20from%20FISC.pdf, [http://perma.cc/5KGD-SWMW]. 
 235. Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated 
Jan. 28, 2009 at 11, In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-
13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/ 
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf, 
[http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT]; see also Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith 
B. Alexander at 8, In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 
(FISA Ct. Feb. 13, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/ 
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf, 
[http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT]. 
 236. Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated 
Jan. 28, 2009 at 4, In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 
(FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/ 
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf, 
[http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT], (citing Order, No. BR 06-05, at 5) (internal foot-
note omitted). 
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that nearly ninety percent of the queries to the bulk dataset had 
been illegal.237 Nor had they realized that their reports to FISC 
claiming that only RAS-approved numbers were being run 
against the bulk metadata were false.238 
Meanwhile, the NSA had disseminated 275 reports to the FBI 
as a result of contact chaining and queries of NSA’s archive of 
telephony metadata.239 Thirty-one of these had resulted directly 
																																																																																																																						
 237. Id. at 11 (“Based upon NSA’s recent review, neither NSA SID nor NSA 
OGC identified the inclusion of non-RAS-approved identifiers on the alert list as 
an issue requiring extensive analysis.”). 
 238. See, e.g., Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Or-
der Dated Jan. 28, 2009 at 13, In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], 
No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009) (quoting NSA Report to FISC at 12–15, In re 
Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 06-05), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memora
ndum%20of%20US.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT] (“As of the last day of 
the reporting period addressed herein, NSA had included a total of 3980 tele-
phone numbers on the alert list, which include foreign numbers and domestic 
numbers, after concluding that each of the foreign telephone numbers satisfied 
the standard set forth in the Court’s May 24, 2006 [Order] . . . . To summarize the 
alert system: every day new contacts are automatically revealed with the 3980 
telephone numbers contained on the alert list described above, which themselves 
are present on the alert list either because they satisfied the reasonable articulable 
suspicion standard, or because they are domestic numbers that were either a FISC 
approved number or in direct contact with a number that did so.”); see also Decla-
ration of Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander at 7, In re Prod. of Tangible 
Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 13, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memora
ndum%20of%20US.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT] (reprinting the same 
report text and stating, “in short, the reports filed with the Court incorrectly stat-
ed that the telephone identifiers on the alert list satisfied the RAS standard. In 
fact, the majority of telephone identifiers included on the alert list had not been 
RAS approved”). Note that No. BR 06-05 is the initial authorization of the teleph-
ony metadata program, May 24, 2006. No. BR-08 was a renewal application, filed 
Aug. 18, 2006. No. BR 08-13 is a subsequent authorization. The May 2006 order, 
however, has seven tabs for different docket numbers, all of which have been 
redacted, suggesting that there are other, related programs underway. 
 239. Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated 
Jan. 28, 2009 at 17, In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-
13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/ 
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf, 
[http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT]; Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B. Alex-
ander at 42, In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 
(FISA Ct. Feb. 13, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/ 
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf, 
[http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT] (further noting that the 275 reports provided to 
the FBI tipped a total of 2549 telephone identifiers as being in contact with identi-
fiers used to query the system). 
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from the automated alert process.240 In a careful use of lan-
guage, the government noted, “NSA did not identify any re-
port that resulted from the use of a non-RAS-approved ‘seed’ 
identifier.”241 The government did not detail how complete the 
NSA had been in considering the reports; nor did it claim that 
none of the reports had resulted from non-RAS-approved iden-
tifiers.242 The government also did not address the dissemina-
tion of metadata reports within NSA and subsequent actions 
that resulted from the process. 
Despite the gross violation of FISC’s order, the government 
argued that FISC should neither rescind nor modify its order.243 
As required by FISC, the NSA had undertaken an end-to-end 
system engineering and process review (technical and opera-
tional) of its handling of business records metadata; it had un-
dertaken a review of domestic identifiers to ensure that they 
are RAS-compliant; and it had undertaken an audit of all que-
ries made of the business records metadata repository since 
November 1, 2008 with the purpose of determining if any que-
ries had been made using non-RAS-approved identifiers.244 The 
NSA had again trained its employees and adopted new tech-
nologies to limit the number of “hops” permitted from an RAS-
																																																																																																																						
 240. Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated 
Jan. 28, 2009 at 17, In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-
13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/ 
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf, 
[http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT]. 
 241. Id. 
 242. See Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander at 36–37, In re Prod. 
of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 13, 2009), avail-
able at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009% 
20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT] (“[The NSA] 
has . . . conducted a review of all 275 reports of domestic contacts NSA has dissemi-
nated as result of contact chaining [REDACTED] of the NSA’s Archive of BR FISA 
material. NSA has identified no report that resulted from the use of a non-RAS ap-
proved identifier as the initial seed identifier for chaining through the BR FISA ma-
terial.” (internal footnotes omitted)). 
 243. Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated 
Jan. 28, 2009 at 2, 15–21, In re Production of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], 
No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memora
ndum%20of%20US.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT]. 
 244. Id. at 19. 
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approved seed identifier to three.245 The government offered to 
take additional steps to avoid having the program shut down, 
all of which amounted to involving DOJ’s National Security 
Division more deeply in the telephony metadata program.246 
b. Further Noncompliance 
Although the January 2009 incident represents the first ad-
mission of noncompliance that was made public, it is far from 
the first—or only—time that the NSA acted outside the scope 
of its authority to collect records under section 215 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act.247 Recently released documents provide myriad 
further examples. 
In September 2006, for instance, the NSA’s Inspector General 
expressed concern that the agency was collecting more data 
than authorized under the order.248 The NSA had been obtain-
ing 16-digit credit card numbers as well as names or partial 
names contained in the records of operator-assisted calls.249 It 
																																																																																																																						
 245. Id. at 20. 
 246. See id. at 20–21 (listing under “Additional Oversight Mechanisms the gov-
ernment Will Implement”: (1) NSA’s OGC consulting with DOJ’s National Securi-
ty Division (NSD) on “all significant legal opinions that relate the interpretation, 
scope and/or implementation” of FISC orders related to BR 08-13; (2) NSA’s OGC 
providing NSD with copies of the mandatory procedures; (3) NSA’s OGC 
promptly providing NSD with copies of all formal briefing and/or training mate-
rials; (4) arranging meetings among NSA’s OGC, NSD, and NSA’s Director of 
Signals Intelligence prior to seeking renewal of the orders; (5) meetings once per 
period of future orders between NSA’s OIG and NSD; (6) review and approval of 
all proposed automated query processes prior to implementation). 
 247. See, e.g., Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Or-
der Dated Jan. 28, 2009 at 19, In re Production of Tangible Things From [RE-
DACTED], No. BR 08-13, available at http://www.dni.gov/files/ 
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf, 
[http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT] (citing notice of compliance filed Jan. 26, 2009, 
which reports that between Dec. 10, 2008, and Jan. 23, 2009, two analysts conduct-
ed 280 queries using non-RAS-approved identifiers). 
 248. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 1, at 2–3 (see page 95–96 of 
1846 and 1862 Production, Mar. 5, 2009) (“[M]anagement controls do not provide 
reasonable assurance that NSA will comply with the following terms of the Order: 
‘NSA may obtain telephony metadata, which includes comprehensive communi-
cations, routing information, including but not limited to session identifying in-
formation, trunk identifier, and time and duration of a call. Telephony metadata 
does not include the substantive content of any communications, or the name, 
address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer.’”). 
 249. See id. at 3 (see page 96 of 1846 and 1862 Production, Mar. 5, 2009). 
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later emerged that an over-collection filter inserted in July 2008 
failed to function.250 
On October 17, 2008, the government reported to FISC that, 
after FISC authorized the NSA to increase the number of ana-
lysts working with the business records metadata, and had di-
rected that the NSA train the newly-authorized analysts, thirty-
one (out of eighty-five) analysts subsequently queried the 
business records metadata in April 2008 without even being 
aware that they were doing so.251 The upshot was that NSA ana-
lysts used 2373 foreign telephone identifiers to query the busi-
ness records metadata without first establishing reasonable, 
articulable suspicion.252 Despite taking corrective steps, on De-
cember 11, 2008, the government notified FISC that an analyst 
had not installed a modified access tool and, resultantly, had 
again queried the data using five identifiers for which no RAS 
standard had been satisfied.253 
Just over a month later, the government informed FISC that, 
between December 10, 2008 and January 23, 2009, two analysts 
had used 280 foreign telephone identifiers to query the busi-
ness records metadata without first establishing RAS.254 
The process initiated in January 2009 identified additional 
incidents where the NSA had failed to comply with FISC’s or-
ders.255 In February 2009, the NSA brought two further matters 
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to FISC’s attention. The first centered on the NSA’s use of one 
of its analytical tools to query the business records metadata, 
using non-RAS-approved telephone numbers.256 This tool had 
been used since FISC’s initial order in May 2006 to search both 
the business records metadata and other NSA databases.257 Al-
so in February 2009, the NSA notified DOJ’s National Security 
Division that the NSA’s audit had identified three analysts who 
conducted chaining on the business records metadata using 
fourteen telephone identifiers that had not been RAS-approved 
before the queries.258 
In May 2009, two additional compliance issues arose.259 The 
first compliance incident is completely redacted. The second 
notes a dissemination-related problem: that the unminimized 
results of some queries of metadata had been “uploaded [by 
the NSA] into a database to which other intelligence agen-
cies . . . had access.”260 According to the government, providing 
other agencies access to this information may have resulted in 
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http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2026%202009%20Notificat
ion%20of%20Compliance%20Incident.pdf, [http://perma.cc/J79T-T3VD]. 
 259. In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Re-
quiring the Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], Order, No. BR 09-06, at 
4 (FISA Ct. June 22, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/ 
pub_Jun%2022%202009%20Order.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0D4dE8vxr98] (referenc-
ing government responses to the court’s May 29, 2009 Supplemental Order). 
 260. Id. at 5 (quoting Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident at 2, No. BR 09-
06 (FISA Ct. June 16, 2009)). 
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the dissemination of U.S. person information in violation of 
both U.S. Signals Intelligence Directive 18 as well as the more 
restrictive conditions FISC imposed in BR 09-06.261 
c. FISC Response 
Repeatedly, instead of rescinding prior collection programs, 
FISC merely imposed further requirements on the govern-
ment.262 By spring of 2009, FISC had become fed up with the 
NSA—yet, not fed up enough to actually halt the program. In-
stead, it insisted on two procedures designed to give FISC 
greater insight into how the NSA was using and distributing 
information related to the telephony metadata: that the NSA 
return to FISC before each query of the database, and that the 
NSA file weekly reports with FISC detailing any dissemination 
of the information. Both protections proved temporary. 
FISC’s first temporary solution was to require what traditional 
FISA actually required: NSA application to FISC prior to target-
ing. Between institution of the review and the final report, FISC 
required the NSA to seek approval to query the database on a 
case-by-case basis. FISC was particularly concerned that the 
NSA had averred that having access to all call detail records 
“is vital to NSA’s counterterrorism intelligence mission” be-
cause “[t]he only effective means by which NSA analysts are 
able continuously to keep track of [REDACTED] and all af-
filiates of one of the aforementioned entities [who are taking 
steps to disguise and obscure their communications and 
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identities], is to obtain and maintain an archive of metadata 
that will permit these tactics to be uncovered.263 
According to FISC, the NSA had also suggested that: 
To be able to exploit metadata fully, the data must be col-
lected in bulk . . . . The ability to accumulate a metadata ar-
chive and set it aside for carefully controlled searches and 
analysis will substantially increase NSA’s ability to detect 
and identify members of [REDACTED].264 
Because the order being sought meant, if granted, that the 
NSA would be collecting call detail records of U.S. persons lo-
cated within the United States, who were not themselves the 
target of any FBI investigation and whose metadata could not 
otherwise be legally obtained in bulk, FISC had adopted mini-
mization procedures. It had required, inter alia, that: 
[A]ccess to the archived data shall occur only when NSA has 
identified a known telephone identifier for which, based on 
the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on 
which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts 
giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the tel-
ephone identifier is associated with [REDACTED].265 
FISC had a difficult time believing the NSA’s claim that its non-
compliance with FISC’s orders resulted from NSA personnel be-
lieving that FISC’s restrictions on access to the business records 
metadata only applied to “archived data” (that is, data located in 
certain databases). “That interpretation of [FISC’s] Orders,” Judge 
Reggie Walton wrote, “strains credulity.”266 The NSA had com-
pounded its bad behavior by repeatedly submitting inaccurate 
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descriptions of how it developed and used the alert list process.267 
In support of its claim that the program was vital for U.S. national 
security, the NSA had offered as evidence the paltry claim that, 
after nearly three years of sweeping up all telephony metadata, 
the NSA had generated 275 domestic security reports that, in turn, 
had spurred three preliminary investigations.268 
FISC objected to the government’s assertion that FISC “need 
not take any further remedial action.”269 FISC has also noted 
that, until the NSA has completed the review, “[FISC] sees little 
reason to believe that the most recent discovery of a systemic, 
ongoing violation—on February 18, 2009—will be the last.”270 
Accordingly, starting in March 2009, though the NSA could 
continue to collect data and to test the telephony metadata sys-
tem, it would only be allowed to query it with a FISC order—
or, in an emergency, to query the database and then to inform 
FISC by 5:00 PM, Eastern Time, on the next business day.271 In 
September 2009, however, FISC lifted the requirement for the 
NSA to seek approval in every case.272 
The second protection FISC introduced was, starting on July 3, 
2009, to require the NSA to file a weekly report with FISC, listing 
each time, over the seven-day period ending the previous Fri-
day, in which the NSA had shared, “in any form, information 
obtained or derived from the [REDACTED] BR metadata collec-
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tions with anyone outside NSA.”273 Again, consistent with tradi-
tional FISA, FISC added special protections for U.S. persons: 
For each such instance, the government shall specify the 
date on which the information was shared, the recipient of 
the information, and the form in which the information was 
communicated (e.g., written report, email, oral communica-
tion, etc.). For each such instance in which U.S. person in-
formation has been shared, the Chief of Information Sharing 
of NSA’s Signals Intelligence Directorate shall certify that 
such official determined, prior to dissemination, the infor-
mation to be related to counterterrorism information and 
necessary to understand the counterterrorism information or 
to assess its importance.274 
In August 2009, the government submitted its end-to-end as-
sessment of the NSA telephony metadata system.275 FISC lifted 
its requirements, leaving future dissemination decisions up to 
the NSA. Whether the requirements with which the NSA was 
left effectively check the exercise of authorities is questionable. 
Before the dissemination of information of U.S. persons’ infor-
mation outside the Agency, an NSA official must determine 
that the information is “related to counterterrorism information 
and is necessary to understand the counterterrorism infor-
mation or assess its importance.”276 Because the government 
already considers all of the information in the database to be 
relevant to counterterrorism investigations, and has already 
argued to FISC (and FISC has agreed), that the collection of 
such data is necessary to understand its counterterrorism in-
formation, the degree to which this restriction really prevents 
such dissemination is open to question. 
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d. Technological Gap 
A critical part of FISC’s failure to provide effective oversight 
of the process relates to FISC’s decision to have the NSA per-
form the targeting decision. Part of the problem also stems 
from FISC’s discomfort with the technological aspects of the 
collection and analysis of digital information. For much of the 
discussion of noncompliance incidents, for instance, it appears 
that neither the NSA nor FISC had an adequate understanding 
of how the algorithms operate. Nor did they understand the 
type of information that had been incorporated into different 
databases, and whether they had been subjected to the appro-
priate legal analysis before data mining. 
A similar problem may accompany the reporting require-
ments to Congress. In March 2009, for example, the DOJ sub-
mitted several FISC opinions and government filings—relating 
to the discovery and remediation of compliance incidents in its 
handling of bulk telephony metadata—to the Chairmen of the 
Intelligence and Judiciary Committees.277 A subsequent letter 
noted that the House and Senate Intelligence and Judiciary 
Committees had received briefings in March, April, and Au-
gust before receiving a copy of the NSA’s review in September 
2009.278 To the extent that the representations of the agency are 
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heavily dependent on technical knowledge, the implications 
may not be readily apparent to lawmakers. 
2. Issuance of Detailed Legal Reasoning and Creation of Precedent 
To enforce the specialized probable cause standard encapsu-
lated in FISA, Congress created a court of specialized but ex-
clusive jurisdiction.279 Its job was to ascertain whether sufficient 
probable cause existed for a target to be considered a foreign 
power, or an agent thereof; whether the applicant had provid-
ed the necessary details for the surveillance; and whether the 
appropriate certifications and findings had been made. 
It is thus surprising that the government considers these or-
ders now to be evidence of precedent, on the basis of which, it 
argues, the programs are legal. In ACLU v. Clapper,280 for in-
stance, the government responded to the argument that it had 
exceeded its statutory authority under FISA by arguing: 
[S]ince May 2006, fourteen separate judges of the FISC have 
concluded on thirty-four occasions that the FBI satisfied this 
requirement, finding “reasonable grounds to believe” that 
the telephony metadata sought by the Government “are rel-
evant to authorized investigations . . . being conducted by 
the FBI . . . to protect against international terrorism.281 
The government went on to cite Judge Eagan’s August 2013 
memorandum opinion in further support of its interpretation 
of “relevance.”282 These were the only points of reference that 
mattered: “Considering that the Government has consistently 
demonstrated the relevance of the requested records to the 
FISC’s satisfaction, as Section 215 requires, it is difficult to un-
derstand how the government can be said to have acted in ex-
cess of statutory authority.”283 
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Even more surprising than the role the granting of orders is 
playing for establishing legal precedent is the revelation that 
FISC has greatly broadened the “special needs” exception to 
the Fourth Amendment to embrace wholesale data collection.284 
Although the Supreme Court has never recognized such an ex-
ception, FISC’s unique constitutional interpretation has served 
to authorize broad collection of information on U.S. citizens. 
Notably, because of the secret nature of FISC’s proceedings and 
the ex parte nature of the court, there are no advocates who 
could appeal a decision based on this interpretation to the Su-
preme Court. Consequently, an unreviewable, complex body of 
law, establishing doctrines unrecognized by the Supreme 
Court, has emerged as precedent for future application to FISC. 
In In re Directives, FISCR looked back at its decision in In re 
Sealed Case to confirm “the existence of a foreign intelligence 
exception to the warrant requirement.”285 It acknowledged that 
FISCR had “avoided an express holding that a foreign intelli-
gence exception exists by assuming arguendo that whether or 
not the warrant requirements were met, the statute could sur-
vive on reasonableness grounds.”286 FISCR went on to deter-
mine that, as a federal appellate court, it would “review find-
ings of fact for clear error and legal conclusions (including 
determinations about the ultimate constitutionality of govern-
ment searches or seizures) de novo.”287 It then asserted, for the 
first time, a foreign intelligence surveillance exception to the 
Fourth Amendment: 
The question . . . is whether the reasoning of the special 
needs cases applies by analogy to justify a foreign intelli-
gence exception to the warrant requirement for surveillance 
undertaken for national security purposes and directed at a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power reasonably be-
lieved to be located outside the United States. Applying 
principles derived from the special needs cases, we conclude 
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that this type of foreign intelligence surveillance possesses 
characteristics that qualify it for such an exception.288 
The court analogized the exception to the 1989 Supreme 
Court consideration of the warrantless drug testing of railway 
workers, on the grounds that the government’s need to re-
spond to an overriding public danger could justify a minimal 
intrusion on privacy.289 The government subsequently cited In 
re Directives in its August 9, 2013 white paper, defending the 
telephony metadata program, in support of an exception to the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.290 
FISC continues to go beyond its mandate. In August 2013, for 
instance, FISC issued a twenty-nine-page Amended Memoran-
dum Opinion regarding the FBI’s July 18, 2013 application for 
the telephony metadata program.291 Appending the seventeen-
page order to the opinion, Judge Claire V. Eagan considered 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the statutory language of 
Section 215, and the canons of statutory construction to justify 
granting the order.292 Similarly, in a 2002 per curiam opinion, 
FISCR suggested the case raised “important questions of statu-
tory interpretation, and constitutionality” and concluded “that 
FISA, as amended by the Patriot Act, supports the govern-
ment’s position, and that the restrictions imposed by the FISA 
court are not required by FISA or the Constitution.”293 
Congress did not design the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court or the Court of Review to develop its own jurisprudence. 
Particularly in light of the secrecy and lack of adversarial pro-
cess inherent in the court, it is concerning that FISC’s decisions 
have taken on a force of their own in legitimizing the collection 
of information on U.S. citizens. 
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3. Judicial Design 
As mentioned above, Congress tried to construct an even-
handed, neutral arbiter by requiring that (a) FISC judges be se-
lected by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from at least 
seven different federal districts; (b) the judges serve staggered 
terms of up to seven years; and (c) having once served, such 
judges are ineligible for further service.294 To ensure diversity, 
any federal district court judge (including a senior judge), who 
has not previously served on FISC, may be selected.295 FISCR, 
in turn, is comprised of judges selected by the Chief Justice.296 
This system has been called into question on two grounds: 
first, the lack of diversity regarding judicial appointment and, 
second, the high rate of applications being granted by FISC. 
Given these characteristics, critics question how effectively 
FISC operates as a check on the executive branch. The observa-
tions are important, but, without more information, it is diffi-
cult to determine the extent to which the current state of affairs 
has substantively impacted the process. 
a. Appointments 
To the extent that political ideology is reflected in the ap-
pointments process, the court is heavily weighted toward one 
side of the political spectrum. The past two Chief Justices have 
been appointed by Republican presidents, and they have tend-
ed to select judges that have been nominated by Republican 
administrations.297 Only one of the current eleven judges serv-
ing on FISC is a Democratic nominee. Over the past decade, of 
the twenty judges appointed to FISC and FISCR, only three 
have been Democratic nominees. 
Although this raises questions about the even-handedness of 
the FISC appointments process, it would be premature to draw 
substantive conclusions based solely on the political makeup of 
the bench. Any meaningful examination of how composition 
influences the outcome of cases would need to compare either 
FISC decisions with other, more diverse courts, or the individual 
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decisions reached by FISC judges appointed by one party with 
decisions reached by judges appointed by the opposing party. 
Such studies would be almost impossible to conduct. FISC 
opinions are classified. Beyond this, they are sui generis, in that 
FISC is the only court that considers FISA applications. It also 
may be that externalities influence which judges opt for FISC 
membership. That is, more Republican appointees than Demo-
cratic appointees may inquire or make clear that they would be 
interested in serving on FISC. No studies have yet been con-
ducted demonstrating why the appointments process aligns 
with political party, making any conclusions as to the effect 
somewhat arbitrary. 
To the extent that political ideology enters into the equation, the 
way in which it has interacted with the court’s role in establishing 
precedent deserves notice, as it undermines the appearance of a 
neutral arbiter and emphasizes deference to and support for 
greater power for the executive. According to the public record, 
FISCR, for instance, has only met twice: once in 2002 and once in 
2008.298 On both occasions, the panels consisted entirely of Repub-
lican appointees, some of whom had publicly argued that FISA 
was an unconstitutional usurpation of executive power. 
Judge Laurence Silberman of the D.C. Circuit testified to 
Congress in 1978 (when FISA was being debated) that the legis-
lation violated the Constitution.299 Judge Silberman, who had 
previously served as Deputy Attorney General, was “absolute-
ly convinced that the administration bill, if passed, would be 
an enormous and fundamental mistake which the Congress 
and the American people would have reason to regret.”300 For 
Judge Silberman, the judiciary’s role in any national security 
electronic surveillance should be circumscribed. He explained: 
																																																																																																																						
 298. See In re Directives [REDACTED] Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA. Ct. Rev. 2008); In re Sealed 
Case, 310 F.3d 717. 
 299. See Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance: Hearings on H.R. 5794, H.R. 
9745, H.R. 7308, and H.R. 5632 Before the Subcomm. on Legislation of the H. Permanent 
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong. 221 (1978) (statement of the Hon. Laurence 
H. Silberman), available at http://www.cnss.org/pages/foreign-intelligence-
surveillance-act-fisa.html, [http://perma.cc/8EMD-ZGLW]. 
 300. Id. at 217. 
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I find the notion that the President’s constitutional authority 
to conduct foreign affairs and to command the armed forces 
precludes congressional intervention into the manner by 
which the executive branch gathers intelligence, by electron-
ic or other means, to be unpersuasive, and in that respect I 
agree with my colleague here to the left. But to concede the 
propriety of a congressional role in this matter is by no 
means—and this is the burden of my testimony—to concede 
the propriety or constitutionality of the judicial role created 
by the administration’s bill.301 
The Judge’s chief concern was not a so-called “imperial presi-
dency,” but the advent of an “imperial judiciary.”302 The authori-
ties transferred to FISC thus represented an unconstitutional 
erosion of executive power.303 Another FISC judge, Ralph Guy, 
similarly argued for the government as a U.S. Attorney in United 
States v. United States District Court304 that the President did not 
need a warrant to engage in national security surveillance.305 
Along with Judge Leavy, a Reagan appointee, Judges Silberman 
and Guy heard the first appeal in the history of FISA—issuing a 
decision that made it possible for the government to use the 
looser restrictions in FISA even in cases in which the primary 
purpose of the investigation was criminal in nature.306 
With the court overwhelmingly constituted by nominees of 
one political party, it is perhaps unsurprising that some of the 
most important decisions have been made by panels entirely 
constituted by the same. The FISCR panel that appears to have 
created a foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment warrant requirement lacked a diverse political base. It 
included Chief Judge Selya and Senior Circuit Judges Winter 
and Arnold—appointees of Presidents Ronald Reagan and 
George H. W. Bush. 
To the extent that political appointments stand in as a proxy 
for political ideologies, such as greater deference to the execu-
tive branch, the lack of diversity in the appointments process—
																																																																																																																						
 301. Id. at 219. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
 304. 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
 305. See generally id. 
 306. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 736 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
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especially in regard to some of the most important and far-
reaching secret decisions issued by the court—raises important 
questions about the extent to which FISC, as conceived by 
Congress, is serving as neutral arbiter. Without more detailed 
information about the judicial process, however, the extent to 
which this is the case remains in question. 
 
FIGURE 1: JUDGES APPOINTED TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE COURT AND COURT OF REVIEW BY ORIGINAL 
APPOINTMENT TO THE BENCH307 
 
District Judge  Court Dates of 
appointment 
Appointing  
President 
Rosemary M. 
Collyer* 
FISC 3/8/2013–3/7/2020 George W. 
Bush
Claire Eagan* FISC 2/13/2013–5/18/2019 George W. 
Bush
Michael W. 
Mosman* 
FISC 5/4/2013–5/3/2020 George W. 
Bush
Raymond J. 
Dearie* 
FISC 7/2/2012–7/1/2019 Ronald 
Reagan 
William C. 
Bryson** 
FISCR 12/1/2011–5/18/2018 Bill Clinton 
Jennifer B. 
Coffman 
FISC 5/19/2011–1/8/2013 Bill Clinton 
F. Dennis Say-
lor IV*
FISC 5/19/2011–5/18/2018 George W. 
Bush
Martin L.C. 
Feldman* 
FISC 5/19/2010–5/18/2017 Ronald 
Reagan 
Susan W. 
Wright* 
FISC 5/19/2009–5/18/2016 George H. 
W. Bush 
Thomas F. Ho-
gan* 
FISC 5/19/2009–5/18/2016 Ronald 
Reagan 
Morris S. Ar- FISCR 6/13/2008–5/18/2015 George H. 
																																																																																																																						
 307 . See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court of Review: Current and Past Members, FEDERATION AM. SCIENTISTS, 
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/fisc-members.pdf, [http://perma.cc/9FVC-
XGMC] (last visited Dec. 2, 2013). 
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nold** W. Bush 
James B. Zagel* FISC 5/19/2008–5/18/2015 Ronald 
Reagan 
Mary A. 
McLaughlin* 
FISC 5/19/2008–5/18/2015 Bill Clinton 
Reggie Wal-
ton* 
FISC 5/19/2007–5/18/2014 George W. 
Bush
Roger Vinson FISC 5/4/2006–5/3/2013 Ronald 
Reagan 
John D. Bates FISC 2/22/2006–2/21/2013 George W. 
Bush
Bruce M. Selya FISCR 5/19/2005–5/18/2012 Ronald 
Reagan 
Malcolm How-
ard 
FISC 5/19/2005–5/18/2012 Ronald 
Reagan 
Frederick J. 
Scullin 
FISC 5/19/2004–5/18/2011 Ronald 
Reagan 
Dee Benson FISC 4/8/2004–4/7/2011 George W. 
Bush
Ralph Winter FISCR 11/14/2003–
5/18/2010
Ronald 
Reagan 
George P. Ka-
zen 
FISC 7/15/2003–5/18/2010 Jimmy 
Carter
Robert Broom-
field 
FISC 10/1/2002–5/18/2009 Ronald 
Reagan 
Colleen Kollar-
Kotelly 
FISC 5/19/2002–5/18/2009 Bill Clinton 
James G. Carr FISC 5/19/2002–5/18/2008 Bill Clinton 
James Robert-
son 
FISC 5/19/2002–
12/19/2005
Bill Clinton 
John E. Con-
way 
FISC 5/19/2002–
10/30/2003
Ronald 
Reagan 
Edward Leavy FISCR 9/25/2001–5/18/2008 Ronald 
Reagan 
Nathaniel M. 
Gorton 
FISC 5/19/2001–5/18/2008 George W. 
Bush
Claude M. Hil-
ton 
FISC 5/18/2000–5/18/2007 Ronald 
Reagan 
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Michael J. Da-
vis 
FISC 5/18/1999–5/18/2006 Bill Clinton 
Ralph B. Guy, 
Jr. 
FISCR 10/8/1998–5/18/2005 Gerald Ford 
Harold A. 
Baker 
FISC 5/18/1998–5/18/2005 Jimmy 
Carter
Stanley S. 
Brotman 
FISC 7/17/1997–5/18/2004 Gerald Ford 
William H. 
Stafford 
FISC 5/19/1996–5/18/2003 Gerald Ford 
Royce C. Lam-
berth 
FISC 5/19/1995–5/18/2002 Ronald 
Reagan 
Laurence H. 
Silberman 
FISCR 6/18/1996–5/18/2003 George W. 
Bush
Paul H. Roney FISCR 9/13/1994–5/18/2001 Richard  
Nixon
John F. Keenan FISC 7/27/1994–5/18/2001 Ronald 
Reagan 
James C. 
Cacheris 
FISC 9/10/1993–5/18/2000 Ronald 
Reagan 
Earl H. Carroll FISC 2/23/1993–5/18/1999 Jimmy 
Carter
Charles 
Schwartz Jr. 
FISC 8/5/1992–5/18/1998 Gerald Ford 
Bobby R. 
Baldock 
FISCR 6/17/1992–5/18/1998 Ronald 
Reagan 
Ralph G. 
Thompson 
FISC 6/11/1990–5/18/1997 Gerald Ford 
Frank H. 
Freedman 
FISC 5/30/1990–5/18/1994 Richard  
Nixon
Wendell A. 
Miles 
FISC 9/21/1989–5/18/1996 Richard  
Nixon
Robert W. 
Warren 
FISCR 10/30/1989–
5/18/1996
Richard  
Nixon
Sidney Arono-
vitz 
FISC 6/8/1989–5/18/1992 Gerald Ford 
Joyce H. Green FISC 5/18/1988–5/18/1995 Jimmy 
Carter
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Conrad K. Cyr FISC 5/18/1987–
11/20/1989
Ronald 
Reagan 
Collins J. Seitz FISCR 3/19/1987–3/18/1994 Lyndon B. 
Johnson 
* Denotes current members of FISC     
**Denotes current members of FISCR 
b. Order Rate 
Augmenting concerns prompted by the lack of diversity in 
terms of appointments to FISC and FISCR is the rather notable 
success rate the government enjoys in its applications to the 
court. Scholars have noted that the success rate is “unparalleled 
in any other American court.”308 Over the first two and a half 
decades, for instance, FISC approved nearly every single appli-
cation without any modification. 309  Between 1979 and 2003, 
FISC denied only three out of 16,450 applications.310 
Since 2003, FISC has ruled on 18,473 applications for electronic 
surveillance and physical search (2003–2008), and electronic sur-
veillance (2009–2012).311 Court supporters note that a significant 
number of these applications are either modified or withdrawn 
by the government prior to FISC ruling. But even here, the num-
bers are quite low: 493 modifications still only comes to 2.6% of 
the total number of applications. Simultaneously, the govern-
ment has only withdrawn twenty-six applications prior to FISC 
ruling.312 These numbers speak to the presence of informal pro-
cesses, whereby FISC appears to be influencing the contours of 
applications. Without more information about the types of mod-
ifications that are being required, however, it is impossible to 
																																																																																																																						
 308. Ruger, supra note 266, at 245. 
 309. See 1 KRIS & WILSON, supra note 167, at 469; Letter from Attorney Gen. William 
French Smith to Dir., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts (Apr. 22, 1981), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1980rept.html, [http://perma.cc/0gryFWv7hZe] 
(“No orders were entered which modified or denied the requested authority, except 
one case in which the Court modified an order and authorized an activity for which 
court authority had not been requested.”). 
 310. LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM: POWER, POLITICS, 
AND LIBERTY 232 (2008). 
 311. See infra Figure 2. 
 312. Id. 
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gauge either the level of oversight or the extent to which FISC is 
altering the applications. 
Critics also point to the risk of capture presented by in camera, 
ex parte proceedings, and note that out of 18,473 rulings, FISC 
has only denied eight in whole and three in part. Whatever the 
substantive effect might be, the presentational impact is of note. 
 
FIGURE 2: FISC RULINGS ON ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND 
PHYSICAL SEARCH (2003–2008) AND ELECTRONIC SURVEIL-
LANCE (2009–2012)313 
 
Year Applications 
on which 
FISC ruled 
Approved Mod-
ified 
Denied 
in part 
Denied 
in whole 
With-
drawn 
by gov’t  
2003314 1727 1724 79 0 3315 0
2004316 1756317 1756 94 0 0 3
2005318 2072319 2072 61 0 0 2
2006320 2176321 2176 73 1 0 5
																																																																																																																						
 313. Starting in 2009, the Department of Justice began providing the breakdown 
of the number approved, modified, denied in part, denied in whole, or withdrawn 
by the government prior to the FISC ruling only for those applications involving 
electronic communications. Prior to that time, these numbers were combined. 
 314. Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legis-
lative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to Mr. L. Ralph Mecham, Dir., Admin. 
Office of the United States Courts (Apr. 30, 2004), available at 
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2003rept.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0Vu9UXSTi4y]. 
 315. An additional application was initially denied but later approved. Id. 
 316. Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legis-
lative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker, 
U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 1, 2005), available at 
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2004rept.pdf, [http://perma.cc/4W63-92U5]. 
 317. Of 1758 submitted, three were withdrawn prior to FISC ruling and one was 
resubmitted. Id. 
 318. Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legis-
lative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker, 
U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 28, 2006), available at 
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2005rept.pdf, [http://perma.cc/UV22-GC3G]. 
 319. Of 2074 submitted, two were withdrawn prior to FISC ruling, and one was 
resubmitted. Id. 
 320. Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legis-
lative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. 
House of Representatives (Apr. 27, 2007), available at 
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2006rept.pdf, [http://perma.cc/32AX-FEYA]. 
 321. Of 2181 submitted, five were withdrawn prior to FISC ruling. Id. 
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2007322 2371 2370 86 1 3323 0
2008324 2082 2083325 2 0 1 0
2009326 1321327 1320 14 1 1 8
2010328 1506329 1506 14 0 0 5
2011330 1674331 1674 30 0 0 2
																																																																																																																						
 322. Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 
Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Nancy 
Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 30, 2008), available at 
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2007rept.pdf, [http://perma.cc/NTD6-
7CJ4]. 
 323. Discrepancy in the numbers stems in part from holdover applications and de-
nials. Two applications, for instance, filed in 2006 were not approved until 2007. Id. 
 324. Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative 
Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Harry Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. 
Senate (May 14, 2009), available at 
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2008rept.pdf, [http://perma.cc/8KA4-E9UC]. 
 325. Discrepancy in the numbers stems in part from holdover applications and 
denials. Two applications filed in CY 2007 were not approved until CY 2008. Id. 
 326. Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative 
Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President, U.S. 
Senate (Apr. 30, 2010), available at https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa 
/2009rept.pdf, [http://perma.cc/5VA5-8R6B]. 
 327. For the first time since 2003, no numbers are available for modifications or 
denials for the full number of applications submitted (physical search, electronic 
surveillance, and combined applications). Instead, the report notes that of the 1376 
total submitted in the former three categories, 1329 were related to electronic sur-
veillance. Eight of these applications were withdrawn, one denied in whole, one 
denied in part, and fourteen modified, with 1320 approved. The number of appli-
cations is thus missing the numbers for physical search and physical search com-
bined applications. Id. 
 328. Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative 
Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Harry Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. 
Senate (Apr. 29, 2011), available at https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa 
/2010rept.pdf, [http://perma.cc/G36L-LBED]. 
 329. The total number of electronic surveillance, physical search, and combined 
applications was 1579. The report, however, isolates the electronic applications (1511), 
and provides breakdowns for modifications, denials, etc., for just that category. Of the 
total of 1511, five were withdrawn by the government prior to FISC ruling. Id. 
 330. Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative 
Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President, U.S. 
Senate (Apr. 30, 2012), available at https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa 
/2011rept.pdf, [http://perma.cc/HD44-EAY5]. 
 331. Note that there were 1745 total applications that included electronic sur-
veillance and physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes. It appears that 
approximately seventy of the orders related solely to physical search, as the 
breakdown for electronic surveillance is only done for the 1674. Two of the initial 
orders were withdrawn prior to FISC ruling. Id. 
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2012332 1788333 1788 40 0 0 1
Totals 18,473 18,469 493 3 8 26 
 
Setting modifications aside for the moment, the deference 
that appears to exist regarding outright denials or granting of 
orders seems to extend to FISC rulings with regard to business 
records. Almost no attention, however, has been paid to this 
area. It appears that FISC has never denied an application for an 
order under this section. That is, of 751 applications since 2005, 
all 751 have been granted, as the following figure shows. 
 
FIGURE 3: ORDERS FOR THE PRODUCTION OF TANGIBLE GOODS 
 
Year Number of applications 
to FISC under 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1862(c)(2)
Number of applications 
granted by FISC 
2005334 155 155
2006335 43 43
2007336 6 6
2008337 13 13
																																																																																																																						
 332. Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Of-
fice of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Harry Reid, 
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (Apr. 30, 2013), available at https://www.fas.org 
/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2012rept.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0KymPaptHiZ]. 
 333. The government made a total of 1856 applications for electronic surveil-
lance or physical searches; of those, 1789 included requests for electronic surveil-
lance. Of those, one was withdrawn by the government prior to FISC ruling. Id. 
 334. Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legis-
lative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Richard B. Cheney, Presi-
dent, U.S. Senate (Apr. 28, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/nsd/foia 
/foia_library/2005fisa-ltr.pdf, [http://perma.cc/UK7V-FQDN]. 
 335. Letter from Richard A. Hertling, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of 
Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Richard B. Cheney, 
President, U.S. Senate (Apr. 27, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/nsd/foia 
/foia_library/2006fisa-ltr.pdf, [http://perma.cc/E9ME-5PEQ]. 
 336. Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., 
Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Richard B. 
Cheney, President, U.S. Senate (Apr. 30, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
nsd/foia/foia_library/2007fisa-ltr.pdf, [http://perma.cc/M5L7-3QGR]. 
 337. Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative 
Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President, U.S. 
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2009338 21 21
2010339 96 96
2011340 205 205
2012341 212 212
Totals 751 751
 
It is important to underscore that the lack of more contextual 
data cautions against inferring too much from the nonexistent 
rate of denial. In passing the tangible goods provision, Congress 
tied the court’s hands, requiring FISC to grant applications once 
the statutory conditions are met.342 To the extent, then, that FISC 
is deferential to the executive, responsibility lies at least in part 
with the legislature. In addition, it is almost impossible to tell, 
outside of the classified world, the extent to which the court 
pushes back on the DOJ—not just in regard to specific orders, 
but in relation to broader rules and procedures, as well as in an 
oversight capacity. Two examples come to mind. 
In 2010, John D. Bates, Presiding Judge of FISC, issued a de-
classified Rules of Procedure, requiring notice and briefing of nov-
																																																																																																																						
Senate (May 14, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/nsd/foia/foia_library/ 
2008fisa-ltr.pdf, [http://perma.cc/RVY8-GWLR]. 
 338. Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative 
Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President, U.S. 
Senate (Apr. 30, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/nsd/foia/foia_library/ 
2009fisa-ltr.pdf, [http://perma.cc/MNA7-XGLD]. 
 339. Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative 
Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President, U.S. 
Senate (Apr. 29, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/nsd/foia/foia_library/ 
2010fisa-ltr.pdf, [http://perma.cc/3QQX-NK9W]. 
 340. Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative 
Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President, U.S. 
Senate (Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/nsd/foia/foia_library 
/2011fisa-ltr.pdf, [http://perma.cc/57T5-CYR2]. 
 341. Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Of-
fice of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Joseph R. Biden, 
Jr., President, U.S. Senate (Apr. 30, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov 
/nsd/foia/foia_library/2012fisa-ltr.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0tNcrgUS6nx]. 
 342. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1) (2006) (“Upon an application made pursuant to this 
section, if the judge finds that the application meets the requirements of subsec-
tions (a) and (b), the judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested, or as modi-
fied approving the release of tangible things.” (emphasis added)). 
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el issues before the court.343 This document suggested that FISC 
would not, in the future, simply accept applications in new areas 
of the law without first considering the underlying legal issues. 
Second, the recently-released judicial opinions from 2009 
suggest that FISC was pressuring the NSA with regard to its 
failure to ensure that the identifiers run against the database be 
subjected to a test of reasonable, articulable suspicion. The 
court was clearly uncomfortable with the pattern of misinfor-
mation that had marked the government’s previous representa-
tions to FISC. But, these same documents also reveal the extent 
to which the court relies on the NSA to police its own activi-
ties—again raising questions about the extent to which FISC 
adequately performs its envisioned role. As a final note, it is 
important to recognize that the sheer volume of the numbers 
associated with the tangible goods provisions (751) is remarka-
ble in part because any one order could result in the collection 
of millions of records on millions of people, as we have seen 
with the telephony metadata program. In light of the in cam-
era, ex parte proceedings, these numbers raise further ques-
tions about FISC’s role. 
II. BULK COLLECTION AND FISA’S STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The telephony metadata program violates FISA’s express 
statutory language in three areas: first, with regard to the lan-
guage “relevant to an authorized investigation”; second, in re-
lation to the requirement that the information sought be ob-
tainable under subpoena duces tecum; and third, in its 
violation of the restrictions specifically placed on pen registers 
and trap and trace equipment. 
A.  “Relevant to an Authorized Investigation” 
The government argues that the NSA’s telephony metadata 
program is consistent with the language of 50 U.S.C. § 1861 in that 
all telephone calls in the United States, including those of a wholly 
																																																																																																																						
 343. FISA CT. R. 11, available at https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/fiscrules-
2010.pdf, [http://perma.cc/5K96-A4LZ]. The current rules, issued November 1, 
2010, superseded both the Feburary 17, 2006 Rules of Procedure and the May 5, 
2006 Procedures for Review of Petitions Filed Pursuant to Section 501(f) of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, As Amended. 
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local nature, are “relevant” to foreign intelligence investigations. 
The word “relevant” itself, the administration states, “is a broad 
term that connotes anything ‘[b]earing upon, connected with, [or] 
pertinent to a’ specified subject matter.”344 Turning to its “particu-
larized legal meaning,” the government argues: 
It is well-settled in the context of other forms of legal process 
for the production of documents that a document is ‘rele-
vant’ to a particular subject matter not only where it directly 
bears on that subject matter, but also where it is reasonable 
to believe that it could lead to other information that directly 
bears on that subject matter.345 
That massive amounts of data may be involved is of little import: 
Courts have held in the analogous contexts of civil discovery 
and criminal and administrative investigations that ‘rele-
vance’ is a broad standard that permits discovery of large 
volumes of data in circumstances where doing so is necessary 
to identify much smaller amounts of information within that 
data that directly bears on the matter being investigated.346 
Applied to the telephony metadata program, though recogniz-
ing that the telephony metadata program is “broad in scope,” 
the government argues that there are nevertheless “reasonable 
grounds to believe” that the category of data (i.e., all telephone 
call data), when queried and analyzed, “will produce infor-
mation pertinent to FBI investigations of international terror-
ism.”347 For communications data, the government argues, con-
nections between individual data points can only be reliably 
identified through large-scale data mining.348 As DOJ explained 
to Congress: “The more metadata NSA has access to, the more 
likely it is that NSA can identify, discover and understand the 
network of contacts linked to targeted numbers or addresses.”349 
																																																																																																																						
 344. SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 9 (quoting 13 THE OXFORD ENG-
LISH DICTIONARY 561 (2d ed. 1989)). 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. at 1–2. 
 347. Id. at 2. 
 348. See id. 
 349. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY’S BULK COL-
LECTION PROGRAMS FOR USA PATRIOT ACT REAUTHORIZATION 5 (2011), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2011_CoverLetters_Report_Collection.pdf, 
[http://perma.cc/S7CD-E8Z7]. 
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There are two sets of responses to the government’s argu-
ments. The first centers on the government’s claim that all te-
lephony metadata is relevant. The second concerns the connec-
tion in the statutory language between the relevance of the 
information to be obtained and “an authorized investiga-
tion.”350 
1. Relevance Standard 
Four legal arguments undermine the government’s claim 
that there are “reasonable grounds” to believe that hundreds of 
millions of daily telephone records are “relevant” to an author-
ized investigation. First, the NSA’s interpretation of “relevant” 
collapses the statutory distinction between relevant and irrele-
vant records, thus obviating the government’s obligation to 
discriminate between the two. Second, this reading renders 
meaningless the qualifying phrases in the statute, such as “rea-
sonable grounds.” Third, the government’s interpretation es-
tablishes a concerning legal precedent. Fourth, the broad read-
ing of “relevant” contravenes congressional intent. 
First, in ordinary usage, something is understood as relevant 
to another thing when a demonstrably close connection be-
tween the two objects can be established.351 This is also the way 
in which courts have consistently applied the term to the col-
lection of information—as with grand-jury subpoenas, where 
the information collected must bear some actual connection to 
a particular investigation.352 
																																																																																																																						
 350. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iii) (2006). 
 351. See, e.g., OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1474 (3d ed. 2010) (defining rele-
vant as “the state of being closely connected or appropriate to the matter in 
hand”); MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1051 (11th ed. 2006) (defin-
ing “relevant” as “having significant and demonstrable bearing on the matter at 
hand”); see also Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Pre-
liminary Injunction at 9–12, ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13-cv-03994 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 
2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/natsec/clapper/2013.08.26% 
20ACLU%20PI%20Brief.pdf, [http://perma.cc/CCV9-ZSHT]. 
 352. See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 383, 387–88 (2004) (noting 
that “overbroad” discovery orders were “anything but appropriate” because they 
“ask[ed] for everything under the sky”); Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 
U.S. 214, 221 (1951) (overturning use of a “catch-all provision” in a subpoena on 
grounds that it was “merely a fishing expedition to see what may turn up”); In re 
Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.) (narrowing a grand-jury 
subpoena because it improperly required an individual to turn over the contents 
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In contrast, almost none of the information the government 
obtained under the bulk metadata collection program is de-
monstrably linked to an authorized investigation. The govern-
ment itself has admitted this. Writing to Representative James 
Sensenbrenner, Peter Kadzik, the Principal Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General, acknowledged, “most of the records in the 
dataset are not associated with terrorist activity.”353 FISC Judge 
Reggie Walton drew the point more strongly: 
The government’s applications have all acknowledged that, 
of the [REDACTED] of call detail records NSA receives per 
day (currently over [REDACTED] per day), the vast majority 
of individual records that are being sought pertain neither to 
[REDACTED] . . . In other words, nearly all of the call detail 
records collected pertain to communications of non-U.S. 
persons who are not the subject of an FBI investigation to ob-
tain foreign intelligence information, [and] are communica-
tions of U.S. persons who are not the subject of an FBI inves-
tigation to protect against international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities.354 
In other words, most of the information being collected does 
not relate to any individuals suspected of any wrongdoing. 
In defense of its broad interpretation, the government argues 
that it must collect irrelevant information to ascertain what is 
relevant. This means that the NSA, in direct contravention of 
the statutory language, is collapsing the distinction between 
relevant and irrelevant records—a distinction that Congress 
required be made before collection. Because of this collapse, the 
NSA is gaining an extraordinary amount of information. The 
records the government sought under the telephony metadata 
program detail the daily interactions of millions of Americans 
who are not themselves connected in any way to foreign pow-
																																																																																																																						
of multiple filing cabinets “without any attempt to define classes of potentially 
relevant documents or any limitations as to subject matter or time period”). 
 353. Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. 
Department of Justice, to the Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives 2 (July 16, 2013), available at http://1.usa.gov/12GN8kW, 
[http://perma.cc/9F49-US7R]. 
 354. In re Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], BR 08-13, at 11–12 
(FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/ 
documents/section/pub_March%202%202009%20Order%20from%20FISC.pdf, 
[http://perma.cc/9YZ-CMCV]. 
840 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 37 
ers or agents thereof. They include private and public interac-
tions between senators, between members of the House of Rep-
resentatives, and between judges and their chambers, as well as 
information about state and local officials. They include par-
ents communicating with their children’s teachers, and 
zookeepers arranging for the care of animals. Metadata infor-
mation from calls to rape hotlines, abortion clinics, and political 
party headquarters are likewise not exempt from collection—
the NSA is collecting all telephony metadata. 
Second, in addition to collapsing the distinction between rel-
evant and irrelevant records, reading FISA to allow this type of 
collection would neuter the qualifying phrases contained in 50 
U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A). The statute requires, for instance, that 
there be “reasonable grounds” to believe that the records being 
sought are relevant.355 Although FISA does not define “reason-
able grounds,” the Supreme Court has treated this phrase as 
the equivalent of “reasonable suspicion.”356 This standard re-
quires a showing of “specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 
warrant” an intrusion on an individual’s right to privacy.357 
The FISC order requires that Verizon disclose all domestic tel-
ephone records—including those of a purely local nature.358 Ac-
cording to Verizon Communications News Center, as of last 
year the company had 107.7 million wireless customers, connect-
ing an average of 1 billion calls per day.359 It is impossible that 
the government provided specific and articulable facts showing 
reasonable grounds for the relevance of each one of those cus-
																																																																																																																						
 355. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A). 
 356. See, e.g., United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36 (2003); United States v. 
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227 (1985); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 
881–82 (1975); KRIS & WILSON, supra note 167, § 19:3. 
 357. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 
 358. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangi-
ble Things from Verizon Bus. Network Svcs., Secondary Order, BR 13-80, at 2 (FISA 
Ct. Apr. 25, 2013), available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/ 
2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order?guni=Article:in%20body%20link, 
[http://perma.cc/C6XM-RWNM]. 
 359 . Verizon Communications Company Statistics, VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS 
NEWS CENTER, http://www.statisticbrain.com/verizon-communications-company-
statistics/, [http://perma.cc/J267-NK6Y] (last visited March 13, 2014). 
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tomers or calls. Interpreting all records as relevant effectively 
renders the “reasonable grounds” requirement obsolete. 
The statute does not explain precisely what makes a tangible 
item relevant to an authorized investigation. Nevertheless, the 
act suggests that tangible things are “presumptively relevant” 
when they:  
[P]ertain to—(i) a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power; (ii) the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign 
power who is the subject of such authorized investigation; 
or (iii) an individual in contact with, or known to, a suspect-
ed agent of a foreign power who is the subject of such au-
thorized investigation.360 
This section appears not to apply to the telephony metadata 
program. It would be impossible to establish that all customer and 
subscriber records pertain to a foreign power or an agent thereof, 
or to a particular, suspected agent of the same, who is the subject 
of an authorized investigation. Perhaps five or ten customers may 
fall into this category, but to include millions simply pushes the 
bounds of common sense. Accordingly, the telephony metadata 
are neither relevant nor presumptively relevant. 
Third, the breadth of the government’s interpretation estab-
lishes a troubling precedent. If all telephony metadata are rele-
vant to foreign intelligence investigations, then so are all e-mail 
metadata, all GPS metadata, all financial information, all bank-
ing records, all social network participation, and all Internet 
use. Both the DOJ and FISC have suggested that there may be 
other programs in existence that operate in a similar fashion.361 
Some media reports appear to support this. On September 28, 
2013, for instance, the New York Times reported that the NSA 
“began allowing the analysis of phone call and email logs in 
November 2010 to begin examining Americans’ networks of 
																																																																																																																						
 360. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A). 
 361. See, e.g., In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production 
of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], BR 13-109, at 19–20 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 
2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br13-09-primary-
order.pdf, [http://perma.cc/95LF-ACV7] (“This Court has previously examined 
the issue of relevance for bulk collections. See [6 LINES OF REDACTED TEXT] 
While those matters involved different collections from the one at issue here, the 
relevance standard was similar.”). 
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associations.”362 If all telephony metadata are relevant, then so 
are all other data—which means that very little would, in fact, 
be irrelevant to such investigations. If this is the case, then such 
an interpretation radically undermines not just the limiting 
language in the statute, but the very purpose for which Con-
gress introduced FISA in the first place. 
Fourth, the government’s interpretation directly contradicts 
Congress’s intent in adopting Section 215. At the introduction 
of the measure, Senator Arlen Specter explained that the lan-
guage was meant to create an incentive for the government to 
use the authority only when it could demonstrate a connection 
to a particular suspected terrorist or spy.363 During a House Ju-
diciary Committee meeting on July 17, 2013, Representative 
James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) reiterated that Congress inserted 
“relevant” into the statute to ensure that only information di-
rectly related to national security probes would be included—
not to authorize the ongoing collection of all phone calls placed 
and received by millions of Americans not suspected of any 
wrongdoing.364 Soon afterwards, he wrote: 
This expansive characterization of relevance makes a mock-
ery of the legal standard. According to the administration, 
everything is relevant provided something is relevant. Con-
gress intended the standard to mean what it says: The rec-
ords requested must be reasonably believed to be associated 
with international terrorism or spying. To argue otherwise 
renders the standard meaningless.365 
Other members of Congress have made similar claims.366 
																																																																																																																						
 362. James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Examines Social Networks of U.S. Citi-
zens, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 29, 2013, at A1. 
 363. 151 CONG. REC. 13,440 (2005). 
 364. Oversight of the Administration’s Use of FISA Authorities: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Rep. James Sensenbrenner). 
 365. James Sensenbrenner, How secrecy erodes democracy, POLITICO, July 22, 2013, 
http://politi.co/1baupnm, [http://perma.cc/9CG4-NM2Y]. 
 366. See, e.g., Oversight of the Administration’s Use of FISA Authorities: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (July 17, 2013) (statement of Rep. 
Jerrold Nadler) (“[I]f we removed that word from the statute, [the government] 
wouldn’t consider . . . that it would affect [its] ability to collect meta-data in any 
way whatsoever, which is to say [it is] disregarding the statute entirely.”). 
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2. Connection to “an Authorized Investigation” 
There are three ways in which the telephony metadata pro-
gram violates FISA’s requirement in section 1861 that the order 
be sought for use in an “authorized investigation.”367 First, the 
guidelines establishing when such an investigation exists apply 
solely to the initial collection of the information. The FISC order, 
by contrast, allows the collection of the data on an ongoing basis, 
tying instead the search of such information to authorized inves-
tigations. Second, under the Attorney General guidelines, for 
each of the levels there is a predicate specificity required before 
the collection of information: namely, that the investigation be 
premised on specific individuals, groups, or organizations, or 
violations of criminal law. The telephony metadata program, in 
contrast, requires no such specificity before the collection of the 
data. Third, the orders issued by FISC empower the NSA to 
conduct searches of the data in future authorized investigations. 
In other words, the collection of the metadata is considered rele-
vant to investigations generally. This means that the orders do 
not, in fact, relate to (existing) authorized investigations. 
a. Collection of the Information 
FISA, as mentioned above, requires that the government sub-
mit a statement of facts demonstrating reasonable grounds to 
believe that the records being sought are relevant to an author-
ized investigation (other than a threat assessment).368 Its defini-
tion of an “authorized investigation” refers to guidelines ap-
proved by the Attorney General under Executive Order 
12,333.369 The most recent of these guidelines, the Attorney Gen-
eral’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations, provides three cate-
gories of investigations: assessments (i.e., “threat assessments” 
under the 2003 guidelines and Section 215); predicated investiga-
tions (subdivided into “preliminary” and “full” investigations); 
and enterprise investigations (a variant of full investigations).370 
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 370. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR DO-
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FISA, as noted above, makes it clear that the tangible records in 
question may not be sought as part of the first level of national 
security investigations, the assessment stage.371 There is an im-
portant reason for this restriction. It is the most general level 
and, as such, lacks the factual predicate required for the use of 
more intrusive techniques of information gathering. 
Between 2003 and 2008, for instance, at the threat assessment 
stage the FBI could collect information on “individuals, groups, 
and organizations of possible investigative interest, and infor-
mation on possible targets of international terrorist activities or 
other national security threats.”372 But the only techniques al-
lowed, as noted by the Attorney General, were “relatively non-
intrusive investigative techniques.”373 This included: 
																																																																																																																						
(Oct. 3, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/October/08-ag-
889.html, [http://perma.cc/MHT7-MSXY] (noting that the new, consolidated 
guidelines “replace five existing sets of guidelines that separately addressed crim-
inal investigations generally, national security investigations, and foreign intelli-
gence collection, among other matters. In contrast to previous guidelines, the new 
guidelines are generally unclassified, providing the public with ready access in a 
single document to the basic body of operating rules for FBI activities within the 
United States”). For the previous guidelines, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTOR-
NEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR FBI NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND FOR-
EIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION (2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/ 
agency/doj/fbi/nsiguidelines.pdf, [http://perma.cc/7NPR-3SV3] [hereinafter AG’S 
NSI GUIDELINES] (redacted in part); see also David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of 
Tangible Things, LAWFARE RES. PAPER SERIES, Sept. 29, 2013, at 17, available at 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Lawfare-Research-Paper-
Series-No.-4-2.pdf, [http://perma.cc/3Z99-EJN9]. Also note that on December 16, 
2008, the FBI issued a Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide to help to im-
plement the September 2008 Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations. FBI Records: 
the Vault, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, available at 
http://vault.fbi.gov/FBI%20Domestic%20Investigations%20and%20Operations%20
Guide%20%28DIOG%29/fbi-domestic-investigations-and-operations-guide-diog-
2008-version, [http://perma.cc/D29U-JPAW]. A new FBI Domestic Investigations 
and Operations Guide was released Oct. 15, 2011 and updated June 15, 2012. See 
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS 
GUIDE (2012), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/email-content-
foia/FBI%20docs/June%202012%20FBI%20DIOG.pdf, [perma.cc/ZPD5AVV3]. In 
addition to the AG-Dom (Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Opera-
tions), and the DIOG (Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide), every FBI 
HQ operational division has a PG (policy implementation guide) that supplements 
the DIOG. Id. at xxix. 
 371. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A). 
 372. AG’S NSI GUIDELINES, supra note 370, at 3. 
 373. Id. 
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[O]btaining publicly available information, accessing infor-
mation available within the FBI or Department of Justice, re-
questing information from other government entities, using 
online informational resources and services, interviewing 
previously established assets, non-pretextual interviews and 
requests for information from members of the public and 
private entities, and accepting information voluntarily pro-
vided by governmental or private entities.374 
Nowhere in the discussion of the threat assessment stage did the 
2003 guidelines contemplate the use of court-ordered surveillance. 
In 2008, the Attorney General expanded the tools that could 
be used during the assessment stage to include: publicly avail-
able information; all available federal, state, local, tribal, or for-
eign governmental agencies’ records; online services and re-
sources; human source information; interviews or requests for 
information from members of the public and private entities; 
information voluntarily provided by governmental or private 
entities; observation or surveillance not requiring a court order; 
and grand jury subpoenas for telephone or electronic mail sub-
scriber information.375 The addition of the last two items broad-
ened the type of information that could be obtained. Similarly, 
whereas the previous guidelines noted that mail covers, mail 
openings, and nonconsensual electronic surveillance or any 
other investigative technique covered by 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–
2521 “shall not be used during a preliminary inquiry,”376 the 2008 
guidelines dropped any equivalent language. 
Even with the broadening, however, under FISA, tangible 
goods may not be obtained under section 215 during the assess-
ment stage. The purpose is to place a higher burden on the gov-
ernment to justify the use of more intrusive surveillance. If such 
methods are to be used, and the related information collected, 
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 375. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMES-
TIC FBI OPERATIONS, supra note 370, at 20. 
 376. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL 
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there must be a factual predicate establishing a higher level of suspicion 
as to the presence of criminal activity or a threat to national security.377 
For preliminary investigations, this means that the govern-
ment must have information or an allegation indicating the ex-
istence of criminal activity or a threat to U.S. national security 
prior to initiating the investigation.378 For a full investigation, 
there must be “an articulable factual basis for the investigation 
that reasonably indicates” criminal activity or a threat to U.S. 
national security.379 For an enterprise investigation (a variant of 
a full investigation), there must be an articulable factual basis 
for the investigation reasonably indicating “that the group or 
organization may have engaged or may be engaged in, or may 
have or may be engaged in planning or preparation or provi-
sion of support for” racketeering, international terrorism or 
other threats to U.S. national security, domestic terrorism, fur-
thering political or social goals wholly or in part through activi-
ties that involve force or violence and a violation of federal 
criminal law, or a closed range of other offences.380 The guide-
lines thus distinguish between the different levels based on a 
factual predicate of wrongdoing, which then acts as a valve on the 
level of intrusiveness that the government can adopt in collect-
ing more information. 
In contrast, the primary order for the telephony metadata pro-
gram does not follow this approach. Instead, it authorizes the 
collection of data for 90-day periods without any factual predicate 
supporting the acquisition or collection of data. It is thus incompati-
ble with the approach adopted in the Attorney General’s guide-
lines. The order also shifts the emphasis to the analysis of such 
data—which is to be conducted in connection with an author-
ized investigation. This is not, however, what is required by the 
FBI’s own guidelines. It is the collection of such information that 
																																																																																																																						
 377. The guidelines explain: “A predicated investigation relating to a federal 
crime or threat to the national security may be conducted as a preliminary inves-
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is premised on the existence of an authorized investigation—not 
the subsequent analysis of data in the course of the same. 
b. Specificity 
According to the Attorney General’s guidelines, for predicate 
investigations (for which tangible items orders under Section 215 
may be sought) specificity is required before the collection of in-
formation—namely, the investigation must be premised on the 
past or present wrongdoing or foreign intelligence activities of 
specific individuals, groups, or organizations. The telephony 
metadata program, in contrast, collects all call records, without 
specifying the individuals, groups, or organizations of interest. 
For the past decade, specificity has been integral to the 
guidelines’ approach. Under the 2003 Attorney General’s 
guidelines, for instance, preliminary investigations were au-
thorized “when there is information or an allegation indicating 
that a threat to the national security may exist.”381 Such investi-
gations were particular, in that they related to specific individ-
uals, groups, and organizations.382 
Under the 2008 guidelines, a preliminary investigation must 
relate to “a” federal crime or threat to national security.383 For 
foreign intelligence gathering, the guidelines require that only 
full investigations be used. 384  These are defined in singular 
terms, such as “[a]n activity constituting a federal crime or a 
threat to national security.”385 Alternatively, the circumstances 
may indicate that “[a]n individual, group, organization, entity 
is or may be a target of attack, victimization, acquisition, infil-
tration, or recruitment in connection with criminal activity.”386 
For enterprise investigations, the text of the guidelines clearly 
refers to “the group or organization.”387 
Not only are the investigations specific regarding the targets, 
they are specific regarding the facts that support the initiation of 
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the predicate investigation. For enterprise investigations, this 
means that there must be “an articulable factual basis for the in-
vestigation that reasonably indicates that the group or organiza-
tion” was involved in the commission of certain crimes and ac-
tivities.388 Full investigations, in turn, require specific and articu-
articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national 
security may exist.389 Like preliminary investigations, such in-
quiries are specific in that they may relate to individuals, groups, 
and organizations.390 In contravention of the Attorney General 
guidelines, the telephony metadata program collects data, using 
precisely those tools that are limited to preliminary and full in-
vestigations, absent the specificity otherwise required. 
c. Future Authorized Investigations 
Third, FISA contemplates the relevance of information to an 
investigation already in existence at the time the order is granted. 
The statutory language is very specific. Applications must in-
clude “a statement of facts showing that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant 
to an authorized investigation.”391 The placement of the word 
“are” before the word “relevant” suggests that at the time the 
records are being sought, their relevance to an investigation 
must be established. 
The orders issued by FISC, however, depart from the statutory 
language, empowering the NSA to obtain the data in light of 
their relevance to future “authorized investigations”—and re-
quiring telecommunications companies to indefinitely provide 
such information in the future.392 How can the court know that 
all such telephony data will be relevant to investigations that are 
not yet opened? As noted by amici in In re Electronic Privacy In-
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 391. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2006). 
 392. In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Re-
quiring the Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-80, at 2–
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formation Center, Congress could have used any number of alter-
native auxiliary verbs—”such as ‘can’; ‘could’; ‘will’; or ‘might.’ 
But it chose not to do so. Instead, Congress required relevance to 
an investigation existing at the time of the application.”393 
In addition, the information sought must be relevant “to an au-
thorized investigation.” This is both singular (“an”) and past 
tense, in that it has already been “authorized.” The House Report 
that accompanied the first introduction of the business records 
provisions explained that the purpose of this language was to 
provide “for an application to the FISA court for an order direct-
ing the production of tangible items such as books, records, pa-
pers, documents and other items upon certification to the court 
that the records sought are relevant to an ongoing foreign intelligence 
investigation.”394 Yet, how can the court with any certainty suggest 
that all investigations in the future will be authorized? 
The government’s argument, instead of centering on a par-
ticular investigation, appears to create a categorical exception 
for the collection of records. Specifically, it argues that when 
the government “has reason to believe that conducting a search 
of a broad collection of telephony metadata records will pro-
duce counterterrorism information . . . the standard of rele-
vance under Section 215 is satisfied.”395 That is, the determina-
tion depends on the nature of the information to be extracted, 
not on the prior existence of a directly related, authorized in-
vestigation. “Authorized investigations” thus become merely a 
category for which the information is useful.396 The language in 
the FISC order is not “an authorized investigation,” but, rather, 
“authorized investigations.”397 
That the government has one investigation open on al Qaeda, 
or even “thousands of open full or enterprise investigations on 
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suspected terrorists.”). 
 397. See In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order 
Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-80, at 
2–3 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents 
/PrimaryOrder_Collection_215.pdf, [http://perma.cc/TB5P-C8TZ]. 
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terrorist groups or targets, and their sponsors, some or all of 
which could underlie the bulk telephony metadata collection 
applications and orders,”398 fails to justify the collection of so 
many records—indeed, most of those collected—that are not in 
any way directly connected to these authorized investigations. 
This interpretation, moreover, contradicts congressional intent. 
As Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, one of the principal 
authors of the USA PATRIOT Act, noted, “Congress intended to 
allow the intelligence communities to access targeted infor-
mation for specific investigations. How can every call that every 
American makes or receives be relevant to a specific investiga-
tion? This is well beyond what the Patriot Act allows.”399 
B. Subpoena Duces Tecum 
The only express limit on the type of tangible item that can 
be subject to an order under 50 U.S.C. § 1861 is that it “can be 
obtained with a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the 
United States in aid of a grand jury investigation or with any 
other order issued by a court of the United States directing the 
production of records or tangible things.”400 Although it may be 
said as a general matter that Congress intended intelligence 
collection to be subject to different standards than those that 
apply in a criminal context, in at least the provisions relevant to 
tangible goods, it is clear that a criminal standard governs the 
type of information that can be obtained via order. Specifically, 
the collection must be consistent with a subpoena duces tecum. 
The government argues that the telephony metadata pro-
gram is consistent with this provision, and that its determina-
tion must be given the highest level of deference by the 
courts.401 FISC has expressed its agreement with the govern-
ment’s position: 
																																																																																																																						
 398. Kris, supra note 370, at 20. 
 399. Jim Sensenbrenner, This abuse of the Patriot Act must end, THE GUARDIAN, 
June 9, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/09/abuse-
patriot-act-must-end, [http://perma.cc/UJW3-P4PG]. 
 400. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D) (2006). 
 401. See, e.g., Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Mo-
tion for a Preliminary Injunction at 17 n.8, ACLU v. Clapper, 13-cv-3994 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 1, 2013) (citing United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991) (grand 
jury subpoena challenged on relevancy grounds must be upheld unless “there is 
no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the Government seeks will 
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Call detail records satisfy [the subpoena duces tecum] re-
quirement, since they may be obtained by (among other 
means) a ‘court order for disclosure’ under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703(d). Section 2703(d) permits the government to obtain 
a court order for release of non-content records, or even in 
some cases of the contents of a communication, upon a 
demonstration of relevance to a criminal investigation.402 
To evaluate the government’s claim, it is first necessary to 
consider the legal instrument. A subpoena duces tecum is a 
writ or process used to command a witness to bring with him 
and produce to the court books, papers, and other items, over 
which he has control and which help to elucidate the matter at 
hand.403 Unlike warrants, something less than probable cause is 
required.404 The rationale behind this is that the purpose of the 
instrument is not to conduct a search absent a suspect’s con-
sent, but, rather, to obtain documents and information that the 
prosecution has concluded will be material in a case.405 
The authority to issue a subpoena is not unlimited. Under 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, “the court may quash 
or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable 
or oppressive.”406 Precisely what counts as reasonable (or not) 
is heavily context-dependent.407 In United States v. Nixon,408 the 
Court laid out a three-part test, requiring the government to 
establish relevancy, admissibility, and specificity, in order to 
enforce a subpoena in the trial context.409 
																																																																																																																						
produce information relevant to the general subject of the grand jury’s investiga-
tion”)), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/2013.10.01_govt_oppn_to_ 
pi_motion.pdf, [http://perma.cc/7BSL-PJ7T]; NLRB v. Am. Med. Response, Inc., 
438 F.3d 188, 193 (2d Cir. 2006) (in a proceeding to enforce an administrative sub-
poena, “the agency’s appraisal of relevancy” to its investigation “must be accept-
ed so long as it is not obviously wrong,” and the “district court’s finding of rele-
vancy” will be affirmed unless it is “clearly erroneous”). 
 402. In re Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], Supplemental 
Opinion, No. BR 08-13, at 2 n.1 (FISA Ct. Dec. 12, 2008). 
 403. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *382. 
 404. See United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991). 
 405. Joshua Gruenspecht, “Reasonable” Grand Jury Subpoenas: Asking for Infor-
mation in the Age of Big Data, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 543, 544 (2011). 
 406. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(2). 
 407. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985). 
 408. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
 409. See id. at 699–700. 
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The Nixon standard, however, does not apply in the context 
of grand jury proceedings.410 In 1991 the Court explained: 
The multifactor test announced in Nixon would invite pro-
cedural delays and detours while courts evaluate the rele-
vancy and admissibility of documents sought by a particu-
lar subpoena . . . . Requiring the Government to explain in 
too much detail the particular reasons underlying a sub-
poena threatens to compromise the ‘indispensable secrecy 
of grand jury proceedings.’ Broad disclosure also affords 
the targets of investigation far more information about the 
grand jury’s workings than the Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure appear to contemplate.411 
The Court went on to note that this does not mean that the 
grand jury’s investigatory powers are limitless; to the contrary, 
they are still subject to Rule 17(c).412 Nevertheless, grand jury 
subpoenas are given the benefit of the doubt, with the burden 
of showing unreasonableness on the recipient seeking to avoid 
compliance. 413  For claims of irrelevancy, motions to quash 
“must be denied unless the district court determines that there 
is no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the 
Government seeks will produce information relevant to the 
general subject of the grand jury’s investigation.”414 
At the broadest level, then, the government’s assertion, at least 
with regard to the burden of proof regarding the information to 
be obtained and the deference afforded a grand jury subpoena, 
appears to be valid. But there are three critical flaws in the gov-
ernment’s reasoning: first, subpoenas may not be used for fish-
ing expeditions; second, they must be focused on specific indi-
viduals or alleged crimes prior to the collection of information; and 
third, the emphasis is on past wrongdoing—not on potential fu-
ture relationships and actions. In addition, remarkably, FISC has 
admitted that the telephony metadata order it issued violates the 
statutory language requiring that the information to be obtained 
comport with the requirements of a subpoena. 
																																																																																																																						
 410. R. Enters., 498 U.S. at 297–99. 
 411. Id. at 298–99 (citations and quotations omitted). 
 412. Id. at 299. 
 413. Id. at 301. 
 414. Id. 
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1. Fishing Expeditions 
The government’s contention, consistent with United States v. R. 
Enterprises, Inc., is that to fall outside the statutory confines, there 
must be no reasonable possibility that the category of materials 
sought under Section 215 will produce relevant information.415 
Although that case did give a fair amount of latitude in the stand-
ard of relevancy applied to grand jury subpoenas, it also estab-
lished important limits. “Grand juries,” the Court wrote, “are not 
licensed to engage in arbitrary fishing expeditions.”416 
In other words, subpoenas may not be used to obtain massive 
amounts of information from which evidence of wrongdoing—
absent prior suspicion—can be derived. A grand jury, for exam-
ple, could not convene in Bethesda, Maryland, and simply begin 
collecting telephony metadata, which it could subsequently mine 
to find evidence of criminal behavior. To the contrary, an investi-
gator must have a reasonable suspicion that some document or 
communication exists, and that it is directly relevant to the inves-
tigation in question, for the Court to order its production. 
The Court has used this logic to quash a subpoena duces te-
cum requiring that computer hard drives and floppy disks be 
produced.417 The subpoena requested was held to be overbroad 
because the subpoenaed materials “contain[ed] some data con-
cededly irrelevant to the grand jury inquiry.”418 Judge Mukasey 
quashed the subpoena on the grounds that the government 
could narrow the documents requested prior to acquisition.419 
He also rejected the claim that the broader sweep of infor-
mation was justified by the breadth of the investigation un-
derway: even an “expanded investigation” did “not justify a 
subpoena which encompassed documents completely irrele-
vant to its scope.”420 
																																																																																																																						
 415. See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition, supra note 401, at 18–19. 
 416. R. Enters., 498 U.S. at 299. 
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 419. Id. at 13–14. 
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As discussed above in relation to the relevance standard, al-
most all of the telephony metadata collected under Section 215 is 
unrelated to criminal activity. In Judge Reggie Walton’s words, 
“Ordinarily, this alone would provide sufficient grounds for a 
FISC judge to deny the application.”421 The principle at work 
here was recognized by the Eastern District of New York: 
“While the standard of relevancy [as applied to subpoenas] is a 
liberal one, it is not so liberal as to allow a party ‘to roam in 
shadow zones of relevancy and to explore matter which does 
not presently appear germane on the theory that it might con-
ceivably become so.’”422 A subpoena duces tecum may not be 
used to compel the production of records simply because at 
some point, in the future, they might become relevant. 
In a world limited by the physical manifestation of evidence, 
practicality helped to cabin the scope of subpoenas. Technolo-
gy may have changed what is possible in terms of the volume 
and nature of records that can be obtained and stored, and the 
level of insight that can be gleaned. But it does not invalidate 
the underlying principle. Subpoenas, even those issued by 
grand juries, may not be used to engage in fishing expeditions. 
2. Specificity 
Grand jury investigations are specific. That is, they repre-
sent investigations into particular individuals, or particular 
entities, in relation to which there is reasonable suspicion that 
some illegal behavior has occurred. The compelled produc-
tion of records or items is thus limited by reference to the tar-
get of the investigation. 
																																																																																																																						
and six others, over a multi-year period); Ealy v. Littlejohn, 569 F.2d 219, 227 (5th 
Cir. 1978) (“When the grand jury goes on a fishing expedition in forbidden waters, 
the courts are not powerless to act.”); Cessante v. City of Pontiac, No. CIV. A. 07-
cv-15250, 2009 WL 973339, at *12 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 9, 2009) (“While some of the 
information sought may be relevant or lead to relevant information, the request 
for ‘anything and everything’ is overly broad and not narrowly tailored to meet 
the relevancy requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b).”). 
 421. In re Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], Order, No. BR 08-
13, at 9 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/ 
documents/section/pub_March%202%202009%20Order%20from%20FISC.pdf, 
[perma.cc/3YGG-NBTQ]. 
 422. In re Fontaine, 402 F. Supp. 1219, 1221 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (quoting Broadway 
& Ninety Sixth St. Realty Co. v. Loew’s, Inc., 21 F.R.D. 347, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)). 
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If a grand jury were, for instance, focused on the potentially 
criminal acts of the head of a crime family in New York, absent 
reasonable suspicion of some sort of connection to the syndi-
cate, it could not issue a subpoena for the telephone records of 
the Parent-Teacher’s Association at Briarwood School in Santa 
Clara, California. In contrast, the Section 215 orders are broad 
and non-specific. That is, on the basis of no particular suspi-
cion, all call records, many of which are of a purely local na-
ture, are swept up by the NSA.423 
In response to this argument, the government points out that 
there is some precedent in the law for the government to collect 
records in bulk that may be relevant to an investigation and 
then to subject such records to subsequent analysis to deter-
mine which items are, in fact, relevant. In one case, the Eighth 
Circuit upheld a subpoena, even though most of the records 
bore no relationship to any criminal activity.424 This case, how-
ever, fails to support the government’s argument with regard 
to Section 215 and the bulk collection of metadata. 
In In re Grand Jury Proceedings, the government served two 
grand jury subpoenas duces tecum on Western Union.425 The 
first required production of monthly wire transactions at the 
Royalle Inn, Kansas City, Missouri, for a period of thirteen 
months. 426  The second required production of Telegraphic 
Money Order Applications above $1000 from the Royalle Inn, 
Kansas City, Missouri, between January 1984 and February 
1986.427 Western Union moved to quash the subpoenas on the 
ground that they amounted to an unreasonable search and sei-
zure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.428 The government 
responded by alleging that drug dealers in Kansas City were 
using Western Union to transmit money.429 
																																																																																																																						
 423. See In re an Application From the FBI for the Production of Tangible Things 
from [REDACTED], Order, No. 06-05, at 2 (FISA Ct. May 24, 2006), available at 
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/785206/pub-may-24-2006-order-from-
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The Eighth Circuit noted that it had previously held that 
Western Union customers have no privacy interest in Western 
Union records.430 The court cited the Supreme Court’s holding 
in United States v. Miller, in which the Supreme Court deter-
mined, consistent with Smith v. Maryland, that bank customers 
do not enjoy a legitimate expectation of privacy in bank records 
subject to subpoena.431 
The court in In re Grand Jury specifically noted that the re-
quest at issue—namely, the production of records from Royalle 
Inn—was not as sweeping as subpoenas that the judiciary had 
found to be outside the bounds of acceptability. In Federal Trade 
Commission v. American Tobacco Co., for instance, the Supreme 
Court refused to uphold the FTC’s direction to two tobacco 
companies to produce letters and contracts.432 The FTC had 
claimed “an unlimited right of access to the respondents’ pa-
pers . . . relevant or irrelevant, in the hope that something 
[would] turn up.”433 The Eighth Circuit similarly declined to 
uphold a subpoena calling for an attorney’s records over a ten-
year period. 434  The collection of all U.S. persons’ telephony 
metadata is more properly considered in the same league as 
FTC v. American Tobacco Co. and Schwimmer v. United States, in 
which the courts recognized the overbroad use of government 
authority, as opposed to the more limited collection of infor-
mation at issue in In re Grand Jury Proceedings. 
3. Past Crimes 
Grand jury investigations are also retroactive, searching for 
evidence of a past crime. The telephony metadata orders, in 
contrast, are both past- and forward-looking, in that they antic-
ipate the possibility of illegal behavior in the future. Although 
most of the individuals in the database are suspected of no 
wrongdoing whatsoever, the minimization procedures allow 
for any information obtained from mining the data to then be 
																																																																																																																						
 430. United States v. Gross, 416 F.2d 1205, 1213 (8th Cir. 1969); accord Newfield 
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 432. See FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305 (1924). 
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used in criminal prosecution. This is an unprecedented use of 
subpoena information-gathering authority amounting to a 
permanent, ongoing grand jury investigation into all possible 
future criminal acts. 
4. March 2009 FISC Opinion 
FISC has openly recognized that the information it obtains from 
the metadata program could not otherwise be collected with any 
other legal instrument—including a subpoena duces tecum. In a 
secret opinion in March 2009, Judge Reggie Walton wrote: 
Because the collection would result in NSA collecting call 
detail records pertaining to [REDACTED] of telephone 
communications, including call detail records pertaining to 
communications of United States (U.S.) persons located 
within the U.S. who are not the subject of any FBI investiga-
tion and whose metadata could not otherwise be legally cap-
tured in bulk, the government proposed stringent minimiza-
tion procedures that strictly controlled the acquisition, 
accessing, dissemination, and retention of these records by 
the NSA and FBI.435 
Later in the document, he again noted that the information 
“otherwise could not be legally captured in bulk by the gov-
ernment.”436 These assertions directly contradict the statutory 
requirement that the information could otherwise be obtained 
via subpoena duces tecum and amount to an admission, by the 
court, that the program violated the statute. 
What makes the the court’s failure to stop the illegal program 
even more concerning, perhaps, is Judge Walton’s explanation 
of why, even though the information could not legally be ob-
tained in any other way, FISC allowed the government to pro-
ceed. He continued: 
Nevertheless, the FISC has authorized the bulk collection of 
call detail records in this case based upon: (1) the govern-
ment’s explanation, under oath, of how the collection of and 
access to such data are necessary to analytical methods that 
are vital to the national security of the United States; and (2) 
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minimization procedures that carefully restrict access to the 
BR metadata and include specific oversight requirements.437 
In other words, FISC allowed an illegal program to operate be-
cause the government (1) promised that it was vital to U.S. na-
tional security, and (2) was directed by the court to police its 
own house by following the minimization procedures. The 
former is a flimsy excuse for allowing the executive branch to 
break the law. The latter highlights the extent to which the 
court, precisely because of the size of the collection program in 
question, was dependent on the NSA: “In light of the scale of 
this bulk collection program, the Court must rely heavily on 
the government to monitor this program to ensure that it con-
tinues to be justified . . . and that it is being implemented in a 
manner that protects the privacy interests of U.S. persons.”438 
Recall that Congress created FISC to protect U.S. persons’ 
privacy interests. Congress did not anticipate that FISC would 
simply hand over this responsibility to the NSA. 
C. Evisceration of Pen-Trap Provisions 
All of the information obtained through the telephony 
metadata program is already provided for in FISA’s pen register 
and trap and trace provisions.439 The FISC order requires that 
telecommunication service providers turn over all telephony 
metadata between the United States and abroad or wholly with-
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 439. The government recently declassified two FISC opinions about a bulk elec-
tronic communications metadata program conducted under the Pen Register and 
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lease, Office of the Dir. of Intelligence, DNI Clapper Declassifies Additional 
Intelligence Community Documents Regarding Collection Under Section 501 of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (Nov. 18, 2013), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-
2013/964-dni-clapper-declassifies-additional-intelligence-community-documents-
regarding-collection-under-section-501-of-the-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-
act-nov, [perma.cc/54VA-5H6A]. 
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in the United States, including local telephone calls.440 Telephony 
metadata, in turn, includes “comprehensive communications 
routing information, including but not limited to session identi-
fying information (e.g., originating and terminating telephone 
number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) num-
ber, International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) 
number, etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers, 
and time and duration of call.”441 It does not include the name, 
address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer.442 
Under FISA subchapter three, the government may obtain 
customers’ and subscribers’ telephone numbers, local or long 
distance telephone records, and “any records reflecting the pe-
riod of usage (or sessions) by the customer or subscriber.”443 
The government may also obtain any “associated routing or 
transmission information” related to the telephone or instru-
ment number of the customer or subscriber.444 
Unlike the NSA’s current practice, however, each order under 
the pen-trap provisions must be approved by either FISC or a 
magistrate judge appointed for the purpose of approving pen-
trap orders under FISA.445 Orders must specify the precise iden-
tity (if known) of the person who is the subject of the investiga-
tion, and the person to whom is leased or in whose name the 
telephone line is listed.446 Heightened protections are provided 
for U.S. persons: collection may not be conducted solely on the 
basis of otherwise protected First Amendment activity.447 
																																																																																																																						
 440. In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Re-
quiring the Production of Tangible Things from Verizon Business Network Ser-
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 443. 50 U.S.C. § 1842d (2006). 
 444. Id. 
 445. Id. § 1842(b)(2). 
 446. Id. § 1842(d)(2)(A)(i)-(ii). 
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What the NSA is doing with the telephony metadata pro-
gram is essentially obtaining all of this same information, with-
out first making a particularized showing in relation to the tar-
get, obtaining an individualized court order, or ensuring the 
U.S. persons’ data are given heightened protection. The issue is 
thus not whether U.S. persons’ data are being collected “solely 
on the basis of otherwise protected First Amendment activi-
ty”—but that they are being collected without any individualized 
suspicion and on no basis whatsoever. In essence, the NSA has 
sidestepped the carefully-constructed protections of subchapter 
three to collect all telephony metadata. 
D. Potential Violation of Other Provisions of Criminal Law 
There are, in addition, other statutory provisions that raise 
questions about the legality of the current telephony metadata 
program. In December 2008, FISC issued a “Supplemental 
Opinion” giving the court’s reasons for concluding that the 
records to be produced pursuant to the telephony metadata 
orders were properly subject to production under 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1861.448 The reason behind the order appears to be that, alt-
hough such orders were previously approved, for the first time 
the government had identified the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2702–2703 that are relevant to the question. 
Under 50 U.S.C. § 1861, Congress empowered the govern-
ment to apply to FISC “for an order requiring the production of 
any tangible things (including books, records, papers, docu-
ments, and other items).”449 The court placed special emphasis 
on the use of the word “any,” suggesting that it “naturally 
connotes ‘an expansive meaning,’ extending to all members of 
a common set, unless Congress employed “language limiting 
[its] breadth.”450 
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The court had apparently considered “any” to be without 
limit, until 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702–2703 was brought to its atten-
tion.451 This statute laid out an apparently exhaustive set of cir-
cumstances under which telephone service providers could 
provide customer or subscriber records to the government.452 
An order under 50 U.S.C. § 1861 was not included in this list.453 
At the same time that Congress had passed section 215 of the 
USA PATRIOT Act, moreover, it had amended sections 2702 
and 2703 in ways that appeared to re-affirm that communica-
tions service providers could only divulge records to the gov-
ernment in particular circumstances—without specifically not-
ing FISC orders.454 
Judge Walton reconciled this tension in a most curious man-
ner. He pointed to National Security Letters—a completely dif-
ferent form of subpoena (i.e., an administrative subpoena), not-
ing that in the USA PATRIOT Act, Congress empowered the 
FBI, without prior judicial review, to compel a telephone ser-
vice provider to produce “subscriber information and toll bill-
ing records information,” on the basis of FBI certification of rel-
evance to an authorized foreign intelligence investigation.455 
Judge Walton pointed to the heightened requirements of Sec-
tion 1861, i.e., that the government provide a “statement of 
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
the tangible things sought are relevant” to a foreign intelli-
gence investigation, and that FISC determine that the applica-
tion is sufficient.456 He then noted that Section 2703(c)(2) ex-
pressly permits the government to use administrative 
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subpoenas to obtain certain categories of non-content infor-
mation from a provider—and concluded that Congress surely 
could not have intended a higher standard for FISC orders.457 
The problem with his reasoning is that despite the precision 
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702–2703 and the concurrent amendment of 
these sections with the introduction of USA PATRIOT Act sec-
tion 215, Congress nowhere included in the language of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2703–2703 provision for FISC orders as an exception 
to the closed set. Instead, it allowed the provision of telephony 
metadata to the government only in two cases: first, when the 
governmental entity uses an administrative subpoena author-
ized by a federal or state statute; or, second, when a federal or 
state grand jury or trial subpoena issues.458 The next paragraph, 
moreover, ties the provision directly to the actual commission 
of a crime. A court order for disclosure under Section 2703(c) 
may only be issued by a court of competent jurisdiction where 
the government can provide “specific and articulable facts 
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that . . . the records or other information sought, are relevant 
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”459 The types 
of records the FBI sought from FISC, by contrast, extended well 
beyond records either relevant or material to an ongoing crimi-
nal investigation. Furthermore, under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), the 
judiciary is empowered to quash or modify such orders where 
the records being requested “are unusually voluminous in na-
ture.”460 It would be difficult to imagine any telephony metada-
ta database more voluminous than one collecting all call data in 
the United States. As such, the statute contemplates yet further 
limits on the collection of information. 
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In its White Paper, the government argues that the telephony 
metadata collection program complies with the Constitution.461 
In so doing, it relies on Smith v. Maryland, in which the Su-
preme Court held that participants in telephone calls lack a 
reasonable expectation of privacy (for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment) in the telephone numbers dialed and received on 
one’s phone.462 Judge Eagan similarly relies on Smith in her 
August 2013 memorandum opinion on the bulk collection pro-
gram.463 It is the only Supreme Court Fourth Amendment case 
that she directly discusses, on the grounds that it is dispositive 
of the question of whether the NSA has the authority to collect 
all telephony metadata.464 
The government’s reliance on Smith v. Maryland is problem-
atic. The case involved individualized, reasonable cause to be-
lieve that the target of the pen register engaged in criminal be-
havior and threatening and obscene conduct.465 The placement 
of the pen register, moreover, was obtained via consent.466 Most 
importantly, significant technological and societal changes 
mean that the intrusiveness of the technology and the resultant 
harm to U.S. citizens’ privacy interests are fundamentally dif-
ferent from the situation that the Court confronted in 1979. 
The cornerstone of the government’s argument is Katz v. Unit-
ed States, a case in which the Supreme Court supplemented tres-
pass doctrine with a reasonable expectation of privacy.467 But 
Katz itself was an effort by the Court to understand the Fourth 
Amendment in light of changing technologies. Since that time, 
tension has developed into what is now a split on the Court be-
tween those who consider Fourth Amendment incursions in 
terms of physical trespass, and those who adopt the reasoning of 
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Katz more broadly. Thus, a series of cases involving thermal 
scanners,468 GPS devices,469 and highly-trained dogs470 have di-
vided along these lines. 
Regardless of which approach one adopts, there is a strong 
argument that bulk collection falls within constitutional protec-
tions. The telephony metadata program amounts to a general 
warrant, the prohibition of which gave rise to the Fourth 
Amendment. The reason such warrants were rejected is be-
cause they amounted to granting the government an indefinite 
right of trespass, for which redress (because of their execution 
with legal sanction) could not be sought. Beyond the general 
warrant concern, the bulk telephony metadata program digital-
ly trespasses on the private lives of U.S. citizens. 
Under the reasonable expectation of privacy test, Americans 
do not expect that information provided to telephone service 
providers will be collected wholesale by the government to as-
certain whom they call, who calls them, how long they talk, 
and where they are located when they do so. Most Americans 
do not even realize that they are providing this information to 
their telephone companies when they make a phone call. Nor 
do they realize the significant social network and substantive 
analysis that can be performed on this data to generate new 
insights into their private lives. 
A variant of the government’s argument suggests that the 
only point at which an individual has a privacy interest is not 
at the moment of acquisition of data, but at the moment when 
the data is subjected to individual queries or logarithmic pro-
cessing. That is, the “search” in question relies on two addi-
tional considerations: (a) whether knowledge is being extracted 
(or further knowledge is being generated) from a broader data 
set comprised of third party data and (b) whether a human in-
terlocutor is involved in the exchange. 
There are a number of problems with this approach. In addi-
tion to the trespass and reasonable expectation considerations 
discussed above, the Supreme Court has never carved out an 
“automation exception” to the Fourth Amendment. It is at the 
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point that the thermal imaging device records heat signatures, 
that the GPS chip is attached, and that the dog steps onto the 
porch, that the search has occurred. That is the point at which 
an individual’s private information is recorded. In addition, 
human beings have been involved in the process all the way 
along—regardless of the nature of the collection device. A hu-
man being makes the decision to obtain telephony metadata 
and to record it. Human beings program the equipment and 
arrange for it to be activated and to receive the information. 
They decide how it will be stored, accessed, and shared in the 
future. Analysis of the data is simply the final step in a long 
series of human decisions. 
A final argument offered in support of the program is that, 
even if privacy interests are recognized, the national security 
interests at stake override whatever privacy intrusion arises 
from the bulk collection of telephony metadata.471 Variants of 
this argument emphasize threats that the country faces and the 
extent to which access to information significantly strengthens 
the intelligence community’s hand. DOJ explained to Congress: 
“[T]hese . . . collection programs significantly strengthen the 
Intelligence Community’s early warning system for the detec-
tion of terrorists and discovery of plots against the home-
land.”472 This claim lacks specificity. Usefulness qua usefulness 
is never sufficient justification for overriding statutory or con-
stitutional constraints. 
A. The Problem with Smith v. Maryland 
The Fourth Amendment establishes “[t]he right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”473 In 1967, the Su-
preme Court interpreted this language in a manner that pro-
tected people, not places. 474  Justice Stewart, writing for the 
Court, explained, “What a person knowingly exposes to the 
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public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve 
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be con-
stitutionally protected.”475 As Justice Harlan noted in his con-
currence, the question is both subjective and objective: An in-
dividual must have exhibited an actual expectation of privacy 
and that expectation must “be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”476 Resultantly, “a man’s home is, for 
most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, 
activities, or statements that he exposes to the ‘plain view’ of 
outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no intention to keep them 
to himself has been exhibited.”477 
In Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that a pen reg-
ister placed on a telephone line did not constitute a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, because per-
sons making phone calls do not have a reasonable expectation 
that the numbers they dial will remain private.478 The key sen-
tence from the decision centered on the customer’s relationship 
with the telephone company: “A person has no legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to 
third parties.”479 It is this sentence that spawned what has come 
to be known as the “third party doctrine.”480 
The government relies on this opinion and the resultant 
third-party doctrine to argue that the telephony metadata pro-
gram is constitutional. In the DOJ’s August 2013 White Paper, 
it suggests that a Section 215 order is not a search because “the 
Supreme Court has expressly held participants in telephone 
calls lack any reasonable expectation of privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment in the telephone numbers dialed.”481  In 
ACLU v. Clapper, the government again cited to the Court’s rea-
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soning in Smith v. Maryland that, even if a subscriber harbored 
a subjective expectation that the numbers dialed would remain 
private, it would not be reasonable because individuals have 
“no legitimate expectation of privacy in information” voluntar-
ily turned over “to third parties.”482 The government suggested 
that because courts subsequently followed Smith to find no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the sending or receipt of e-
mail and Internet protocol addressing information, as well as 
subscriber information, “Smith is fatal to Plaintiffs’ claim that 
the collection of metadata records of their communications vio-
lates the Fourth Amendment.”483 
Judge Eagan similarly relied almost exclusively on Smith v. 
Maryland in her August 2013 opinion: “The production of tele-
phone service provider metadata is squarely controlled by the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Maryland.”484 She rea-
soned that because customers are aware that telephone service 
providers maintain call detail records in the normal course of 
business, customers assume the risk that the telephone compa-
ny will provide those records to the government.485 That infor-
mation was collected in bulk was of no consequence: “[W]here 
one individual does not have a Fourth Amendment interest, 
grouping together a large number of similarly-situated indi-
viduals cannot result in a Fourth Amendment interest spring-
ing into existence ex nihilo.”486 
The problem with these arguments is that they fail to consider 
the specific facts and circumstances in Smith. They also fail to 
address critical ways in which the privacy interests impacted by 
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the use of pen registers and their application to broad sectors of 
the population have changed as technology has advanced.487 
First, consider the facts of Smith v. Maryland. On March 5, 1976, 
Patricia McDonough was robbed in Baltimore, Maryland.488 After 
giving the police a description of the robber and a 1975 Monte 
Carlo she had seen near the scene of the crime, she started receiv-
ing threatening and obscene phone calls from a man who identi-
fied himself as the robber.489 At one point, the caller asked her to 
go out in front of her house.490 When she did, Ms. McDonough 
saw the 1975 Monte Carlo moving slowly past her home.491 On 
March 16, the police observed a car of the same description in her 
neighborhood.492 Tracing the license plate, police discovered that 
the car was registered to Michael Lee Smith.493 
The following day, the police asked the telephone company, 
without a warrant, to install a pen register to trace the numbers 
called from Smith’s home telephone.494 The company agreed, 
and that same day Smith called Ms. McDonough’s home.495 On 
the basis of this and other information, the police applied for 
and obtained a warrant to search Smith’s house.496 Upon exe-
cuting the warrant, police found a telephone book with the 
corner turned down to Ms. McDonough’s name and number.497 
In a subsequent six-man lineup, Ms. McDonough identified 
Smith as the person who robbed her.498 
Although the police did not obtain a warrant prior to in-
stalling the pen register, at a minimum, reasonable suspicion 
had been established that the target of the surveillance, Michael 
Lee Smith, had robbed, threatened, intimidated, and harassed 
Patricia McDonough. The police, accordingly, installed the pen 
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register consistent with their reasonable suspicion that Smith 
was engaged in criminal wrongdoing. 
The telephony metadata program is an entirely different sit-
uation. The NSA is engaging in bulk collection absent any rea-
sonable suspicion that the individuals, whose telephone infor-
mation is being collected, are engaged in any wrongdoing. To 
the contrary, almost all of the information obtained will bear no 
relationship whatsoever to criminal activity. The government, 
however, wants to place a pen register and trap and trace on all 
U.S. persons—essentially treating everyone in the United States 
as though they are Michael Lee Smith. 
In Smith, the police wanted only to record the numbers di-
aled from the suspect’s telephone.499 Although it is now often 
forgotten, at the time the case was decided telephone compa-
nies were treated as utilities, with local telephone calls billed by 
the minute. What was unique about the technology involved in 
the pen register was that it could both identify and record the 
numbers dialed from a telephone—a function that the phone 
company itself did not have. The purpose of the pen register 
was therefore specific and limited. 
By contrast, the bulk collection program now collects the 
numbers dialed, the numbers that call a particular number, 
trunk information, and session times. While the police in 1976 
were concerned with whether Michael Lee Smith was calling 
one specific number, the NSA metadata program now collects 
all numbers called—in the process obtaining significant 
amounts of information about individuals. Calls to a rape crisis 
line, an abortion clinic, a suicide hotline, or a political party 
headquarters reveal significantly more information than what 
was being sought in Smith. This makes the sheer amount of in-
formation available significantly different. 
Trunk information, moreover, reveals not just the target of a 
particular telephone call, but where the callers and receivers 
are located.500 At the time of Smith, the police were only able to 
tell when someone was located at Smith’s home. The telephone 
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did not follow Smith around. In contrast, mobile technologies 
now allow the police to ascertain where persons are located, 
creating a second layer of surveillance based simply on trunk 
identifier information. The bulk collection of records, moreo-
ver, means that the government has the ability to do that for 
not just one person, but for the entire country. 
Further characteristics distinguish the case. In Smith v. Mary-
land, for instance, the police sought the information for a short 
period. The bulk metadata collection program, by contrast, 
while continued at 90-day intervals, has been operating for 
seven years now and the NSA argues that it should be a per-
manent part of the government surveillance program. 
In Smith, the telephone company consented to placing the 
pen register on the line. There was no element of compulsion 
involved. This is a critical element in the analysis. The Fourth 
Amendment only applies to government actors. To the extent, 
then, that private companies are acting in their private capaci-
ties, the Fourth Amendment does not apply. In 1989, however, 
the Supreme Court considered a case in which a railroad com-
pany conducted drug testing on employees at the behest of the 
government.501 The Supreme Court held that when private ac-
tors act under compulsion of the sovereign authority, they 
must be viewed as an instrument or agent of the government.502 
In the case of the telephony metadata program (and in con-
trast to the situation in Smith v. Maryland), the government is 
compelling the telephone companies to produce all telephony 
metadata, under court order and with threat of sanction for 
failing to abide by the terms of the secondary order. The tele-
communication service providers are thus acting directly at the 
behest of the government and, as such, should be considered 
within the reach of the Fourth Amendment. 
Perhaps the most important difference between the two situ-
ations lies in the realms of technology and social construction. 
The extent to which we rely on electronic communications to 
conduct our daily lives is of a fundamentally different scale 
and complexity than the situation that existed at the time the 
Court heard arguments in Smith. Resultantly, the extent of in-
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formation that can be learned about not just individuals, but 
about neighborhoods, school boards, political parties, Girl 
Scout troops—indeed, about any social, political, or economic 
network—simply by the placement of a pen register or trap 
and trace, is far beyond what the Court contemplated in 1979. 
B. More Intrusive Technologies and Their Impact on Privacy 
The government argues that even if one sets aside Smith v. 
Maryland and considers the collection of telephony metadata to 
be a search, it is nevertheless reasonable. 503 This claim dramati-
cally understates both the evolution of technology and the in-
trusiveness of the program. Millions of Americans’ communi-
cations are currently being tracked. The data include intimate 
details about U.S. citizens’ lives that can be mined for further 
information. Significant social analysis can also be conducted 
on the data. Sophisticated algorithms, for instance, can be ap-
plied to pen register information to ascertain where the im-
portant nodes are in a network. Alliances, friendships, and 
predilections can be uncovered by studying patterns in behav-
ior. And unlike raw content, the type of information that can be 
gleaned is ordered—making it in some ways even more useful 
than content itself. 
Consider the sheer volume of communications being moni-
tored. Although the FISC orders that the government has re-
leased and acknowledged relate solely to one company (Veri-
zon), officials have also acknowledged that the acquisition of 
telephony metadata extends to the largest telephone service 
providers in the United States: Verizon, AT&T, and Sprint.504 
This means that every time the average U.S. citizen makes a 
telephone call, the NSA is collecting the location, the number 
called, the time of the call, and the length of the conversation.505 
The numbers are worth noting. According to the Wall Street 
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Journal, Verizon has 98.9 million wireless customers and 22.2 
million landline customers; AT&T has 107.3 million wireless 
customers and 31.2 million landline customers; and Sprint has 
55 million customers in total.506 In short, the program monitors 
hundreds of millions of people. 
As for the type of information obtained, the FISC order re-
quests that the telephone service providers give the govern-
ment all “call detail information,” a term that is defined by 
regulatory provision as: “Any information that pertains to the 
transmission of specific telephone calls, including, for out-
bound calls, the number called, and the time, location, or dura-
tion of any call and, for inbound calls, the number from which 
the call was placed, and the time, location, or duration of any 
call.”507 The FISC order further directs that the company pro-
vide “session identifying information,” such as originating and 
terminating number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity 
number, and the International Mobile station Equipment Iden-
tity number.508 As Edward Felten, a Professor of Computer Sci-
ence at Princeton University, recently explained to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee: 
These are unique numbers that identify the user or device 
that is making or receiving a call. Although people who 
want to evade surveillance can make it difficult to connect 
these numbers to their individual identities, for the vast ma-
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jority of ordinary Americans these numbers can be connect-
ed to the specific identity of a person.509 
The FISC order also directs the company to provide trunk iden-
tifier information. This data traces the route a telephone call 
takes, in the process establishing the location of the people tak-
ing part in the conversation.510 
What can be done with this information is a significantly 
deeper intrusion on Americans’ right to privacy than was at 
issue in Smith. As Felten explains, “Telephony metadata is easy 
to aggregate and analyze because it is, by its nature, structured 
data.”511 Sophisticated data-mining and link-analysis programs 
can be used to then analyze this information, and it can do so 
more quickly, deeply, and cheaply than in the past. Even the 
amount of data that can be retained for such analysis is of a 
radically different scale than was conceivable in 1979. 
From this information, the government can determine patterns 
and relationships, such as personal details, habits, and behaviors, 
that U.S. citizens had no intention or expectation of sharing.512 The 
government can also obtain content. Felten writes: 
[C]ertain telephone numbers are used for a single purpose, 
such that any contact reveals basic and often sensitive in-
formation about the caller. Examples include support hot-
lines for victims of domestic violence and rape. Similarly, 
numerous hotlines exist for people considering suicide, in-
cluding specific services for first responders, veterans, and 
gay and lesbian teenagers. Hotlines exist for sufferers of var-
ious forms of addiction, such as alcohol, drugs, and gam-
bling. Similarly, inspectors general at practically every fed-
eral agency—including the NSA—have hotlines through 
which misconduct, waste, and fraud can be reported, while 
numerous state tax agencies have dedicated hotlines for re-
porting tax fraud. Hotlines have also been established to re-
port hate crimes, arson, illegal firearms and child 
abuse . . . . The phone records indicating that someone called 
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a sexual assault hotline or a tax fraud hotline will of course 
not reveal the exact words that were spoken during those 
calls, but phone records indicating a 30-minute call to one of 
these numbers will still reveal information that virtually 
everyone would consider extremely private.513 
Even if U.S. citizens wanted to opt out of having this infor-
mation collected, it would be virtually impossible to do so. 
There have, for instance, been advances in encryption. But 
these technologies all revolve around content—not metadata. 
Although some technologies are focused on metadata, these are 
not sufficiently advanced to allow for real-time communica-
tion.514 The only option is therefore not to use a telephone. The 
cost of doing so, however, would lean towards divesting one-
self of a role in the modern world—impacting one’s social rela-
tionships, employment, and ability to conduct financial and 
personal affairs. 
Notably, all of these considerations are focused on telephony 
metadata. But the logic of the government’s argument, as ap-
plied to metadata generally, has virtually no limit. One could 
equally argue that all financial flows, Internet usage, and e-mail 
exchanges are relevant to ongoing terrorism investigations un-
der section 215. Almost all forms of metadata could be at stake. 
Americans have contractual relationships with myriad cor-
porate entities, to whom they have entrusted parts of their 
lives, such as friendships, correspondence, buying patterns, 
and financial records. Creating a contractual relationship with 
Safeway, however, to gain access to reduced prices for food, is 
something different in kind from divulging to the U.S. gov-
ernment that you keep kosher, help to support your mother, 
and attend synagogue. Americans reasonably expect that their 
movements, decisions, and communications will not be record-
ed and analyzed by the intelligence agencies. 
C. Judicial Tension: Trespass and Katz’s Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy 
In Katz v. United States, the Court replaced the previous tres-
pass doctrine with one based on a reasonable expectation of 
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privacy. The Court explained, “The fact that the electronic de-
vice employed to” record Katz’s conversation “did not happen 
to penetrate the wall of the phone booth can have no constitu-
tional significance.”515 For the Court, the Constitution protected 
electronic violations, as much as physical intrusions, into space 
otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
Katz itself was an effort by the Court to come to terms with 
new technologies. Since that time, tension has emerged and 
now marks a split on the Court between those who consider 
Fourth Amendment incursions in terms of physical trespass, 
and those who adopt the reasoning of Katz more broadly. Thus, 
a series of cases involving areas such as thermal imaging,516 
GPS devices,517 and highly-trained dogs,518 divide along these 
lines, with one Justice (Sotomayor) siding alternately with one 
side or the other. Regardless of which approach one adopts, 
however, the bulk collection of Americans’ metadata runs afoul 
of the Fourth Amendment. 
In the realm of trespass, the program authorized under Section 
215 amounts to a general warrant—which was the very definition 
of an unreasonable search and seizure at the time of the founding. 
It was to prohibit general warrants, and thereby to gain the sup-
port of anti-Federalists for the fledgling Constitution, that James 
Madison wrote the Fourth Amendment and introduced it into 
Congress in 1789 as part of the Bill of Rights.519 The telephony 
metadata program, moreover, amounts to a digital trespass on 
citizens’ private lives. The application of Katz’s reasonable expec-
tation of privacy test, albeit via a different route, reaches a similar 
conclusion: that is, the telephony metadata collection program 
falls within Fourth Amendment protections. 
1. The Prohibition on General Warrants 
At the time of the founding, English courts rejected general 
warrants. A different standard, however, marked the crown’s 
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treatment of the American colonies. This angered the colo-
nists, who saw themselves, first and foremost, as English-
men—and therefore deserving of all the rights and privileges 
accorded to English subjects. 
Perhaps the most famous case establishing the right of Eng-
lishmen to be free of a general writ dates from November 1762, 
when King George III’s messengers broke into a man’s home to 
execute a warrant issued by the Secretary of State.520 The warrant 
empowered the king’s men “to make strict and diligent search 
for . . . the author, or one concerned in the writing of several 
weekly very seditious papers.”521 The men, who searched John 
Entick’s home for four hours without his consent and against his 
will, “broke open, and read over, pried into and examined all [of 
his] private papers [and] books.”522 Upon departure, the men 
seized Entick’s documents, charts, pamphlets, and other materi-
als.523 Chief Justice of the Common Pleas Charles Pratt, First Earl 
Camden, ruled that both the search and the seizure were unlaw-
ful. He explained: 
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George Montagu Dunk, Earl of Halifax, Viscount Sunbury, and Baron 
Halifax one of the Lords of his Majesty’s Honourable Privy Council, 
Lieutenant General of His Majesty’s Forces, Lord Lieutenant-General and 
General Governor of the kingdom of Ireland, and principal Secretary of 
State, etc. these are in His Majesty’s name to authorize and require you, 
taking a constable to your assistance, to make strict and diligent search 
for John Entick, the author, or one concerned in writing of several weekly 
very seditious papers, entitled The Monitor, or British Freeholder, No 357, 
358, 360, 373, 376, 378, 379, and 380, London, printed for J. Wilson and J. 
Fell in Pater-Noster-Row; which contains gross and scandalous 
reflections and invectives upon His Majesty’s Government, and upon 
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civil and military, and all loving subjects whom it may concern, are to be 
aiding and assisting to you as there shall be occasion; and for so doing 
this shall be your warrant. Given at St. James’s the 6th day of November 
1762, in the third year of His Majesty’s reign, Duke Halifax. To Nathan 
Carrington, James Watson, Thomas Ardran, and Robert Blackmore, four 
of His Majesty’s messengers in ordinary. 
Id. at 807. 
 522. Id. at 814. 
 523. Id. at 807–08. 
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Suppose a warrant which is against law be granted, such as 
no justice of peace, or other magistrate high or low whomso-
ever, has power to issue, whether that magistrate or justice 
who grants such warrant, or the officer who executes it, are 
within the [statute] 24 Geo. 2, c. 44? To put one 
case . . . suppose a justice of peace issues a warrant to search 
a house for stolen goods, and directs it to four of his serv-
ants, who search and find no stolen goods, but seize all the 
books and papers of the owners of the house, whether in 
such a case would the justice of peace, his officers or serv-
ants, be within the [statute]?524 
Two aspects to the case proved particularly troubling: first, 
the writ had empowered the crown to seize all documents—
not just those of a criminal nature; and, second, no demonstra-
tion had been made prior to the search and seizure establishing 
the probability that Entick was engaged in criminal activity: 
The warrant in our case was an execution . . . without any 
previous summons, examination, hearing the plaintiff, or 
proof that he was the author of the supposed libels; a power 
claimed by no other magistrate whatever . . . it was left to 
the discretion of these defendants to execute the warrant in 
the absence or presence of the plaintiff, when he might have 
no witness present to see what they did; for they were to 
seize all papers, bank bills, or any other valuable papers they 
might take away if they were so disposed; there might be 
nobody to detect them.525 
The court suggested that since the Glorious Revolution and 
the restoration of William and Mary to the throne, such powers 
had been denied to the crown. It was precisely such aggran-
dizement of power that had led to revolution in the first place. 
The Chief Justice stated, “we can safely say there is no law in 
this country to justify the defendants in what they have done; if 
there was, it would destroy all the comforts of society; for pa-
pers are often the dearest property a man can have.”526 The 
court flatly rejected the use of such general warrants. 
What was banned in England, however, became common-
place in the colonies. Resultantly, the use of writs of assistance 
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played a central role in lending speed to the American Revolu-
tion. Acting under writs established by Parliamentary statute, 
officers of the crown had permission to search the homes, pa-
pers, and belongings of any person.527 As early as 1660, legisla-
tion empowered magistrates to: 
[I]ssue out a Warrant to any person or persons thereby ena-
bleing him or them with the assistance of a Sheriffe Justice of 
Peace or Constable to enter into any House in the day time 
where such Goods are suspected to be concealed, and in case 
of resistance to breake [sic] open such Houses, and to seize 
and secure the same goods soe [sic] concealed, And All Of-
ficers and Ministers of Justice are hereby required to be aid-
ing and assisting thereunto.528 
The writs came to be seen as the worst instrument of arbi-
trary power, turning colonists against the crown. Their use was 
part of a general crack-down engineered by British Prime Min-
ister William Pitt, who directed the American colonial gover-
nors and royal customs officers to enforce trade and navigation 
laws more strictly—specifically, to “make the strictest and most 
diligent Enquiry into the State of this dangerous and ignomini-
ous Trade.”529 He ordered that every step authorized by law be 
taken “to bring all such heinous Offenders to the most exem-
plary and condign [sic] Punishment.”530 
In response to Pitt’s order, the governor of Massachusetts 
Bay Colony began making use of the writ, prompting Boston 
merchants to hire James Otis to challenge their constitutionali-
ty. In what has become one of the most famous examples of 
early American legal oration, Otis argued that the writs were 
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contrary to “the fundamental principles of law.”531 Scholars hail 
Otis’s argument in the case as helping “to lay the foundation 
for the breach between Great Britain and her continental colo-
nies.”532 As A.J. Langguth observed, at the Writs of Assistance 
trial, “James Otis stood up to speak, and something profound 
changed in America.”533 
One of our best accounts of Paxton’s Case comes from John 
Adams, who was present at the argument and whose mentor, 
Jeremiah Grindley, the most distinguished member of the bar 
in Boston, opened the case for the crown. 534  In replying to 
Grindley, Otis stated that his efforts were being made “out of 
regard to the liberties of the subject.” 535 The rights of British 
subjects were under assault, compelling him to oppose “all 
such instruments of slavery on the one hand and villainy on 
the other as this Writ of Assistance is.” 
For Otis, the writ was “the worst instrument of arbitrary 
power.”536 He ignored the crown’s claim of necessity—and cur-
rent practice—noting that “the writ prayed for in this petition, 
being general, is illegal.”537 He highlighted four concerns: first, 
it was universal—in other words, it could be executed by any-
one in possession of it; second, it was perpetual in that it indef-
initely allowed the holder of the writ to conduct searches; third, 
no prior evidence of wrongdoing need be involved in its execu-
tion; and fourth, there was no requirement to swear to suspi-
cion of wrongdoing or, following execution, to inquire into its 
exercise. “One of the most essential branches of English liberty 
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is the freedom of one’s house,” Otis opined.538 General war-
rants would annihilate the privilege associated with that right. 
Although the court ruled against Otis, John Adams later 
wrote that his arguments “breathed into this nation the breath 
of life.”539 On June 12, 1776, the Virginia Constitutional Con-
vention adopted the Virginia Declaration of Rights—a docu-
ment that deeply influenced the Declaration of Independence, 
as well as other states’ constitutions, and became the basis for 
the Bill of Rights—without which, the Constitution would nev-
er have been ratified. 
The Virginia Declaration of Rights stated, inter alia, “That 
general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be 
commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a 
fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or 
whose offense is not particularly described and supported by 
evidence, are grievous and oppressive and ought not to be 
granted.”540 The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 similarly 
objected to the use of general warrants: 
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable 
searches and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, 
and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary 
to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previ-
ously supported by oath or affirmation, and if the order in 
the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected 
places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to 
seize their property, be not accompanied with a special des-
ignation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure; 
and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the 
formalities, prescribed by the laws.541 
The New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 lifted the clause 
almost verbatim.542 The Virginia ratifying convention of 1788 
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made a point to ensure that the subsequent Constitution would 
include a provision affirming that “every freeman has a right to 
be secure from all unreasonable searches and siezures [sic] of 
his person, his papers and his property.”543 New York, in turn, 
required nearly identical language, as did North Carolina—
even as Virginia, New York, and North Carolina all con-
demned overbroad warrants as “‘therefore’ unreasonable—
‘grievous,’ ‘oppressive,’ and ‘dangerous.’”544  Consistent with 
these states’ understandings, James Madison’s first draft of the 
Fourth Amendment addressed the right of the people “to be 
secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and their oth-
er property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures.” 545 
Madison understood the clause as a ban against general war-
rants.546 
In 1886 the Supreme Court recognized the importance of the 
writs and the Founders’ rejection of the same as encapsulated 
in the Fourth Amendment: 
In order to ascertain the nature of the proceedings intended 
by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution under the 
terms “unreasonable searches and seizures,” it is only neces-
sary to recall the contemporary or then recent history of the 
controversies on the subject, both in this country and in Eng-
land. The practice had obtained in the colonies of issuing 
writs of assistance to the revenue officers, empowering 
them, in their discretion, to search suspected places for 
smuggled goods, which James Otis pronounced “the worst 
instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of Eng-
lish liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that ever 
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was found in an English law book;” since they placed “the 
liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.” 
This was in February, 1761, in Boston, and the famous de-
bate in which it occurred was perhaps the most prominent 
event which inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the 
oppressions of the mother country. “Then and there,” said 
John Adams, “then and there was the first scene of the first 
act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. 
Then and there the child Independence was born.547 
The Court acknowledged the importance of Lord Camden’s 
decision in Entick v. Carrington: 
[Camden’s] great judgment on that occasion is considered as 
one of the landmarks of English liberty. It was welcomed 
and applauded by the lovers of liberty in the colonies as well 
as in the mother country. It is regarded as one of the perma-
nent monuments of the British Constitution, and is quoted 
as such by the English authorities on that subject down to 
the present time.548 
It was precisely general warrants that the Framers meant when 
referring to unreasonable searches and seizures.549 
Throughout U.S. history, the Supreme Court has continued to 
recognize the special role played by general warrants and writs 
of assistance in shaping the contours of the Fourth Amendment. 
In 1980, the Court recognized that it was “familiar history that 
indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the au-
thority of ‘general warrants’ were the immediate evils that moti-
vated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment.”550 
General warrants were presumptively unreasonable. 
Consistent with this reading, Professor Akhil Amar, inquir-
ing as to what the warrant clause means—and what the rela-
tionship is between it and the earlier reasonableness clause—
suggests that “broad warrants—warrants that fail to meet the 
various specifications of clause two—are inherently unreason-
able under clause one.”551 Such a general warrant would im-
munize the officer who carried it out from a subsequent tres-
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pass suit.552 In the case of Entick v. Carrington, “Armed with 
sweeping warrants issued by executive officials, various gov-
ernment henchmen broke into Englishmen’s houses, searched 
their papers, arrested their persons, and rummaged through 
their effects, in hopes of finding” wrongdoing.553 
Professor Thomas Davies similarly recognizes that “[t]he his-
torical statements about search and seizure” in the Fourth 
Amendment “focused on condemning general warrants. In 
fact, the historical concerns were almost exclusively about the 
need to ban house searches under general warrants.”554 Evi-
dence suggests that “unreasonable searches and seizures” was 
a proxy for “the inherent illegality of any searches or seizures 
that might be made under general warrants.”555 Davies posits 
that the reason the Framers even bothered “to adopt constitu-
tional bans against general warrants in light of the apparent 
consensus that the general warrant was illegal at common law” 
was because of genuine concern that Congress might endanger 
the right in the future.556 
The FISC Order authorizing the telephony metadata program 
is a general warrant. It authorizes the government to rummage 
through our papers and effects in the hope of finding wrongdo-
ing. There is no previous suspicion of criminal activity. Almost 
none of the information obtained relates to illegal behavior. 
It matters little whether one stores one’s papers in a filing 
cabinet in one’s den, or places all financial documents in the 
iCloud—the digital equivalent, in modern times, of a filing cab-
inet. Sheer volume of information requires individuals to ar-
range for storage of everything from medical records to family 
photos. E-mail, in turn, holds our correspondence—papers that 
we place on a server with a company with whom we have a 
contractual relationship. Banking records may be accessible 
over the Internet. These are our modern day equivalents of the 
papers and effects held by Entick in his home. 
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In considering the case of Entick v. Carrington, Lord Camden 
wrote, “The great end for which men entered into society was 
to secure their property.”557 He continued, “By the laws of Eng-
land, every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is 
a trespass.” Camden added: 
Papers are the owner’s goods and chattels; they are his dear-
est property, and are so far from enduring a seizure that 
they will hardly bear an inspection . . . where private papers 
are removed and carried away, the secret nature of those 
goods will be an aggravation of the trespass, and demand 
more considerable damages in that respect.558 
Allowing the government to obtain bulk metadata is the 
equivalent of a digital trespass on what Justice Brandeis re-
ferred to as the “privacies of life.”559 Not only does the gov-
ernment gain penetrating insight into our private affairs, but it 
does so to a degree that even those engaged in the activity itself 
do not realize. That it is an electronic trespass, and not a physi-
cal one, matters naught. Brandeis explained, “It is not the 
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that 
constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of 
his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and 
private property . . . .”560 The digital trespass in which the NSA 
is engaging is not supported by probable cause. It is not sup-
ported by reasonable suspicion. No suspicion of any wrongdo-
ing whatsoever is contemplated by the collection of records. It 
is the equivalent of a general warrant and, as such, is odious to 
the Fourth Amendment. 
2. Search of Metadata and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
In recent Fourth Amendment cases considering new technol-
ogies, a schism has appeared in the Court between adopting an 
approach based on traditional concepts of trespass, and exam-
ining the facts from the vantage of the reasonable expectation 
of privacy—a higher bar adopted in 1967 as a way of augment-
ing the Court’s previous reliance on physical space. 
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In United States v. Jones,561 the Court considered a case involv-
ing 28-day surveillance.562 The government obtained a search 
warrant permitting it to place a Global-Positioning System 
(GPS) tracking device on a car registered to the wife of a sus-
pected drug dealer.563 The day after the warrant expired, agents 
installed the device and followed the car’s movements for near-
ly a month.564 Information thus obtained allowed the govern-
ment to indict Antoine Jones and others on drug trafficking 
conspiracy charges.565 The Supreme Court held that attaching 
the GPS device to the car and tracing its movements amounted 
to a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.566 
This case is important for determining the constitutionality 
of the telephony metadata program in three important ways. 
First, it recognized that Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
test did not supplant the rights in existence at the time the 
Fourth Amendment was forged. Justice Scalia, writing for the 
Court, explained: 
It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case: 
The government physically occupied private property for 
the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt 
that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a 
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
when it was adopted.567 
Justice Scalia cited Entick v. Carrington, noting that the Court 
had described it as a “‘monument of English freedom’ ‘un-
doubtedly familiar’ to ‘every American statesman’ at the time 
the constitution was adopted, and considered to be ‘the true 
and ultimate expression of constitutional law’ with regard to 
search and seizure.”568 For Justice Scalia, and for the Court, the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test was of no consequence: 
“At bottom, we must ‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of 
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privacy against government that existed when the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted.’”569 
Just as the Court eschewed Katz v. United States as being in-
apposite for consideration of the rights that existed when the 
Fourth Amendment was adopted, it would be equally inappo-
site to dismiss the Fourth Amendment’s rejection of general 
warrants. “[A]t a minimum,” Justice Scalia wrote, the “18th-
century guarantee against unreasonable searches . . . must pro-
vide . . . the degree of protection it afforded when it was adopt-
ed.”570 The concept of a general warrant and the Court’s con-
ception of trespass are, as previously noted, historically con-
connected. The reason that general warrants were rejected at 
the time of the Founding was because they provided a carte 
blanche to the government to trespass at will upon one’s prop-
erty and to search through one’s papers and effects without 
any reasonable suspicion. 
The second point to draw out of Jones is that what can be con-
sidered a shadow majority appears to recognize that changed 
circumstances exist, so as to augment the need for new privacy 
protections. At least five Justices indicated unease with the in-
trusiveness of modern technology in light of changed times, of-
fering in the process different aspects of a mosaic theory of pri-
vacy. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, 
and Justice Kagan, suggested that in most criminal investiga-
tions, long-term monitoring “impinges on expectations of priva-
cy.”571 The nature of new technologies mattered: 
Recent years have seen the emergence of many new devices 
that permit the monitoring of a person’s movements. In 
some locales, closed-circuit television video monitoring is 
becoming ubiquitous. On toll roads, automatic toll collection 
systems create a precise record of the movements of motor-
ists who choose to make use of their convenience. Many mo-
torists purchase cars that are equipped with devices that 
permit a central station to ascertain the car’s location at any 
time so that roadside assistance may be provided if needed 
and the car may be found if it is stolen.572 
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Unlike in the past, the daily business of living one’s life cre-
ates a digital record with privacy implications. “Perhaps most 
significant,” Justice Alito added, “cell phones and other wire-
less devices now permit wireless carriers to track and record 
the location of users—and as of June 2011, it has been reported, 
there were more than 322 million wireless devices in use in the 
United States.”573 Before computers, practicality proved one of 
the greatest protectors of individual privacy. It was difficult 
and expensive to conduct long-term surveillance. But technol-
ogy has changed the equation. The government now is more 
able to engage in long-term surveillance; but though relatively 
short-term monitoring of individuals’ movements in public 
space might be consistent with the Fourth Amendment, “the 
use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most 
offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”574 
Justice Sotomayor went one step further, calling into ques-
tion the entire basis for third party doctrine. Specifically, in 
light of the level of intrusiveness represented by modern tech-
nology, “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an 
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in infor-
mation voluntarily disclosed to third parties.” 575  Sotomayor 
pointed out: 
This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people 
reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third 
parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. People 
disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to the cel-
lular providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail ad-
dresses with which they correspond to their Internet service 
providers; and the books, groceries, and medications they 
purchase to online retailers.576 
She added, “I would not assume that all information voluntari-
ly disclosed to some member of the public for a limited pur-
pose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment 
protection.”577 
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The third point to draw from Jones reflects the growing ten-
sion between trespass and the Katz test, as applied to new and 
emerging technologies—and the increasingly consistent results 
reached by the Court, regardless of which approach is adopted. 
Thus, although Justice Sotomayor sided with the majority on 
trespass grounds, she still embraced the same result as a prod-
uct of the application of Katz. 
Jones was not the first manifestation of this tension in light of 
new and emerging technologies. In Kyllo v. United States,578 the 
Court considered whether thermal scanning conducted outside 
of a target’s home constituted a search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.579 Agents, having picked up a heat signa-
ture that suggested that grow lights were being used inside the 
target’s garage, used the information to obtain a search warrant 
which, when executed, revealed several marijuana plants. As in 
Jones, the concept of trespass figured largely in the decision.580 
In Kyllo, the Court held that where the government em-
ployed a device, not in general public use, to uncover details 
inside a home that otherwise could only be uncovered via 
physical intrusion, such surveillance constituted a search with-
in the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and was thus pre-
sumptively unreasonable without a warrant.581 As in Jones, Jus-
tice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court: “It would be 
foolish to contend,” he wrote, “that the degree of privacy se-
cured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely 
unaffected by the advance of technology.”582 The question the 
Court confronted was “what limits there are upon this power 
of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”583 In 
this equation, Scalia suggested, homeowners should not be left 
to “the mercy of advancing technology.” 584  The Fourth 
Amendment, if nothing else, drew a bright line at the curtilage 
of the home. 
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The dissent, written by Justice Stevens and joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Kennedy, con-
sidered the heat signature of the plant to be in the public do-
main.585 For the dissenters, the case did not turn on the question 
of whether there was search or a seizure inside a home without 
a warrant, but rather on the application of plain view doctrine: 
Indeed, the ordinary use of the senses might enable a neigh-
bor or passerby to notice the heat emanating from a build-
ing, particularly if it is vented, as was the case here. Addi-
tionally, any member of the public might notice that one 
part of a house is warmer than another part or a nearby 
building if, for example, rainwater evaporates or snow melts 
at different rates across its surfaces. Such use of the senses 
would not convert into an unreasonable search if, instead an 
adjoining neighbor allowed an officer onto her property to 
verify her perceptions with a sensitive thermometer.586 
For the dissent, applying Katz, there was no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in heat emissions located outside of the 
home. At the same time, however, the dissent was careful not 
to limit Fourth Amendment protections to homes themselves: 
“If such equipment did provide its user with the functional 
equivalent of access to a private place—such as, for example, the 
telephone booth involved in Katz, or an office building—then 
the rule should apply to such an area as well as a home.”587 The 
collection of telephony metadata can be considered in both 
senses—as a digital trespass within the private sphere (and 
thus consistent with the majority opinion), as well as a viola-
tion of the reasonable expectation of privacy that attends “the 
functional equivalent of access to a private place,” such as 
one’s filing cabinet or personal telephone records.588 
Electronic recordkeeping has become integral to the conduct 
of life in the twenty-first century. Electronic communications 
have now assumed a vital role with regard to social, political, 
economic, and other activity. As a new technology, embedded 
in our social structure, it is on a par with the role of the tele-
phone that the Court considered in Katz: 
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One who occupies [a phone booth], shuts the door behind 
him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is sure-
ly entitled to assume that the words he utters into the 
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read the 
Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the pub-
lic telephone has come to play in private communication.589 
Whatever role telephones played in 1967, their integration in-
to society has only deepened in the intervening years. Electron-
ic communications have come to play a vital role not just in so-
cial interactions, but in conducting all of one’s private affairs. 
That we contract with private companies to ensure careful 
treatment of this information, that we use passwords to access 
our telephone, banking, and financial records online, and that 
we limit access to this information, is the equivalent of shutting 
the door of the phone booth. 
The courts are beginning to recognize privacy interests in 
this new, electronic sphere. In 2010, for instance, in United 
States v. Warshak, the Sixth Circuit held that the government 
had violated Warshak’s Fourth Amendment rights when it ob-
tained e-mail content from Warshak’s internet service provider, 
absent a warrant based on probable cause.590 The court noted 
that Warshak had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the e-
mail he had stored with an ISP.591 
The amount of information that computers can hold makes 
them different in kind. In 2011, the Ninth Circuit considered 
the search of a computer at the border.592 The dissent noted: 
Computers store libraries’ worth of personal information, 
including substantial amounts of data that the user never in-
tended to save and of which he is likely completely unaware 
(for example, browsing histories and records of deleted files 
in unallocated space). Computers offer “windows into [our] 
lives far beyond anything that could be, or would be, stuffed 
into a suitcase for a trip abroad.”593 
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For the dissent, particularized suspicion was necessary to per-
form such searches because individuals have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in their electronic files. 
Most recently, the Supreme Court has confronted cases in-
volving the use of drug-sniffing dogs. In Florida v. Jardines,594 
the Court held that the use of a narcotics dog outside a home 
was a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment. 595  Once again, Justice Scalia authored the opinion, in 
which he resolved the question solely on property rights 
grounds.596 The act of placing the dog on the front porch, to 
conduct a forensic search of someone’s home, constituted a 
search.597 The trespass in question thus proved sufficient to find 
the act unconstitutional.598 The majority did not need to reach 
the question of whether the sniff also violated the suspect’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.599 
Although the Court did not rule on whether the officers had vi-
olated Jardines’ expectation of privacy under Katz, Justice Elena 
Kagan offered a concurring opinion in which she noted that, in-
stead of under a property rubric, she “could just as happily have 
decided [the case] by looking to Jardines’ privacy interests.”600 For 
Kagan, law enforcement would have been equally outside the 
bounds of the Constitution for standing in a space adjacent to 
one’s dwelling and searching for evidence with impunity. Kagan 
noted the relationship between the two approaches: 
It is not surprising that in a case involving a search of a 
home, property concepts and privacy concepts should so 
align. The law of property ‘naturally enough influence[s]’ 
our ‘shared social expectations’ of what places should be 
free from governmental incursions.601 
Kagan’s concurrence in Jardines, like the dissent’s acknowl-
edgement of Katz in Kyllo, and Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence 
in Jones, signals a convergence between Justice Scalia and oth-
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ers on the Court as to the existence of mutually-reinforcing 
spheres protecting U.S. citizens—in the face of new technolo-
gies—from undue government interference. This is precisely 
the space occupied by the bulk collection of U.S. citizens’ te-
lephony records. Under either approach, the program, and sim-
ilarly situated bulk collections of U.S. citizens’ records, violates 
the Fourth Amendment. 
D. The Proverbial Needle in the Haystack 
We live in an age in which individual actors have the capa-
bility and the intent to harm U.S. national security. Such per-
sons may be tied to state actors, the traditional target of U.S. 
intelligence activities, or they may not. They may be acting as 
part of a multi-national network, they may be acting on behalf 
of a domestic group, or they may simply have a grudge against 
the United States or its people. The potential construction, dis-
semination, and use of weapons of mass destruction—such as 
biological weapons, nuclear devices, cyber attack, or conven-
tional force used against critical infrastructure targets—by such 
persons changes the equation in terms of how the state must 
act to protect its interests. It must try to anticipate aggression 
from state actors, of course, but it must also try to anticipate 
action from non-state actors and individuals. 
With such non-traditional threats in mind, proponents of the 
telephony metadata program have argued that to find threats, 
intelligence agencies must first obtain, and then mine, all indi-
viduals’ data. The analogy that has been suggested is that intel-
ligence agencies must first build a haystack, in order to find the 
proverbial needle. The assumptions underlying this model are 
that all individuals potentially present a threat, and that the 
threat from individuals can only be identified and understood 
in the context of all the data. 
For constitutional purposes, the argument continues, it is not 
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to build 
the haystack. This only occurs once someone starts sifting 
through the hay to find the needle. A further nuance in this ar-
gument suggests that, to the extent that the creation of the hay-
stack is being accomplished through technology and automa-
tion, and no human being is involved, the building of the 
haystack—and even the analysis of the data—is outside the 
confines of the Fourth Amendment. 
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In its 2011 report to Congress, for instance, the Department 
of Justice noted two NSA bulk collection programs in existence: 
first, the telephony metadata program under Section 215 and, 
second, the bulk collection of e-mail envelope information un-
der the pen-trap provisions of FISA.602 DOJ noted, “Both of 
these programs operate on a very large scale [REDACTED 
TEXT] However, as described below, only a tiny fraction of 
such records are ever viewed by NSA intelligence analysts.”603 
There are a number of problems with this argument, the first 
being (consistent with the argument above) that it is the collec-
tion of information that brings the bulk collection of infor-
mation within the meaning of a search for Fourth Amendment 
purposes—that is, under the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test, individuals reasonably assume that their movements 
which are recorded by cell phone towers, and their social inter-
actions, placement in social networks, interests, and possible 
concerns that emerge from calling records, are not going to be 
recorded and transmitted to the NSA to be analyzed, queried, 
stored, and shared with other agencies. This is precisely what 
sets the NSA surveillance program apart from Smith v. Mary-
land, in which limited information was provided by the carrier 
to the police. It was on these grounds that in December 2013 
Judge Richard Leon held that the NSA collection program is 
likely unconstitutional.604 
The strongest counterargument is that offered by Judge 
Pauley of the Southern District of New York, who asserts that 
calling data on tens of millions of Americans, and the retention 
of this data, represented precisely what was settled in Smith.605 
In other words, the data in question is only different in volume, 
not kind, from what was at stake in Smith v. Maryland. That it 
happens to yield more insight into individuals’ lives matters 
naught: the key question, instead, is whether it has been pro-
vided to a third party. The problem with this analysis is that it 
ignores the point of inquiring into the reasonableness of the 
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search. By including both an objective and a subjective stand-
ard, the Court allowed for the context and the evolution of 
technology to be taken into account. In Jones, as was considered 
above, five Justices questioned whether Smith continues to be 
applicable in light of the evolution of technology. 
In a recent post arguing against the constitutionality of the 
NSA bulk metadata collection program, Professor Geoffrey R. 
Stone, who served on the President’s Review Board of the 
metadata collection program, added yet a further considera-
tion. The costs traditionally associated with traditional pen reg-
isters and trap and trace equipment have, in the past, created a 
barrier to the government’s use of the same.606 The use of a pen 
register is time-consuming, fact specific, and costly. As a prac-
tical matter, the government can use it in only a handful of sit-
uations. The knowledge that the government can use a pen reg-
ister without probable cause and a warrant therefore has 
almost no effect on the average person’s expectations of priva-
cy or behavior.607 
The decision to make a telephone call (or not) thus does not 
turn on the “infinitesimal risk” that the government might 
have placed a pen or trap on our number.608 Technology, how-
ever, Stone argues, has changed the calculation.609 The govern-
ment can now do this without any of the efficiency barriers 
that, in the past, would have prevented us from being placed 
under surveillance.610 This was precisely the point that Justice 
Alito brought out in Jones in relation to the use of GPS technol-
ogies.611 Technology should not continually erode our tradi-
tional expectations of privacy. Stone observes, “Without that 
principle, the evolution of a ‘Big Brother’ government could do 
serious damage to the liberty, privacy and dignitary interests of 
the individual that are essential to a free society.”612 
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In the context of the haystack argument, it is important to 
note here that the previous absence of technology performed an 
important privacy function: It created administrative barriers 
to impinging on individuals’ private lives. The very question of 
whether or not to build a haystack is a quintessential twenty-
first century question. To suggest that there is no privacy im-
plication in building the haystack ignores the important limit-
ing function that lack of technology and resource constraints 
previously played. 
A second problem with the haystack approach is that the Su-
preme Court has not recognized any “automation exception” to 
the Fourth Amendment. To the contrary, it is the moment at 
which the thermal device picks up the heat signature, when the 
GPS device is placed on the car, and when the dog sniffs the ma-
rijuana inside the home that the search has occurred. In United 
States v. Karo,613 for instance, a case that turned on the use of a 
beeper to follow a suspected drug dealer’s car, Justice Stevens 
explained: “The expectation of privacy should be measured 
from the standpoint of the citizen whose privacy is at stake, not 
of the government. It is compromised the moment the invasion 
occurs. A bathtub is a less private area when the plumber is pre-
sent even if his back is turned.”614 It is the collection of the in-
formation that thus represents an intrusion into privacy. 
A variant of the haystack argument that suggests that no 
search occurs until a human being sees the data being collected 
ignores the fact that this is a government-centric approach. The 
Fourth Amendment, however, protects individual rights from 
government intrusion. It is thus from the individual’s perspective 
that one must evaluate both the act of trespass and the objec-
tive and subjective expectations of privacy (as under Katz). And 
from the individual’s perspective, it is at the moment the telepho-
ny metadata is collected that the search occurs. It would thus 
matter little if the government mounted cameras inside every 
American’s home, promising not to actually watch the tapes 
until some future point in time. The act of mounting the camera 
and recording the information is precisely what constitutes a 
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search, and thus brings such behavior within the protection of 
the Fourth Amendment. 
A third problem with the government’s line of reasoning is 
that it ignores the intercession of human judgment throughout 
the process. It is a human being that decides to collect the in-
formation. Human beings submit applications to FISC, grant 
applications, and issue primary and secondary orders to collect 
the data. Human beings program computers to collect infor-
mation and to collate it. Human beings write the algorithms, 
replete with inbuilt assumptions and biases, and then decide 
where the information goes and in what form it will be availa-
ble for other human beings to see. In short, human beings are 
involved throughout the process. To represent it otherwise is to 
ignore the extent to which technology is being used at the be-
hest of government and not in its stead. 
In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall wrote, “We 
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expound-
ing.”615 Just over a century later, Justice Brandeis recognized 
that in the intervening time, the Supreme Court had “repeated-
ly sustained the exercise of power by Congress, under various 
clauses of that instrument, over objects of which the Fathers 
could not have dreamed.”616 
For Brandeis, the purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to 
protect the privacies of life: 
But “time works changes, brings into existence new condi-
tions and purposes.” Subtler and more far-reaching means 
of invading privacy have become available to the govern-
ment. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the 
government, by means far more effective than stretching 
upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whis-
pered in the closet.617 
Justice Brandeis’ words proved prescient: 
The progress of science in furnishing the government with 
means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. 
Ways may someday be developed by which the govern-
ment, without removing papers from secret drawers, can re-
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produce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to 
expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. 
Advances in the . . . sciences may bring means of exploring 
unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions. “That places 
the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer” 
was said by James Otis of much lesser intrusions than these. 
To Lord Camden, a far slighter intrusion seemed “subver-
sive of all the comforts of society.” Can it be that the Consti-
tution affords no protection against such invasions of indi-
vidual security?618 
The technologies at issue in the bulk collection program in-
vade U.S. citizens’ privacy to a degree unprecedented in the 
past. It was Brandeis that noted, “As a means of espionage, 
writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny instru-
ments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wire-
tapping.”619 Yet the wiretapping of a single individual is but an 
equally “puny instrument” when compared with the wholesale 
collection and analysis of all communication records. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act sought to em-
power the NSA and others to take advantage of new technolo-
gies and to engage in necessary foreign intelligence gathering, 
while preventing the intelligence community from engaging in 
sweeping surveillance of U.S. citizens. Congress enacted a se-
ries of restrictions, requiring that the target of such surveillance 
be a foreign power, or an agent thereof, insisting that probable 
cause support such claims, and heightening the protections af-
forded to the domestic collection of U.S. citizens’ information. 
FISA’s expansion gradually brought physical searches, pen reg-
isters and trap and trace devices, as well as business records 
and tangible goods, within its remit. These new authorities re-
tained much of the structure that defined the statute. 
The NSA’s bulk collection of metadata contradicts the gen-
eral approach Congress adopted in enacting FISA. The FISC 
orders lack the particularization required prior to the acquisi-
tion of information and the role FISC now plays departs from 
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that Congressenvisioned. The bulk collection program, moreo-
ver, violates the statutory language in at least three ways: it 
does not comport with the requirement that the tangible goods 
sought “are relevant to an authorized investigation”; it violates 
the requirement that the information be otherwise obtainable 
via subpoena duces tecum; and it bypasses the statutory provi-
sions governing pen registers and trap and trace devices. Com-
pounding the illegality of the program are serious constitution-
al concerns. The FISC order governing the telephony metadata 
program amounts to a general warrant, which the Fourth 
Amendment precludes. The government’s efforts to save the 
program on grounds of third party doctrine are unpersuasive 
in light of the unique context of Smith v. Maryland, new tech-
nologies, and changed circumstances. Growing tension be-
tween trespass doctrine and Katz’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy, as applied to new technologies, suggests that under 
either approach, the telephony metadata program falls outside 
constitutional bounds. 
There are a number of steps that could be taken as part of a 
comprehensive FISA reform, to address the shortcomings not-
ed in this Article. First, and most importantly, to comply with 
constitutional demands, the administration, the courts, or Con-
gress needs to bring the bulk collection of U.S. persons’ 
metadata under Section 215 to an end. Second, to strengthen 
FISC’s ability to respond to applications, a number of judicial 
reforms could be adopted. Foremost on this list is the introduc-
tion of adversarial counsel. 
In some sense it is inevitable that FISC opinions would extend 
beyond the original role envisioned by the court (i.e., granting 
orders), to issuing memorandum opinions. Like all courts, FISC 
must interpret statutory language and constitutional require-
ments, in order to apply the law to particular circumstances. 
Although FISC is not exercising jurisdiction over cases and con-
troversies, it is overseeing a judicial process and, as such, exer-
cising judicial power.620 It is a logical extension of this function 
that such decisions would then become guidance for similarly 
situated requests from the Department of Justice and others. 
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A high standard of due diligence is recognized and practiced 
by DOJ’s National Security Division (NSD)—an entity particu-
larly aware of its responsibilities in light of in camera, ex parte 
proceedings.621 It was NSD, for instance, that recognized in 
January 2009 that the NSA had only been subjecting approxi-
mately ten percent of its queries to RAS inspection—and that 
reported this within a week to FISC. 
Nevertheless, for reasons that the Founders and numerous 
courts in the interim have clearly recognized, the executive 
branch is hardly a neutral, disinterested observer when its own 
interests are on the line. Justice Powell explained in United 
States v. United States District Court that the duties and re-
sponsibilities of executive officers are “to enforce the laws, to 
investigate, and to prosecute . . . . [T]hose charged with 
this . . . duty should not be the sole judges of when to utilize 
constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks.”622 
He underscored the problem: “[U]nreviewed executive discre-
tion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating 
evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy . . . . ”623 
Allowing contrary views enables the vigorous prosecution of 
narrow interests, in the process providing FISC with a broader 
and deeper understanding of the issues at stake. It has taken 
many scholars by surprise, for instance, that Judge Eagan’s 
August 2013 opinion considers Smith v. Maryland as entirely 
dispositive of the Fourth Amendment question. United States 
v. Jones garners but a footnote, with the opinion omitting any 
sustained discussion of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The 
importance of adversarial counsel extends beyond merely a 
constitutional advocate to the potential use of adversarial 
counsel (with subpoena authorities) to represent corporate and 
other rights-based interests of U.S. persons. There are a number 
of ways in which an adversarial process could be created. This 
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is a matter for policy debate. That one is needed, from a legal 
and constitutional perspective, is clear. 
Another alteration that would strengthen FISC’s hand would 
be to provide the court with the technical expertise required to 
allow it to ensure that the minimization and other procedures it 
requires are actually followed by the executive branch. As the 
multiple noncompliance incidents suggest, simply leaving it to 
the NSA to self-report creates a gap between what is legally 
required and what occurs in practice. Having deeper insight 
into the technologies is critical. There is something fundamen-
tally disturbing about FISC simply trusting the executive 
branch to police its own operations. History, certainly, has 
taught us the danger of proceeding in this manner. 
Yet, further alterations that may address some of FISC’s 
shortcomings relate to substantive changes to the law. Untying 
the court’s hands, for instance, with regard to whether or not 
certain orders should be granted would help to respond to the 
critique that the court has such a high rate of acceptance of ap-
plications. It is Congress, at least in relation to Section 215, that 
imposed these limits on FISC. Removing these, and making 
other statutory changes, such as restoring the prior targeting 
requirement, heightening protections for U.S. persons, adding 
“and material” after “relevant,” narrowing the definition of 
“foreign intelligence” to exclude “foreign affairs,” and requir-
ing the government to demonstrate past effectiveness prior to 
renewal orders, would further strengthen the role that FISC 
could play in overseeing foreign intelligence gathering. 
In sum, myriad changes could be put into place to allow the 
government to take advantage of new technologies, to counter 
national security threats, and to ensure that the provisions op-
erate in accordance with the U.S. Constitution.624 In the inter-
im, both Congress and the courts have a role to play in insist-
ing that the executive branch operates within statutory and 
constitutional constraints. 
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